Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF WORKS

Trafalgar Square (Starlings)

Mr. Hurd: asked the Minister of Works what action he is taking this winter to dislodge the starlings that roost round Trafalgar Square and foul the monuments and pavements.

The Minister of Works (Mr. Patrick Buchan-Hepburn): Experiments with a loudspeaker device are continuing. But even if these were successful, which I am bound to say is unlikely, the cost of a full installation would be very great. I am afraid I see no prospect at present of finding an effective method of dislodging the starlings which is both humane and economical.

Mr. Hurd: If my right hon. Friend does not see much hope of effective help from the scientists, would he consider calling in aid the sparrowhawk or the owl?

Mr. Buchan-Hepburn: I do not think I could control the sparrowhawk or the owl, and if it were a stuffed one I think the starlings would get used to it quite soon.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Could not the Government persuade these birds to spend the winter in Port Said or Jamaica?

Office Building, Marylebone

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of Works what are the provisions made for the embellishment of the new district office building in Marylebone; whether by sculpture or murals; and whether any sculptors or painters have been approached.

Mr. Buchan-Hepburn: None as yet. The first stage of the building is not planned to start for about two years, and it will be at least six months before planning has proceeded far enough to enable me to make any decision on these questions.

Dr. Stross: May we take it that by that Answer the right hon. Gentleman asserts again that consultations with appropriate painters and sculptors take place when the time comes, and will he make a declaration to the House, as his predecessors have done, that there will always be consideration for the proper embellishment of all Government buildings in this way?

Mr. Buchan-Hepburn: While I am entirely in sympathy with the hon. Gentleman in appreciating the desirability of providing artistic embellishment for suitable buildings, I must, of course, have regard to the cost. I will consider the matter directly the plans have reached a suitable stage.

Sir A. Gomme-Duncan: Will my right hon. Friend take care that the sculpture does not consist entirely of Mongoloid women in an advanced state of elephantiasis?

Mr. Buchan-Hepburn: I will bear that point in mind.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH ARMY

Cyprus and Middle East

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for War what casualties have been suffered by National Service men from Aberdeen in Cyprus and the Middle East during 1956; and what was in each case the nature of the casualty.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. John Hare): Two National Service soldiers, whose next-of-kin live in Aberdeen, have died. Three have been injured during operations against terrorists in Cyprus this year. One of these suffered head injuries and the rest sustained burns in the forest fire of last June. Elsewhere in the Middle East no National Service men from Aberdeen were casualties.

Mr. Hughes: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what are the injuries of these gallant men, where they are now and how many of them have been sent home?

Mr. Hare: I will certainly let the hon. and learned Gentleman have those details if he so desires.

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for War how many Scottish soldiers and National Service men are now serving in Cyprus and the Middle East; and if he will state where they are.

Mr. Hare: This information is not readily available.

Mr. Hughes: What is the youngest age at which National Service men are sent abroad, and how long are they expected to serve in a theatre of war?

Mr. Speaker: That seems quite a different question.

Mr. Remnant: asked the Secretary of State for War how long a soldier is required to serve in Cyprus before being allowed leave outside that island.

Mr. Hare: I assume that my hon. Friend refers to the scheme by which married Regular soldiers, whose families have had to remain in this country because of the emergency in Cyprus, may be allowed free travel to the United Kingdom. Among other conditions, they must have been overseas apart from their families for at least nine months.

Mr. Remnant: Can my right hon. Friend deny that a soldier who went to Cyprus at the beginning of October has been told he can come home for Christmas leave if he pays his own fare? Will my right hon. Friend examine that case, because it seems quite wrong that a man's leave should depend on his parents' ability to pay his fare?

Mr. Hare: Naturally, I will look at the case if my hon. Friend will send the details of it to me, but, of course, this is a privilege which applies only to married men. It does not apply to single men. That may be the answer to my hon. Friend's question.

Mr. Hastings: Is it correct that soldiers in Cyprus who have fulfilled all the conditions and are granted Christmas leave are asked to pay £57 for the cost of transport to England and back again?

Mr. Hare: The situation is this. The normal rule for men serving overseas is that they should take their leave locally. Exceptions are the married soldiers, as I

have just told the House. Naturally, there are also the compassionate cases, for whom a payment of passage is given. For the unmarried soldiers the normal thing is that they should have their leave within Cyprus, for which special facilities are given. In cases where men are prepared to pay a reduced fare home, they may, with the permission of their commanding officer, do so.

Mr. J. Griffiths: Will the right hon. Gentleman not look at this matter again? I think hon. Members on both sides of the House would regard it as frightfully mean that young men who are asked to serve in Cyprus should be asked to pay their own fares home. Will the right hon. Gentleman not look at the matter again in order to meet what is, I am sure, the desire of the whole House?

Mr. Hare: We must be fair. This is a concession on the general rule which applies to overseas stations. I will certainly look at what the right hon. Gentleman has said, but I think the answer is probably going to be in the negative.

Reservists

Mr. Brockway: asked the Secretary of State for War how many reservists recalled for service in the Middle East failed to report for duty when required on the termination of their leaves; how many men were involved in protests against their retention in Cyprus or conditions there; how many in each category have been charged; of these, how many were acquitted; and what punishments were awarded to those found guilty.

Mr. Hare: I assume that the hon. Member refers to the 638 reservists who failed to embark on the "Asturias" to return to Germany at the end of their leave. Many of these had been granted extended leave; 32 were apprehended as absentees, and the remainder rejoined their units after only a short absence. I know of 116 cases in which disciplinary action has been taken. Seventy-one of the men concerned were admonished and the remainder received punishments ranging from three days' confinement to barracks to 28 days' detention. This information may not be complete as some of the units concerned are now in transit.
I assume that the second half of the hon. Member's Question refers to a


demonstration which occurred at Headquarters Field Records Cyprus. Disciplinary action was taken against 23 noncommissioned officers and men; 16 of these were dealt with summarily by their commanding officer, 12 being acquitted and the remainder receiving minor punishments. Seven men were tried by general court-martial on 12th November. Six of them were found guilty of joining in the mutiny and one of disobeying a lawful command. Sentences range from reduction to the ranks and 12 months' detention to 14 days' detention.

Mr. Brockway: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that very full reply, may I ask him, in view of the sense of frustration from which these men suffer—often kicking their heels and being in idleness for weeks—and the ultimate repudiation of military action by the United Nations, whether he will not reprieve these punishments altogether?

Mr. Hare: I do not think that is a helpful supplementary question. We really must not exaggerate these things. I admit that a number of these men were standing by with all their transport and with their equipment packed up and that they were not as fully employed as we should have liked them to have been, but as soon as news of the worsening international situation broke they hurried to their units. That is a fact which, I think, demonstrates that, basically, there was nothing wrong with their morale.

Mr. Strachey: While it is quite impossible to condone the action of those men, would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that the numerous character of these incidents, almost unparalleled in Army history, shows the very repugnant nature of the military tasks the Government were asking these men to perform?

Mr. Hare: The right hon. Gentleman has got hold of the wrong end of the stick. I have pointed out that, as soon as news of the worsening international situation broke, these men hurried back to their units.

Mr. Dudley Williams: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that most of this conduct has been caused by the encouragement given to such individuals by Left-wing opinion in this country?

Mr. Hare: No, I think the House really should keep this in proportion. I think my answer is a fair one, and I believe it to be the truth.

Mr. Stokes: Does not the right hon. Gentleman's previous answer prove conclusively what I suggested to him last week, namely, that if he were to allow all the reservists to go, they would come back on call, whether by wireless or by telegram and that, therefore, there is no reason why he should retain any more of the reservists in this country at the present time?

Mr. Hare: I am answering later a number of Questions on the Paper about the reservists.

Mr. Stokes: Will they be the right answers?

Mr. Wigg: asked the Secretary of State for War if he will state the terminal gratuities and periods of leave which will be granted to Army reservists on release from the Colours; whether they will be related to the differing condition of service and reserve pay and gratuities of Class A and reservists designated for service in Class A, Class B, Army Reserve, Category I A, I B, II B, and II A of the Army Emergency Reserve, respectively; whether, as the timing of release is related to the exigencies of the service, he will consider special cases of personal and business hardship; and whether he will introduce legislation to remove the anomalies revealed in the workings of the Army Reserve Act, 1950, and the Auxiliary and Reserve Forces Act, 1949.

Mr. Hare: The scales of leave to be granted were given by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence in a Written Answer to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Nottingham, Central (Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux) on 20th November. No arrangements have been made to pay terminal gratuities. We are releasing all reservists who are no longer required as quickly as possible and regardless of their occupation. Applications by others for release on compassionate grounds or because of exceptional business hardship will be considered in the normal way. The composition of the Army Reserve will be reviewed in the light of experience in the present emergency.

Mr. Wigg: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it has always been the practice when the Reserve has been mobilised to pay gratuities of some kind, and that in this case the Government were caught up in an imperfect mobilisation scheme, so that there was bound to be hardship? Ought not gratuities, therefore, to be paid which would take into account the fact that men were called up who received no Reserve pay, a fact which is bound to cause a great deal of heart-burning? Surely, the right hon. Gentleman must now admit that the unrest which has existed amongst reservists springs fundamentally from the fact that the mobilisation scheme of the Government just did not work, and that they called up far too many men.

Mr. Hare: I cannot accept the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary. I think the leave and pay arrangements which we are making are generous, and I think there is not a case for the gratuity for which the hon. Gentleman asks. I can assure him that we are getting on with the job of releasing reservists as quickly as we can.

Mr. Allaun: asked the Secretary of State for War if he will pay former National Service men recalled for the Suez war, who had not volunteered for the Reserve, the sum they would have been entitled to had they been on the Reserve since completing their National Service.

Mr. Hare: I am not sure what the hon. Member means, as all the men recalled were on the Army Reserve. It is a fact that some reservists receive more than others during their Reserve service, but these amounts are related to their greater liability for training and to recall.

Mr. Allaun: Is it not utterly unfair that thousands of former National Service men who did not volunteer for the Reserve, many of them now with young families, should have suffered the same liability to recall as men who did volunteer? Will the Minister consider paying these men, as very partial compensation, the £27 a year minimum which they would have received as members of the Regular Reserve?

Mr. Hare: As the House knows, these bounties are related to the reservist's training liability and his liability to recall in

an emergency without a proclamation. The National Service reservists in category II of the Army Emergency Reserve have a lesser liability, and the fact that it was necessary to recall some of them for the present emergency does not alter that. As to the other part of the hon. Member's supplementary question, I am prepared to consider whether any change in the future is desirable.

Mr. Strachey: Do not these anomalies, which are undoubted in the scheme which the War Office has instituted in this recall, not call for a review of the arrangements for recall to service, of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke just now?

Mr. Hare: I have just said that I am prepared to look at this matter. The reason is obvious. Some men are more liable to recall than others and, because of that, they are paid a higher bounty.

Mr. Wigg: Will not the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to look with care at the different categories recalled? Will he not realise that a man in category IIa of the Army Emergency Reserve has a tremendous grievance against the Government for not giving him some compensation for calling him without notice?

Mr. Hare: I am prepared to look at this matter, but for the future and not for the past.

Mr. Allaun: asked the Secretary of State for War if he is now in a position to give further details about the demobilisation of reservists recalled for the Suez war and of other men retained beyond their normal period of service.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will make a further statement on the release of reservists.

Mr. Hare: I have nothing to add to my statement of last Tuesday, except to confirm that the process of release has already started.

Mr. Allaun: Is the Minister aware of the widespread discontent among these men, particularly National Service men, who have now been away from their homes and their jobs for four months? What is to prevent the right hon. Gentleman from getting all these men, whether they are in Britain, Germany, Cyprus or Suez, home and demobilised in time for Christmas?

Mr. Hare: I have already explained the position of the Government on this matter. I did so to the House last week. I have nothing very much to add, except that I re-emphasise that we must have sufficient reservists and retained Regulars to enable us to meet our military commitments. Our policy is to release those no longer necessary because of the way this emergency has developed. I assure the hon. Member that we made a punctual start on Thursday and that the process is going well.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Have the Government any planned system of priorities for release, apart from individual application on compassionate grounds? Have they any regard to age, length of service, medical category and that sort of thing, or is it a pure fluke whether a man gets released now or next year?

Mr. Hare: The hon. and gallant Gentleman must realise that I had a choice of waiting and working out a complicated list of priorities or getting on with the job of releasing them. I took the latter view, and we are releasing men who are not needed. I assure the House that the estimate of 6,000 men released within six weeks will be honoured. In fact, I pitched my estimate low, but at this stage, because I do not want to create disappointment, I am not prepared to go further.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Will my right hon. Friend have full regard to the psychological effect of giving details about releasing men at a time when the main issue is still hanging in the balance?

Mr. Hare: I hope my noble Friend will agree that I have been careful to say that I do not wish to create disappointment.

Mr. Stokes: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer my question which he would not answer earlier? He said in reply to another Question that people who had failed to return from leave returned immediately they realised how serious was the situation. Would the right hon. Gentleman, therefore, not agree that he can quite easily release people—and there are 14,000 of them at present serving in this country—on the understanding, which they have already recognised, that they must come cack speedily if wanted?

Mr. Hare: The right hon. Gentleman may be assured that I shall not keep them in unnecessarily, and I am getting on with what I call a fair and rapid scheme of demobilisation. I am not prepared to go any further at the moment

Mr. J. Griffiths: Does the right hon. Gentleman's reply to the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) mean that the Government are still prepared to go on defying the United Nations?

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Barons Cross Camp, Leominster

Mr. Baldwin: asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is yet able to release Barons Cross Camp, Leominster, which is being used on few occasions and which is occupying land suitable for the extension of Leominster Urban District Council house building.

Mr. Hare: No, Sir, there is a continuing need for this land.

Mr. Baldwin: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this camp of 34 acres, which is serviced with roads, sewerage and light, is very suitable for extending building accommodation which the local authority wants, and is also an attractive site for industry? Is my right hon. Friend aware that, no matter what his information may be to the contrary, this camp is one which is redundant in the opinion of the local people? Will he send someone down to have a local inquiry to see whether the loss of this land to the local authority by his retention of it may be avoided?

Mr. Hare: As I think my hon. Friend knows, this camp has a dual purpose. In peace-time it is not, I admit, fully occupied but, as my hon. Friend knows, this land is required should an emergency ever arise, and it is for that reason we find it difficult to adopt the suggestion my hon. Friend has made. I have not had any applications for the use of this land for houses. I have had applications for its use for industrial purposes and for its use for a highway depot, but there has been no application to me, apart from what my hon. Friend has just said, for this land to be used for housing.

St. George's School, Hong Kong

Mr. M. Stewart: asked the Secretary of State for War what firm of contractors built the St. George's Army School, Hong Kong, which was completed in April, 1955; and what repairs are now required to the school.

Mr. Hare: The main contractors were Messrs. Lap Hing and Company. As a result of investigations into this and other contracts they were suspended last July from tendering for further War Department work. The repairs which have been carried out to St. George's School and are pending are not large and will not cost in total more than a few hundred pounds. In addition, some concrete paving which has been discovered to be below specification will probably need replacement prematurely.

Mr. Stewart: While thanking the right hon. Government for that reply, may I further ask him whether the cracks in the walls of this school, which let in the rain, will shortly be repaired?

Mr. Hare: Yes, we have made a thorough check of the school, and I think they would be included in the minor repairs which are necessary.

Egypt (Cease-fire Agreement)

Mr. E. Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for War on how many occasions the Egyptian forces have broken the cease-fire agreement since it came into force.

Mr. Hare: There have been three clear breaches of the cease-fire agreement.

Mr. Johnson: Does not that show that the word of the Egyptian Government is absolutely valueless? What does my right hon. Friend propose to do about those breaches of the cease-fire agreement?

Mr. Hare: All these cases have been reported in the Press. There were three occasions on which the Egyptians fired on allied forward troops. In one case the fire was not returned. In the others minimum firing was used for self-defence. These masters were reported immediately to the United Nations.

Mr. Fernyhough: What were the casualties on either side through these breaches of the truce?

Mr. Hare: There were no casualties on our side, and as far as I know there was none on the other.

Officers (Retirements)

Mr. Hayman: asked the Secretary of State for War how many officers have been permitted to retire voluntarily before completing their full period on the active list in each of the last five years, to the latest convenient date.

Mr. Hare: The figures for each of the years 1952 to 1955 are 646, 531, 594 and 746. That for the first ten months of 1956 was 505.

Mr. Hayman: Why must men below the rank of officer purchase their discharges while officers are given them voluntarily?

Mr. Hare: The quick answer is that officers are not permitted to resign in the early years of their service and, as long as there is no emergency, other ranks are permitted to do so.

Mr. P. Williams: Will my right hon. Friend place no barriers in the way of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. S. N. Evans) completing their national service?

Overseas Allowance, Germany

Mr. Fernyhough: asked the Secretary of State for War if he will give details of the overseas allowance paid to officers and other ranks stationed in Germany.

Mr. Hare: As the answer to this Question is a table of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Fernyhough: Are the allowances similar to those applied to Air Force personnel stationed in Germany?

Mr. Hare: Yes, Sir. They are very similar.

Mr. Fernyhough: In that case, how is it that a married corporal, or anyone below the rank of corporal, having his family with him overseas is allowed only 1s. 6d.? Why is there this substantial


differentiation between corporals and other ranks and those above them?

Mr. Hare: The point the hon. Member is getting at is that the sergeant is paid more than the corporal. It is my view and that of my Service colleagues that sergeants should be able to maintain a higher standard of living, not only for

DAILY RATES OF LOCAL OVERSEAS ALLOWANCE PAYABLE IN THE BRITISH FORCES AREA OF GERMANY


—
Single
Married Accompanied
Married Unaccompanied





s.
d.
s.
d.


General
…
Nil
9
3
6
6


Brigadier
…
Nil
8
6
6
4


Colonel/Lieutenant-Colonel
…
Nil
7
9
6
2


Major/Captain/Subaltern
…
Nil
7
0
6
0


Warrant Officer Class I
…
Nil
6
0
2
10


Warrant Officer Class Il/Staff Sergeant
…
Nil
5
8
2
8


Sergeant
…
Nil
5
4
2
6


Corporal and below
…
Nil
1
6
1
6

Private K. Mason (Punishment)

Dr. Stross: asked the Secretary of State for War whether he will order that the punishment awarded to Private K. Mason, of the 1st Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, for having his hands in his pockets and standing bareheaded whilst attending an open-air fete, be expunged from his records.

Mr. Hare: No, Sir. As my hon. Friend explained to the hon. Member in his letter of 20th November, this punishment was not irregular, and I think that such minor disciplinary cases are best dealt with by commanding officers.

Dr. Stross: Does not the Minister accept that this is a very unusual case? Is it not true that there are recruiting posters asking men to join the Services, depicting men without their hats on and in uniform with the caption, "This is the life "? Does the right hon. Gentleman not really think that, in view of the fact that if schoolboys were to sneak on their fellow-schoolboys in this way they would be sent to Coventry, it is time that we stopped this sort of thing altogether?

Mr. Hare: I know that everyone has his own opinion on this matter, but I think everyone agrees that soldiers off duty must maintain a reasonable standard of deportment and discipline. Also, it is extremely difficult to draw the line between this kind of case and that of the

themselves but for their families, than Service men of other ranks.

Mr. Fernyhough: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Following is the table:

soldier who is obviously shabbily dressed, slopping about, and doing no credit either to himself or to the Army.

Court-martial Conviction (Review)

Mr. Marlowe: asked the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to the observations of the Lord Chief Justice on 19th November on the hearing of the appeal of Private R. F. Renn, Portslade, against his conviction for murder by court-martial; and what action he is taking, having regard to the views expressed by the Lord Chief Justice to the effect that had he been tried by a civil court Private Renn might not have been found guilty of murder.

Mr. Hare: The Army Council have reviewed the proceedings of the court-martial held on Richard Frederick Renn at Herford in Germany on 10th May, 1956, and have taken into consideration the observations of the Courts-Martial (Appeal) Court on 19th November when the appeal against conviction was dismissed. The Council has decided that the sentence of ten years' imprisonment which this soldier is now serving shall be reduced to a sentence of two years' imprisonment. This reduction of sentence has been promulgated.

Mr. Marlowe: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the observations of the Lord Chief Justice, and the sense of urgency


in his representations to the War Office, indicated his view that this soldier ought to be released at once? Will my right hon. Friend have the sentence of two years, to which it is now reduced, reviewed again?

Mr. Hare: I am sorry, but my hon. and learned Friend has absolutely the wrong end of the stick. The Lord Chief Justice, who was President of the Court, did not indicate anything of the kind, and I would ask my hon. and learned Friend to read carefully his report before making that kind of allegation.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND COMMERCE

Cinemas (Closure)

Mr. Swingler: asked the President of the Board of Trade what representations he has received from organisations in the cinema trade and film industry about the closure of cinemas in the current year; and what reply he has made to such representations.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. F. J. Erroll): When the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association made representations about the Government's policy towards the film production industry, which my right hon. Friend announced in the House on 2nd August, they mentioned the number of cinemas which had been closed this year as evidence of the difficulties in which exhibitors find themselves. Their representations have been noted.

Mr. Swingler: Is anything being done about this? Is this serious situation not spreading bankruptcy, especially amongst the small men in the cinema trade, and is it not a fact that the closure of a further 100 cinemas is pending at this moment? Is not the Department of the hon. Gentleman going to do anything about this?

Mr. Erroll: The position is being carefully watched.

Mr. Rankin: Is the Minister aware that these cinemas have closed because of the present high level of cinema taxation, and does he think that he will help other cinemas to keep open by adding another tax, as he proposes to do in his scheme?

Mr. Erroll: The level of Entertainments Duty is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As regards the proposed levy, I ask the hon. Gentleman to await the publication of the Bill which is to be introduced shortly.

Western Europe (Duty-Free Imports)

Mr. Ridsdale: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, with a view to furthering the ends of a common market, he will allow individuals to import up to, say, £100 worth of merchandise duty-free from the Continent.

Mr. Erroll: No, Sir.

Mr. Ridsdale: Is it not a fact that our import restrictions for individuals are more extensive than those of any other country in the world, and could my hon. Friend see that something is done as soon as possible on this account, as it would be a great help to people, especially to those living on fixed incomes?

Mr. Erroll: I have considered the suggestion of my hon. Friend, but I can assure him that a number of practical difficulties would prevent its adoption.

Olympic Games Films

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the President of the Board of Trade what representations he has received from the Film Selection Committee about the exhibition of films showing the Olympic Games; and what action he has taken under Section 5 of the Cinematograph Films Act, 1948.

Mr. Erroll: No application under subsection (2) of Section 5 of the Cinematograph Films Act, 1948, has so far been made to the Board of Trade in respect of any such film, and indeed it could not effectively be made until the film had been completed and registered as a British film. There has, therefore, been no reference to the Film Selection Committee and no recommendation from them.

Mr. Jeger: But is the hon. Gentleman not aware that it has already been announced that a film of the Olympic Games will be shown only in very small extracts of not more than three minutes in newsreels or in stills, and that the


major film circuits have boycotted the long film which is now being made whilst the Games are being played? Is not that a scandalous abuse of their monopoly powers, and will not the President of the Board of Trade compel them, with the powers that he has, to show this important film in Britain?

Mr. Erroll: I should make it clear that nothing can be done until the film is in this country and registered as a British film. In any case, it should not be assumed that the United Kingdom exhibitors will refuse to show films that are made of the Olympic Games.

Mr. Bottomley: Is this not a matter that calls for further consideration? In view of the fact that the Games are being held in a British Commonwealth country and that the Duke of Edinburgh opened them, ought there not to be the maximum publicity in the Commonwealth and in the rest of the world? The Government really ought to give it more serious attention.

Mr. Erroll: Very serious attention has been given to the matter, but nothing can be done under this Section until the film is in this country and registered as a British film.

Fruit and Tobacco (Dollar Purchases)

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the need to conserve our dollar resources for essential requirements, he will suspend further licences for dollar expenditure on items such as fruit and canned fruit which can be replaced from Commonwealth sterling sources.

Mr. Erroll: No, Sir. Imports of fruit from the dollar area are severely restricted already. In any event, most of the licences already issued and to be issued cover fruit from the United States under Aid Programmes, and these imports do not cost us dollars.

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: Is my hon. Friend aware that, quite apart from the Mutual Security Aid allocations to which he has referred, and since my Question referred to those items needing dollar expenditure, in the current season alone we are spending 1£¼ million on soft fruit which could easily be replaced from Commonwealth sources?

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. F. Harris: Is the Minister aware that there is very strong feeling indeed on this matter, particularly as we in the sterling area get no corresponding trade for canned goods going back into the dollar countries?

An Hon. Member: Or anything else.

Mr. Erroll: In answer to both my hon. Friends, it is important to remember that we do not wish to pursue a policy of further discrimination in the realm of trade.

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he is taking to promote the substitution of Commonwealth-grown tobacco for tobacco of dollar origin in view of the need to conserve dollar resources for essential purposes.

Mr. Erroll: United Kingdom tobacco manufacturers are restricted as to the proportion of dollar tobacco which they may include in cigarettes made for the home market. This proportion is at present 61 per cent., part of which is supplied by Canada.

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: Is my hon. Friend aware that there will be a surplus of Rhodesian tobacco, or there could be a surplus, available next year if Her Majesty's Government would limit the percentage of dollar-grown tobacco by a very slightly increased amount?

Mr. Erroll: Our information is that United Kingdom cigarette manufacturers are taking up all the Rhodesian leaf that they conveniently can.

Mr. Jay: But will not the Parliamentary Secretary take more seriously the excellent advice that comes from behind him? As the Labour Government successfully raised the proportion of Rhodesian tobacco by a large margin and saved a lot of dollars, why cannot the present Government do the same?

Mr. Erroll: Because the present very high proportion of Commonwealth leaf is about as much as United Kingdom manufacturers can usefully take.

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: On a point of order. In view of the very unsatisfactory replies to both those Questions, I beg to give notice that I shall raise this matter on the Adjournment.

Mr. Snow: Further to that point of order. Is the Minister aware that we shall be very pleased to help his hon. Friend in this matter?

Waste Paper and Cardboard

Mr. Sorensen: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware of difficulties experienced by local authorities in respect of the disposal of their waste paper and cardboard; what action has been taken, in collaboration with the Waste Paper Recovery Association, to ensure useful disposal of surplus paper; and whether consideration has been given to the possibility of securing overseas markets for the waste.

Mr. Erroll: I am aware that local authorities who collect this valuable indigenous material have recently been asked by the Waste Paper Co-ordinating Committee to reduce their deliveries to the mills by at least 10 per cent. for a period of six months. This is necessary because the amount collected and delivered is temporarily in excess of the present capacity of the mills and it is imperative to reduce stocks. I am glad to say that exports of waste paper are increasing. The overseas demand, however, is for good quality waste and the present large stocks are mainly of un-sorted, mixed waste.

Mr. Sorensen: Could not steps be taken to see whether more of this waste paper could be taken from local authorities, since they do not want to clog themselves with an unnecessary surplus of waste paper?

Mr. Erroll: One problem is that waste paper does not keep very well in stock and it is imperative not to accumulate excessive stocks at the mills.

Mr. Bottomley: If good quality waste paper is wanted for export, why not destroy the waste paper not required in order to collect good quality papers which can earn us foreign currency?

Mr. Erroll: I will certainly consider that suggestion.

Mr. Sorensen: Could the Minister say anything about the waste paper collected by private individuals? They, too, are finding it difficult to get rid of it.

Mr. Erroll: I will look into that as well.

Synthetic Rubber

Mr. Sorensen: asked the President of the Board of Trade what further developments have taken place this year in this country in the commercial production of synthetic rubber; what quantity is now on the market; and what is the estimated production during 1957.

Mr. Erroll: Production of synthetic rubber on a commercial scale has not yet begun, but two special purpose synthetic rubber plants with a total capacity of 14,000 tons a year are expected to be in commercial production early next year and a third such plant in the summer of 1957. Production of general purpose synthetic rubber is expected in 1958.

Mr. Sorensen: Is the Minister aware that last year I was informed that the plant was about to be in operation? What has happened meanwhile? Has it been found that the plant is not suitable, or what is the position?

Mr. Erroll: I understand that it is a very complicated plant to bring into operation. It is essentially a matter for the operators themselves to bring it in.

Mr. Gordon Walker: Will the Minister tell us how the price of this synthetic rubber compares with that of the raw rubber which we get from Commonwealth countries?

Mr. Erroll: No. I could not without notice.

Mr. Awbery: asked the President of the Board of Trade what effect the imports and manufactures in Great Britain of synthetic rubber are having upon our trade in natural rubber with Malaya.

Mr. Erroll: Imports of natural rubber are not affected by synthetic rubber production in this country, which has not yet begun on a commercial scale. It is not expected that Malayan exports of natural rubber will be adversely affected by consumption of synthetic in this country because world demand for natural rubber is sufficient to absorb total supplies. Retained imports of natural rubber into the United Kingdom rose steadily in the years 1953 to 1955 in spite of a sharp rise in imports of synthetic rubber. Retained imports of natural


rubber have fallen this year mainly as a result of the recession in the car industry.

Mr. Awbery: Since there is likely in the near future to be an increase in the production of synthetic rubber which will have an effect on our imports and will naturally affect the economic position in Malaya, will the Minister give an undertaking that when the increase in production arises, the damage to Malaya will fall gradually instead of in one dose?

Mr. Erroll: It does not follow that the production of synthetic rubber will damage the exports from Malaya. Indeed, synthetic rubber has been imported into this country without causing any damage so far.

Steel Industry (Fuel Oil)

Mr. Palmer: asked the President of the Board of Trade, in view of the fact that it is the largest single industrial consumer, what special steps he is taking to ensure that the steel industry receives supplies of fuel oil adequate to maintain output and avoid possible unemployment.

Mr. Erroll: Arrangements are being made for the steel industry to obtain additional supplies of creosote pitch to make up for the 10 per cent. reduction in their supplies of fuel oil. It is expected that by this means output can be maintained and unemployment avoided.

Mr. Palmer: Is the Minister aware that this is a question of particular concern to those who represent steel-making constituencies? Will he give the House an assurance that his right hon. Friend will watch the position of which we speak rather more closely than usual?

Mr. Erroll: My right hon. Friend will certainly watch the position for the future, but it should be made plain that the supply of creosote pitch should make good entirely the cut in fuel oil.

Census of Distribution (Self-Service Trading)

Mr. Oram: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in the 1958 Census of Distribution, information will be obtained about the development of self-service trading.

Mr. Erroll: No, Sir. My right hon. Friend, after consulting his Advisory

Committee, thinks that the questions to be asked in the Census should, for reasons of economy and to save traders time and trouble, be limited to the essential minimum,

Mr. Oram: Does not the Minister appreciate that the self-service shop is one of the most encouraging developments in recent years from the point of view of reducing the cost of living? Ought it not, therefore, to be very desirable to get as much information about them as possible and disseminate it amongst those engaged in distribution?

Mr. Erroll: I have a good deal of sympathy with that point of view, but the fact is that the census is only a sample survey covering about 1 in 10 of the smaller independent traders. It might therefore give a very distorted impression if we examined self-service trading which is largely in the hands of the larger traders.

Insured Workers (Regional Distribution)

Mr. Lawson: asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he proposes taking to rectify the wide differences between the regions of which he has been informed as regards the rate of increase in numbers of insured workers.

Mr. Erroll: My right hon. Friend will continue to do what he can to secure a balanced distribution of industry, but the number of jobs available in manufacturing industry is only one of a number of factors which affect the rate of increase in the number of insured workers in a region.

Mr. Lawson: In view of the fact that the rate of increase varies between the regions by as much as fourteen times and that it is clearly shown that Scotland and Wales are suffering very badly and losing their industrial population, will not the Parliamentary Secretary ask his right hon. Friend to review the advance factory building policy?

Mr. Erroll: My right hon. Friend, of course, can influence factory building only by means of the grant of industrial development certificates. He possesses no powers of direction either of factories or of labour.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL FINANCE

Dollar Securities (Sales)

Mr. H. Wilson: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will state the net sales of Government-held dollar securities in the past 12 months and the past four months, respectively.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Harold Macmillan): In the twelve months ending 22nd November, 1956, sales were made in the London market amounting to £12 million. For the four months ending on the same date, the figure was £5·4 million.

Protective Customs Duties (Revenue)

Mr. Bottomley: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what proportion of the revenue in percentage and value is raised by tariffs of one kind or another.

Mr. H. Macmillan: I assume that the right hon. Gentleman is referring to protective Customs duties. The yield in the financial year 1955–56 from these duties was of the order of £90 million, representing just under 2 per cent. of the total net receipts from taxes.

Petrol and Oil Rationing (Revenue Losses)

Mr. Hamilton: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what will be the estimated loss to the revenue in the current financial year and in a full year, respectively, consequent on the rationing of petrol and oils.

Mr. H. Macmillan: The loss of revenue will, of course, depend on the length of time for which rationing has to be maintained. It is estimated that it will amount to about £6 million a month.

Mr. Hamilton: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House how he proposes to recoup his losses in this direction? Further, can he give us any assurance that there will not be further additional bills consequent on the Government's action in Suez? Can he further say whether this particular bill is in addition to that which he announced in the House about a fortnight ago?

Mr. Macmillan: I was asked about additional expenditure the other day. This is a question of loss of revenue, and I have given the figure.

Mr. H. Wilson: In view of this serious figure, plus the loss of revenue from the licensing of cars and Purchase Tax revenue on new cars—all this on top of the £50 million to which he referred the other day—does the Chancellor still maintain that the main structure of his Budget remains unaffected by the economic effects of the Suez crisis?

Mr. Macmillan: Broadly speaking. I expect that the Budget will produce a substantial surplus—slightly reduced, no doubt, but we cannot tell until the outturn—of the order which I estimated.

University Building Projects

Mr. Chetwynd: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will give details of the proposed increased expenditure on university building projects as it applies to each university, together with the estimated increase in the number of students.

Mr. H. Macmillan: The allocation of these sums by the University Grants Committee is not yet fully settled, and in so far as those for 1958 and 1959 are to be devoted to works costing under £50,000, will not be settled for some time. I hope, however, to make available shortly a list of the works estimated to cost over £50,000 which it is proposed to start during the years 1957, 1958 and 1959.
The buildings themselves vary greatly in kind, and range from libraries, laboratories, and other buildings for teaching and research, to halls of residence and students' amenities. It is not, therefore, practicable to relate each project to a specific increase in the number of students in the university in question.

Mr. Chetwynd: Will the Chancellor see that as far as possible there is an equitable distribution between all the universities, and that the bulk of this money does not go to the older universities, which are not necessarily the most needy or the most significant?

Mr. Macmillan: I think we can rely on the admirable advice we get from this Committee and from our other advisers to see that the object of the whole purpose is both to be equitable and to serve the real needs of the nation.

Oil Supplies (Dollar Purchases)

Mr. Moss: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will estimate the additional dollar expenditure required through loss of oil supplies from the Middle East.

Mr. H. Macmillan: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply that I gave to the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Lewis) on 20th November.

Oral Answers to Questions — LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Caravan Sites

Mr. Remnant: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he has completed his consultations with local authorities in regard to caravan sites; and what conclusions were arrived at.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. Enoch Powell): Not yet.

Mr. Remnant: Will my hon. Friend invite local authorities to suspend notices of closure, which may become operative while the discussions are continuing, until after the discussions have been concluded?

Mr. Powell: Local authorities will, no doubt, bear in mind that these discussions are taking place, but I do not think that any such general suggestion can be properly made.

Mr. K. Robinson: Is the hon. Member prepared for the steep rise in the demand for caravan sites which will inevitably follow the passing of the Rent Bill?

Private Street Works, Newcastle-under-Lyme

Mr. Swingler: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what report he has received from his Department's engineering inspector who visited Newcastle-under-Lyme on 9th November to survey private streets; and if he will now give loan sanction for private street works in cases applied for by the borough council.

Mr. Powell: My right hon. Friend has considered the inspector's report and has decided to sanction a loan for the making up of the three streets in question.

Mr. Swingler: While thanking the hon. Member and his right hon. Friend for that reply, which will be welcomed by the Newcastle-under-Lyme Council, which will now be able to get on with the work, is he aware that this is only the first instalment of a very big programme and that it is hoped that the Minister will give the same generous consideration to the later instalments?

Mr. Powell: These are the three streets to which the local authority gave the highest priority.

Differential Rents Scheme, Penarth

Mr. Callaghan: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he is aware that the council house tenants of Penarth, Glamorgan, have voted against a differential rents scheme on a poll con ducted by the council by a majority of seven to one; and what policy is recommended in his circulars in such circum stances where the tenants express their preference for an alternative scheme.

Mr. Powell: My right hon. Friend is aware of the inquiry made by the council. It is for the local authority in each case to decide whether to introduce a differential rents scheme.

Mr. Callaghan: As this local authority has decided to ignore the result of its own poll, despite the overwhelming vote, is any remedy open to the tenants, except to turn out the council?

Mr. Powell: This is a matter rightly and entirely within the discretion of the local authority as a representative body.

Mr. McKay: Can the Parliamentary Secretary say whether a local authority has power to withdraw all subsidies from council houses and refuse rebates of rent on any houses, or give very small rebates to a minority, while using the balance for the reduction of rates?

Mr. Powell: Local housing authorities have power by law to make such reasonable charges for the tenancy or occupation of their houses as they may determine.

Housing Subsidies (Circular)

Mr. Royle: asked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will withdraw Circular No. 59/56, based


on Section 2 of the Housing Subsidies Act, 1956, with a view to easing the financial burden placed on local authorities.

Mr. Powell: This is a matter which will be for discussion on the draft Order under Section 2 laid before the House on 1st November.

Mr. Royle: I am aware of that. Is the hon. Member aware that I am giving him an opportunity of doing something before that Order is laid? Does he fully appreciate the aggravation which the Order has caused local authorities, especially those with very long waiting lists for houses? Will he try to dispel the general impression that the main ingredient of his right hon. Friend is cynicism?

Mr. Powell: Those are points which will no doubt be made and which will certainly be rebutted during the debate on the draft Order.

Oral Answers to Questions — EMPLOYMENT

Motor Car Workers, Dagenham (Short-time Working)

Mr. Parker: asked the Minister of Labour what information he has about short-time working at Ford's, Dagenham.

The Minister of Labour and National Service (Mr. Iain Macleod): I understand that this firm intends to introduce short-time working, but details have not yet been announced. Discussions on the matter are taking place between the firm and the unions concerned.

Mr. Parker: Can the right hon. Gentleman help by speeding up the release of ships for exporting cars?

Mr. Macleod: It is not a matter which comes directly within my province, but I will be glad to draw the attention of my right hon. Friends to the point.

Mr. Lagden: Is my right hon. Friend aware that talks between the staff and the company concerned took place early last week and that the unions will certainly be informed before any short-time work plan is put into operation?

Oral Answers to Questions — SCOTLAND

Fisheries Research Ship "Kathleen" (Accident)

Mr. Hector Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that, at the inquiry into the fatal accident on 5th October, 1955, in the Government Fisheries Research ship "Kathleen", of which details have been sent to him, it was stated that the ship was not suitable for the type of work she was doing and that steps are being taken to remedy this unsuitability by building a new research ship of different design; whether men are still working in this ship in the same dangerous conditions as Mr. Frost, the man who was killed; and what provisions are now being made for their safety.

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. James Stuart): No statement was made that the ship was unsuitable for the work that she was doing, and neither the sheriff nor the jury made any observations to that effect, or to the effect that conditions were dangerous. While greatly regretting this fatal accident, and sympathising with Mr. Frost's relatives. I do not think that the crew of the "Kathleen" faced any greater danger than other seamen. The system of working was in fact the same as that used on commercial fishing vessels; nevertheless a handrail and step have been fitted to assist the crew to step over the winch rope, and the posting of an additional man at the winch controls when seine net gear is being hauled has been authorised.

Mr. Hughes: Does not the insertion of that handrail to which the Secretary of State has just referred indicate that the ship was unsuitable in that respect for the work which Mr. Frost was obliged to do? Does the Secretary of State not realise that when he sends men to work in an unsuitable ship at the risk of their lives, he owes to them and their dependants the added duty of seeing that they do not suffer injury, or, as in this case, death?

Mr. Stuart: As I said, I sympathise most sincerely, but accidents do happen. As the sheriff said, nobody saw this accident and nobody knows how it occurred. The operation has been carried out hundreds of times.

Mr. Hughes: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I shall raise the matter in another way at the earliest opportunity.

Raigmore Hospital, Inverness

Mr. N. McLean: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is aware that the present system of treating outpatients at the Raigmore Hospital at Inverness sometimes causes unnecessary trouble to, and financial expenditure by, the out-patients; and whether he will review, and take steps to improve, this system.

Mr. J. Stuart: I am not aware of any general complaint about the out-patient services at Raigmore. All boards of management have recently been asked to undertake a review of their out-patient departments and reports are at present awaited.

Mr. McLean: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a number of complaints have been made about the system of treatment of out-patients at the Raigmore Hospital at Inverness during the last few years, and that a review of the system at present operating there would be very much in the interests of local people?

Mr. Stuart: I agree with my hon. Friend, but, of course, the regional hospital board wishes to avoid all unnecessary travelling and hardship, and that matter is now being considered.

Hospital Facilities, Skye

Mr. N. McLean: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether a decision has now been taken as to the site of the new hospital in the Isle of Skye; and when the work is expected to start.

Mr. J. Stuart: With our present resources I am afraid that there is no early prospect of a major hospital development in Skye, and, therefore, no final decision has been taken as to the site for it.

Mr. McLean: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the decision that no hospital will be built in the Isle of Skye in the near future will be deeply regretted by the people of Skye and in the neighbouring parts of the west coast of Scotland?

Mr. Stuart: As my hon. Friend doubtless knows, it has been decided in principle to centralise small hospitals, but I cannot now say when and where that will be done.

Oral Answers to Questions — EGYPT (UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE)

Mr. Pitman: asked the Prime Minister (1) what information he has concerning the allegiance, obedience, and command of the troops of the United Nations Force in Egypt: and whether he will agree to withdraw all British troops from Egypt only when assured that the Force will be organised in direct relationship only to the United Nations;
(2) what information he has concerning the status of the United Nations Force; to what extent they are situated in Egypt as potential combatants or only as observers; and whether he will withdraw all British troops only on condition that it is as potential combatants that such troops are stationed.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I have been asked to reply. The status of the United Nations Emergency Force is governed by various reports of the Secretary-General and Resolutions of the General Assembly. According to the Resolution of 5th November, the basic function of the Force is "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the 2nd of November, 1956."
The troops of the Force are under the command of Major-General Burns who was appointed the chief of the United Nations Command by the General Assembly's Resolution of 5th November. There is no question of these troops coming under any other command or having any direct relationship with anybody other than the United Nations.

Mr. Pitman: Does that mean that if, say, a Danish soldier under the command of General Burns were to do some damaging action, recourse would be by action against General Burns, the King of Denmark, or against the soldier?

Mr. Butler: This is a matter of intense complexity, and I would rather give my hon. Friend and the House a considered reply.

Mr. Usborne: While appreciating the temporary urgent use of this Emergency Force, would not the Lord Privy Seal agree that it would be a good idea if the United Nations could recruit a constabulary of its own on a permanent basis and directly recruited?

Mr. Butler: One of the results of Her Majesty's Government's action and policy has been that a United Nations Force has been established. With the evolution of time and the development of international law and the development of the United Nations itself, something on the lines of the hon. Member's suggestion might well emerge.

Mr. Gaitskell: Is it not a little strange that, instead of merely proposing in the United Nations that there should be such a force, Her Majesty's Government had first to invade another country?

Mr. Butler: If the right hon. Gentleman had read the excellent speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary to the English-Speaking Union, he would not be so back-wardly informed as to make an intervention of that sort.

Mr. Baldwin: When the Anglo-French forces are withdrawn from Egypt, will my right hon. Friend endeavour to transfer them to Hungary to stop the slaughter which is going on there and to keep the peace until the United Nations can make up its mind what it wants to do?

Mr. Dugdale: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that not only have we read the Foreign Secretary's speech but also the report of a speech made by the Minister of Education last night, in which he is stated to have laid down certain conditions about this Force which must be observed before Her Majesty's Government agree to the withdrawal of our troops? Is that the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and was that speech made with the right hon. Gentleman's approval?

Mr. Butler: I have had an opportunity of reading a full version of my right hon. Friend's speech, and it corresponds exactly with the statements I made in the House on Thursday of last week.

AGRICULTURE (LONG-TERM ASSURANCES)

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Derick Heathcoat Amory): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I would like to make a statement on long-term assurances for the agricultural industry.
The Government have now examined, in consultation with the farmers' unions, the problem of devising more effective long-term assurances of support. I am glad to say that agreed new arrangements have been worked out. The objective was to find a system of forward guarantees that would give more positive help to the industry in its forward planning. I believe that the new arrangements will achieve this purpose; and the farmers' unions share this belief.
The new arrangements, of which details are set out in a White Paper that is being published today, are as follow:
The Government will give additional assurance to the industry by means of two undertakings that will operate at annual reviews in future. The first will be an undertaking to maintain each year the total value of the guarantees—including production grants: at present about £1,150 million—at not less than 97½ per cent. of the total in the preceding year, plus or minus any cost increases or decreases that have occurred on review commodities since the last annual review. This represents a new and important development of the assurances stemming from the Agriculture Act.
Secondly, for the individual commodities, there will be an undertaking to maintain the guaranteed price for each commodity each year at not less than 96 per cent. of the guaranteed price for the previous year. This will give reassurance of continuing stability for the returns from each commodity. It will apply to crops as well as to livestock and livestock products. For livestock and live stock products there will also be a provision that in any period of three years reductions in the guaranteed price for a particular commodity will not together exceed 9 per cent.
Subject to these assurances, annual review determinations will continue on present lines so that account may be


taken every year of all the relevant factors affecting the economic condition of the industry, and adjustments to the guarantees made where necessary. Crop price guarantees will, however, be determined after each annual review for the immediately succeeding harvest, instead of for the harvest of the following year as hitherto, so as more rapidly to reflect changes in costs and other circumstances.
New arrangements to meet present-day conditions have been made regulating the circumstances in which special reviews will in future be held.
Last, but not least, as part of these comprehensive arrangements, the Government will introduce a major new scheme of grants for assisting the provision of permanent fixed equipment on farms and the making of long-term improvements to land. The details are being worked out in consultation with the landowners and farmers. The grants will be at the rate of 33⅓ per cent., and the additional cost to the Exchequer may amount to about £50 million over a 10-year period. The Government hope that this new provision will lead to more rapid modernisation on farms in all parts of the United Kingdom and so to greater working efficiency and lower production costs.
These new arrangements will strengthen Part I of the Agriculture Act and the Government will observe the new undertakings at the 1957 Annual Price Review. Legislation will be introduced as soon as practicable to give authority for the new scheme of grants for farm improvements and to amend the Agriculture Act where necessary.
The general long-term policy of the Government will continue to be to support and assist the industry to achieve maximum economic output. I am glad to say that these comprehensive new arrangements have been welcomed by the farmers' representatives as a sound and satisfactory basis for future confidence and the necessary forward planning in the industry.
I am placing in the Library of the House the text of the letters that have been exchanged between the Government and the farmers' unions regarding their agreement.

Mr. T. Williams: I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House will

welcome this statement, especially because there is something new in it. We shall, however, have to read it very carefully before we can finally pass judgment. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman two or three questions which might be helpful to the House. First, with regard to the fixed equipment grants, the right hon. Gentleman suggests in his statement that it will cost about £5 million per annum for the next ten years. Will that be a direct Treasury grant or, like other production grants, will it mean a small reduction in prices?
Secondly, the right hon. Gentleman said that current prices in any year cannot fall below 97½ per cent. of the prices paid last year. Would that amount to approximately £29 million? If prices did descend by 2½ per cent., would it amount to about £29 million?
Thirdly, the right hon. Gentleman said that the individual commodity price cannot fall more than 4 per cent. compared with last year. To illustrate what I mean I would point out that pig meat values last year were £165 million. Therefore, assuming that this new scheme is in operation this year, pig meat prices could not fall more than £6,600,000.

Mr. Amory: Yes, I think that the right hon. Gentleman is right. On the first point, these capital grants will certainly be additional to the guaranteed prices and the other production grants, and, therefore, will be a direct charge on the Exchequer.
I think that the right hon. Gentleman is also right about his second question. The position is that the margin which the Government have is 2½ per cent. on the aggregate total, plus or minus any price increase. If there were neither a price increase nor a price decrease the total margin would, as he said, be about £29 million, but against that there is to be set the annual gain in productivity to the industry which, in the past, we have calculated as being between £20 million and £30 million.
I think that the right hon. Gentleman is also right on his third point. The margin there will be 4 per cent. on the guaranteed price for each commodity.

Mr. Williams: Will the grant for fixed equipment largely be devoted to the very large number of small farms?

Mr. Amory: I very much hope—and I think that the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me, from his knowledge of the industry—that it will be of particular help to the small farmers. It will be paid to the landlord if there is a landlord and tenant but, by agreement between the landlord and tenant, it could be paid to the tenant, if he incurs the expenditure. It will be of very great help to the large number of small owner-occupiers, and is one of the reasons why I, personally, am particularly keen on this new farm improvement scheme.

Mr. Hurd: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on being able to induce the Treasury and the Cabinet to take a long view. Do we understand that it is the considered view of the Government that these longer-term assurances will now enable farmers to get ahead with the job of economic production and marketing without having to look over their shoulders so much, which will be to the benefit of the public generally?

Mr. Amory: Yes, Sir. I realise the very difficult time which farmers have been having because of the unusual and exceptionally difficult weather which we have experienced in the last year or two. I am confident that these new assurances will enable the farmers to go forward with renewed confidence and continue their really remarkable progress in increasing productivity.

Mr. Gooch: May I ask the Minister whether, when he is next considering capitalisation and long-term policy, he will, in addition to consulting landowners and farmers, also consult representatives of the workers?

Mr. Amory: I hope the hon. Gentleman knows that I am at all times anxious to keep in as close touch as possible with the representatives of the workers.

Captain Duncan: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether I am right in assuming that when I heard him talk about unions it included the Scottish union as well as the English union? That was not quite clear to me. May I ask, also, whether the fixed equipment grants will apply to reconstructed buildings as well as to new buildings?

Mr. Amory: The answer is, "Yes" in both cases. The unions cover England,

Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The grants will apply to every scheme of capital expenditure either for new buildings or major reconstructions, provided that the expenditure can be regarded as economic.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: On a point of order. The right hon. Gentleman has just mentioned Scotland, Sir. Are we to understand that he has now taken over responsibility for agriculture in Scotland? Are we not to get a statement from the Secretary of State for Scotland?

Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.

Mr. Grimond: May I ask whether the schemes contained in the long-term programme are in addition to existing schemes for marginal areas and the crofting counties? If that be so, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman, as representing the Secretary of State for Scotland, whether, in addition to consultation with landowners and farmers' unions, and so on, there will be consultation with those with special knowledge of small farms in the marginal areas and crofting districts and particularly the Crofter Commission?

Mr. Amory: These are additional to the grants at present made under the Hill Farming and Livestock Rearing Acts and to marginal producers under the marginal production schemes. I will convey the observations of the hon. Gentleman to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland.

Commander Agnew: May I ask whether the percentage diminution safeguard announced by my right hon. Friend for individual commodities will mean that the rolling average system for pigs, which has proved unsatisfactory to so many farmers, will now be superseded by something giving them a better assurance?

Mr. Amory: That is a separate question, but my hon. and gallant Friend will find in HANSARD an explanation of the new scheme we have instituted to replace the rolling average system. The new scheme will apply as from 25th March next.

Mr. Coldrick: Having regard to the constant criticism of members of the Government about granting subsidies to


consumers who do not need them, will the Minister, when granting subsidies to farmers, differentiate between those who need them and those who do not?

Mr. Amory: The important objective which we must keep before us is to ensure that the payment of these subsidies results in increased efficiency in the industry. in the interests of the whole nation.

Major Legge-Bourke: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether the improvements grant and capital equipment grant will be equally applicable to horticultural growers who require them for gas storage and refrigeration plant? May I ask also whether consideration was given during the discussions to the possibility of making the annual review retrospective rather than forward?

Mr. Amory: Capital grants will apply to items of equipment which are common to horticulture and the rest of agriculture. They will not apply to highly specialised equipment. Consideration was given to every conceivable aspect and alternative before we decided on the proposals which I have announced. In the result we came to the conclusion, for the reasons stated in the White Paper, that it was advisable, broadly speaking, to continue the present arrangements for the Annual Price Review.

Mr. Peart: May I ask the Minister whether he came to any conclusion about the aim of his policy? Is it the aim to increase production to a certain percentage over a five-year period, and with any specific emphasis on crop products?

Mr. Amory: Our general production policy is the one I gave in my statement. It remains to obtain the maximum economic production from the industry. We have mentioned the products that we believe should be expanded in the national interest in the White Papers issued after the last three Annual Price Reviews. We are anxious to see still further production of beef, mutton and lamb and further production of home-grown feeding stuffs in order to ease our balance of payments. Those are the factors to which we attach importance.

DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN OF WAYS AND MEANS

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I beg to move,
That Sir Gordon Touche be the Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.
The hon. Member whose appointment I now move for the office of Deputy-Chairman has been a Member of this House since 1931. He has been the Chairman of the Committee of Selection and since 1945 a member of the Chairman's Panel. He has presided over Standing Committees which have considered important Bills. This experience should stand him in good stead, and I therefore have pleasure in commending the appointment of the hon. Member to the House.
I should like just to say a word or two about the late Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris, until recently the Deputy-Chairman, whose death we all feel so keenly. He had many fine qualities which endeared him to us all. He was a man of great integrity, a kindly man, and he presided over our deliberations with tact and good humour.
Sir Rhys was a man of quiet personality. It has been said by one of his most intimate friends that, on leaving the Chair, he usually went to his own room, where he read and rested and did not meet us all outside as much as some other personalities. Nevertheless, we got to know him very well from the contact of his own personality through the Chair and with us personally. We got to know him by talking to him about our small affairs of business and we became grateful to him for the way in which he helped us all.
Sir Rhys's legal training was a help to him in unravelling the abstruse points of procedure which so frequently arise in this House. He had a varied career and was at one time a Metropolitan magistrate. He sat throughout his Parliamentary life for Welsh constituencies and was well respected and very popular in the Principality. We offer our sympathy to his relatives.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: On behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends, I wish to support the Motion that Sir Gordon Touche be Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means, and to extend to him our best wishes on attaining this office.


As the Lord Privy Seal has just said, his experience in this House, and particularly as a member of the Chairman's Panel, will be of great value to him in his new office. We feel confident that he will uphold the very high standards set by his predecessors.
I would add some words on behalf of this side of the House about the late Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris. We are all aware that the posts of Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means are extremely onerous. They involve long hours, constant attendance both in Committee and the whole House, when we sit as a Committee and when we sit as a House. They involve qualities such as tact, skill, knowledge of procedure, and, as the Lord Privy Seal has said, also a sense of humour.
Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris had these qualities in abundance. He was a quiet, modest man, extremely conscientious and essentially fair-minded. He always put the service of the House first. We extend to his relatives our deep sympathy, and pay our tribute to one who was universally respected and liked, and who was, above all things, a true servant of this House.

Mr. J. Grimond: I should like to say. on behalf of the Liberal Party, that we welcome Sir Gordon Touche, and regret very much the death of Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris. I would like to be associated with all that has been said about Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris by the Lord Privy Seal and by the Leader of the Opposition.
To us, as to many others in this House. Sir Rhys was peculiarly a friend. It is as that that we shall primarily miss him. He was also, to our small party, a counsellor and adviser who gave his advice without any thought at all of his own advancement. I think it will be agreed that his opinions flowed from firm principles, which he held regardless of their popularity and of political temptations to abandon or modify them. That was a drawback to him, from the point of view of politics, but I think that it lent him very great strength as a Member of the House and as a contributor to the affairs of the country. We, too, would like to send our sincere sympathy to his family.

Mr. David Grenfell: On this—to the majority of us here—sad occasion I ought to pay a meed of tribute to the late Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris, who was not only a political neighbour but an old friend and fellow-countryman. He was a man with whom I had been on excellent terms for the whole period of my service in this House.
Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris was a modest man. He was high-minded, and concealed a' large reserve of real ability beneath his kindly and simple-mannered conduct. On the morning on which he died he passed me as I sat in the Lobby. I thought he looked ill. He appeared to be almost staggering when I saw him coming. I realised that there was something out of the ordinary in his physical condition. He told me that he had been ill, but that he hoped to be able to go through the day. I did not speak to him afterwards. I feel deeply the loss of a neighbour who had been a friend to all of us here.
Sir Rhys was not a man who sought popularity, but he was truly popular. He was highly respected and I am very proud that it was so. I join in paying a tribute to one who was a faithful servant of the House, a modest Welshman who displayed his courage on more than one occasion, and who was always courteous.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That Sir Gordon Touche be the Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.

BILL PRESENTED

ELECTRICITY

Bill to provide for the dissolution of the Central Electricity Authority and the establishment of a Central Electricity Generating Board and an Electricity Council, and for the transfer of functions of the said Authority to that Board or Council or to the Minister of Fuel and Power; to make further provision as to other matters relating to the supply of electricity; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, presented by Mr. Aubrey Jones; supported by Mr. R. A. Butler, Mr. James Stuart, the Attorney-General, Mr. Henry Brooke, and Mr. Renton: read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Thursday and to be printed. [Bill 32.]

CHEQUES

Mr. Graham Page: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make amendments of the law relating to cheques and similar instruments; in respect of the endorsement thereof; to the discharge of obligations by cheque; to the recognition of cheques as receipts; to crossed and uncrossed cheques and the giving of value therefor; and to make consequent amendments of the law relating to the lights and duties of paying bankers, collecting bankers and bankers' customers towards each other.
The purpose of the Bill is to abolish the need for the endorsement of 97 out of every 100 cheques that are drawn. I had the privilege nearly two years ago of being granted leave to introduce a Bill for a similar purpose. That was in the previous Parliament. With the end of that Parliament the Bill came to an end, but in the meantime, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer had appointed a Committee to investigate the principles proposed in the Bill. The terms of reference of the Committee were:
To consider (a) whether, and if so in what circumstances and to what extent, it is desirable to reduce the need for the endorsement of order cheques and similar instruments received for collection by a bank.
That Committee reported earlier this month, and I would express my humble admiration and gratitude for its very interesting Report. No doubt hon. Members who are interested in this matter have read the Report and will agree with me. If I refer to only one or two items of the summary of that Report, it is only because my time is limited in moving this Motion and not because of any lack of appreciation of the most interesting Report. Paragraph 109 (iii) says:
Our assessment of the weight of work done in connection with endorsements is that a large amount of unproductive effort is expended in relation to the provisions of a Statute which was framed to meet conditions very different from today's. We think that if a way can be found to reduce present labours without involving corresponding disadvantages its adoption would be well worthwhile.
The unproductive effort referred to in that recommendation entails tens of millions of man-hours in unnecessarily endorsing cheques and therefore entails millions of pounds in wages and salaries paid to those who carry out that unnecessary endorsement.
The Report further recommends, in paragraph 109 (v):
We consider that a substantial saving of unproductive work would be achieved, and the present system would be appropriately adapted to modern conditions and needs, if it were arranged that endorsement was no longer necessary on a cheque being collected by a bank on behalf of a customer who was the payee. We recommend a change of the law to this effect, making it clear that the collecting banks should not suffer any loss of protection thereby.
If that recommendation is carried out it will still retain the valuable characteristics of a cheque that it can be negotiated by endorsement. In fact, only 3 per cent. of all cheques drawn are so negotiated. The other 97 per cent. are paid direct by the payee into the payee's bank. It is in connection with this 97 per cent. that I would desire, in this Bill, to abolish the need for endorsement.
Of course there would be a number of consequential amendments in respect of the relationship of bankers and customers which are set out fully in that Report. One particularly interesting consequential amendment which I desire to introduce into the Bill would be to make certain that a paid cheque is as good prima facie evidence of receipt as a formal receipt signed over a twopenny stamp.
I am in the unique position of being able at this very early stage in the process of a Private Member's Bill to refer hon. Members to the actual text of the Bill which I desire to present, for that text is set out in the Appendix to the Report to which I have referred. I am sure that a Private Member is seldom so well served in the drafting of his Bill. There are only two additions which I should desire to make to that draft in the Appendix to the Report. One is in connection with certain anomalies in the protection afforded by crossed and uncrossed cheques. That is referred to in paragraph 105 of the Report.
The other addition which I desire to make is this: as the Bill relates to cheques—indeed I have given it the very short title of the "Cheques Bill"—the House might like the opportunity of considering an Amendment to Section 8 of the Truck Act to permit payment of wages by cheque. I repeat the word "permit" for this would be merely a permissive provision. I realise that this


is a controversial matter and might not find its way to the later stages of the Bill without very full consultation, but I believe that I can produce a formula which would fully safeguard the interests of those concerned, particularly those of trade unions on behalf of their members and those of chambers of trade on behalf of shopkeepers.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Page, Mr. Hay, Mr. Holt, Mr. Eric Johnson, Mr. Geoffrey Stevens, and Mr. Geoffrey Wilson.

CHEQUES

Bill to make amendments of the law relating to cheques and similar instruments; in respect of the endorsement thereof; to the discharge of obligations by cheque; to the recognition of cheques as receipts; to crossed and uncrossed cheques and the giving of value therefor; and to make consequent amendments of the law relating to the rights and duties of paying bankers, collecting bankers and bankers' customers towards each other, presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon 1st February and to be printed. [Bill 33.]

COMPLAINT OF PRIVILEGE

Mr. Lewis: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to raise with you a matter which I feel you may be inclined to rule, when you have heard the facts, as being prima facie a breach of Privilege. So that you may be aware of the facts I will briefly relate them.
On Friday last I tabled a Question to the Foreign Secretary for answer on 6th December. Last Sunday, at 2 a.m., I was awakened by a telephone call, when a person who preferred to remain anonymous used the most objectionable, threatening and intimidating language regarding that Question. From 8 a.m. last Sunday, almost for the whole day, for the whole of yesterday and the whole of today until—the last information I had—3.15 this afternoon, abusive, threatening and intimidating calls have been anonymously delivered to my wife and daughter at home. [Laughter.] I do not

think that this is a laughing matter; the calls are really objectionable.
The position became such that on Sunday a person telephoned from a call box, left the receiver off and thus disconnected my phone for some hours. Subsequently, the operator phoned, explained what had happened, and reconnected the phone. Thereupon these abusive calls recommenced. I had to phone the operator to ask whether he would disconnect the phone, but he explained that he was unable to do that. These threatening, abusive, vulgar and anonymous calls continued so much that I was compelled myself to leave my receiver off, thereby automatically disconnecting my telephone.
Yesterday morning I received two letters from a local borough councillor explaining that on several occasions on Sunday he had tried to reach me by telephone on an urgent matter affecting the compassionate discharge or compassionate posting of one of my constituents who is a soldier serving in the forces. The councillor said he was unable to make any contact with me. Thereupon, of course, I immediately replaced the receiver, but the calls recommenced and again I had to disconnect the telephone.
Last night my wife replaced the receiver and again the calls recommenced. She told me that they were so vulgar, abusive and anonymous that she was becoming really frightened at what was happening. She said that one of these anonymous phone callers had said that he was referring to an article in last Sunday's Sunday Graphic which, as you know, is a rather disreputable type of Sunday newspaper.
As the Sunday Graphic is a newspaper which I—and, I think, most people who read decent newspapers—do not look at, I was not aware of what had appeared in it, because it is a paper mainly concerned with sex and sensationalism. I had not read the article and, in fact, I was not concerned with it, but I thought that as the disturbance was still going on, and the annoyance was continuing, I had better take an opportunity of looking at the said article. Last night I went to the Library and, in page 2 of the Sunday Graphic, I saw a rather objectionable and offensive article.
In so far as this is a disreputable type of journalism I take no objection to that article. I have no objection to its wording, except the last part, which I will now read to you, Mr. Speaker. It refers to my Question and says:
If you agree with us please do not write and tell us so. Ring up Mr. Lewis and tell him. his number is …
Then the article gives my private telephone number.
I see Ministers opposite smiling and laughing, but this is very serious. I emphasise that I take no objection to the content of the article, but I thought that this was a very serious matter and that I should consult one of my hon. Friends who knows more about Parliamentary procedure than myself, one who had more experience and qualifications. I chose—as anyone would—my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). I explained the matter to him and showed him the article. Immediately he gave it as his considered judgment that that particular section of the article was a gross breach of Privilege and that I should immediately acquaint you with the position, Sir.
You may perhaps recollect, Mr. Speaker, that, accompanied by my right hon. Friend, I called upon you last evening and placed the whole of the facts before you. That was the earliest possible moment I could do so. For your information, even at this moment these abusive and threatening calls are taking place. I emphasise that up to 3.15 this afternoon my wife had received about ten of these vulgar and abusive communications, even though she had to disconnect the telephone for one and a half hours.
My telephone has been virtually put out of order by irresponsible people using objectionable and foul language in anonymous phone calls, threatening me, trying to make me withdraw my Question, and so forth. This has been done at the behest of a Sunday newspaper. By this means my telephone has been deliberately and maliciously disconnected as a result of the incitement of the public by this article and the instruction to people, on the part of this newspaper, to telephone me.
This has meant, of necessity, that I have not been able to carry out my work. My old father is 85 and is liable to drop

dead at any moment. I have a standing instruction to my mother to let me know at any time when he may be in any sort of trouble. She cannot get through to me, and I have no information from minute to minute as to what may be happening.
These threats, intimidations and attacks mean that I cannot deal with my constituents' problems. The President of the Board of Trade should not laugh about this. It is a serious matter. I resent people who are supposed to be Ministers laughing and giving their support to this sort of thing. In my opinion, this is a very gross breach of Privilege on the part of the editor and the Sunday Graphic and I therefore ask you, Mr. Speaker, to rule accordingly that this is prima facie a breach of Privilege.

Mr. Speaker: My duty on these occasions, as the House knows, is not to decide whether a breach of Privilege has, in fact, occurred or not, but merely to settle, for the guidance of the House, the procedural question whether the hon. Member has made out a prima facie case and raised the matter at the earliest possible moment so as to enable me to give the consideration of this matter priority over the Orders of the Day. That is all I propose to consider.
If this had been a complaint by the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Lewis) of the usual sort about the contents of a newspaper article, I should have been obliged to rule it out on time, because it is a strict rule of the House, by which I am bound, as well as other hon. Members, that complaints about such articles must be brought at the earliest possible moment; and the earliest possible moment has been construed as immediately the paper appears or as soon after that as may be. This paper appeared on the Sunday, I understand from the hon. Member, and, therefore, if it had been an ordinary complaint about the contents of an article, to be in time it ought to have been raised yesterday afternoon.
But from what I have heard, I think the hon. Member's complaint goes further than that. He says that he does not object to the contents of the article as such, but he complains that up to the moment he is being molested in the way that he has described and his telephone


arrangements have been rendered ineffective and that this is still going on; and certainly was going on up to a late hour last night, as he told me then.
In these circumstances, although I would rule a complaint on an article out of time and I therefore do not ask the hon. Member to produce the article at the Table, as I normally would, I think that the hon. Member has disclosed a prima facie case of that sort of breach of Privilege which can be called indirect molestation and which has often engaged the attention of the House. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion after careful consideration that I should accept a Motion on the matter.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I have listened to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and I think that under the circumstances I should immediately move, as Leader of the House, that the matter of the complaint be referred to the Committee of Privileges. I am sure that this is the right course to take. Without making any other observations, I simply express regret that the hon. Member should have suffered this great inconvenience.
I therefore beg to move,
That the matter of the complaint be referred to the Committee of Privileges.

Mr. James Griffiths: On behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends, I should like to associate myself with the Motion which has been moved by the Lord Privy Seal.

Question put and agreed to.

Ordered,
That the matter of the complaint be referred to the Committee of Privileges.

Orders of the Day — HOMICIDE BILL

Considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

Clause 1.—(ABOLITION OF "CONSTRUCTIVE MALICE.")

4.16 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I beg to move, in page 1, line 8, to leave out from "another" to "the" in line 9.

The Chairman: I think this Amendment would also go with the next Amendment in the hon. and learned Member's name, in Clause 1, leave out lines 10 to 18 and insert "if the killing be unintentional".

Mr. Paget: The effect of these two Amendments is to provide what I think probably most people erroneously think is already the case—that murder shall in future be intentional killing and that if somebody be killed unintentionally, that shall not be murder. If it were amended in accordance with the two Amendments, the Clause would read as follows:
Where a person kills another the killing shall not amount to murder if the killing be unintentional.
Murder is an ancient crime. It is a crime of the common law and, as such, it has evolved from the ancient law in which all killing was murder and required compensation and in which intention was irrelevant. A definition was given by Lord Coke, and that definition has remained over all this time. It is as follows:
Where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being and under the King's peace, with malice aforethought either express or implied, the death following within a year and a day … 
The great difficulty with that definition is that most of the words in it have been held to mean something quite different from what they appear to mean. For instance, a "reasonable creature in being" includes a raving lunatic, a foreigner or an outlaw. "A person of sound memory and discretion" includes, again, a raving lunatic; because even if he succeeds in establishing the somewhat peculiar and unsound definition of insanity in the M'Naghten Rules, he is still considered


guilty of murder, though insane. Most difficult of all, "malice aforethought" does not mean premeditation or anything of that sort. Nor does it even mean intention to kill. It means a variety of different intentions to which I will come in a moment.
As to what "express or implied" means, although the courts have constantly quoted this definition in three centuries, I cannot discover that any of the courts has ever discovered what "express or implied" means, or what is the difference between malice aforethought express and malice aforethought implied. Altogether, it is not a wholly satisfactory definition.
Let us try for a moment to see what the Clause does as it is now drafted. What apparently it seeks to say is that
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.
According to both Archbold and Russell on crime, which are the two textbooks generally quoted—and there are various judgments to which I will refer—malice aforethought express or implied includes an intention to kill the person killed, an intention to kill some body else—

The Attorney-General (Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller): On a point of order. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has repeatedly referred to malice "express or implied" which is, in fact, the subject of the third Amendment on the Order Paper. Would it not, therefore, be for the convenience of the Committee, Sir Charles—as the discussion is ranging over that topic already—to discuss all three at the same time?

The Chairman: I think so. Perhaps I was a little misled. If it were to suit the convenience of the Committee we could discuss the first three Amendments together and then, when the time comes, have a Division, if necessary, on the Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood).

Mr. Paget: With great respect, Sir Charles, the point about "express or

implied" is quite different. All that I am trying to do at present is to direct attention to the effect which my Amendment would have. To do that, I must first discover what the existing words—including, of course, the words "express or implied"—mean. When one has found out what the effect of those words is, one can decide what the effect of my Amendment is, which is the first alternative. Later we, have to decide what would be the effect of excluding the words "express or implied"—which is a second, and a different, alternative.

The Chairman: In that case, that point can be discussed when we come to the later Amendment. I will, therefore, ask the hon. and learned Member not to discuss it now.

Mr. Paget: With great respect, I have no intention of discussing it now, Sir Charles. I am merely indicating what, in my very humble opinion, the present law does, and what my Amendment would do, and indicating that it is not entirely easy to find out what the position is.
Perhaps the Committee will allow me to go back to the point at which I was interrupted. As I was saying, this is the law at present, according to Archbold and according to Russell, concerning malice aforethought express or implied. Neither book is able to give a particular definition as to which is express and which is implied, because there is great confusion in the authorities, but, as has been indicated, that will be gone into later.
Malice aforethought involves a variety of different intentions. First, there is the intention to kill the person killed. Then there is the intention to kill someone else. Third, there is intention not to kill but to do some serious injury. Fourth, there is an intention to commit a felony. Originally, an intention to commit a felony was certainly part of malice aforethought; so that if a man meant to steal, and accidently killed, that was murder. Later, the courts have said that it must be a felony which is, of its nature, likely to endanger life. If, therefore, a man intends to commit a felony which is likely to endanger life, that at present is malice aforethought.
Does that cease to be malice aforethought because of this Clause as at present drafted? I do not know. It is


very difficult to say that, because malice aforethought is the intention to commit the offence, that is an intention, whether or not the intention is formed
… in the course or furtherance of another offence.
Subsection (2) would exclude a quite different type of case—where somebody is accidentally killed while an attempt is made to avoid arrest. That was denned by the Lord Chief Justice in his summing up in the trial of Craig and Bentley. The Lord Chief Justice then said:
But, gentlemen, there is another and further consideration in this case to which I want to direct your particular attention. Miles, the dead man, was a police officer, and the law of the centuries—in fact, ever since there has been law in this country—has given special protection to police officers while in the execution of their duty, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that in the case of the killing of a peace officer—I use the expression 'peace officer' which is the old expression in English law for the modern police constable; he is in exactly the same position as the old parish constables were before there was any regular police force, and who were the only peace officers in the country—in the case of a peace officer who is killed, the law does not give the accused the same defences as in the case of other persons; it takes one away, and I am going to direct you that this is the law: If a peace officer has arrested, or is endeavouring to arrest (and that includes coming on the scene for the purpose of arresting) a person, and the arrest, if effected, would be lawful, and that person, for the purpose of escaping, or of preventing or hindering the arrest, does a wilful—that is to say, an intentional—act which causes the death of the officer, he is guilty of murder, whether or not he intended to kill or do grievous bodily harm.
I venture to suggest that it really is time to get a more modern and a more simple definition of this crime of murder. I suggest that the simplest available definition is that murder is intentional killing; that is to say, it has to be established that there was an intention to kill.

Mr. Leslie Hale: If my hon. and learned Friend on my right would speak a little louder than my hon. Friends on my left, it would be possible for me to know what we are talking about—and I am really interested.

Mr. Paget: I am very sorry. I am saying that really it is time that we got away from this archaic definition of murder and that we had a definition of this great crime that was both intelligible and logical. I submit that the definition is, quite simply, that murder is intentional

killing, and that it is not murder if the killing is not intended.

Mr. Raymond Gower: I am following the hon. and learned Gentleman with a lot of sympathy, but would he not agree that if his form of words were adopted, it would, in effect, wreck Part II of the Bill, in that if a murder were committed in any of those ancillary ways, such as in furtherance of a theft, or by shooting, and so on, this form of words would be inoperative?

Mr. Paget: No, I do not think so. If we said that murder was intentional killing, then capital murder would be intentional killing—in the course or furtherance of a theft, and so on. The great case both for capital punishment and for a single sentence—that is, a sentence of life imprisonment and not a sentence at the discretion of the judge—is surely the case of deterrence. It does not seem to me that there is much object in providing a great deterrent to prevent somebody from doing something which he does not intend to do. Therefore, as to murder when killing is not intended, the deterrent argument does not seem to be very strong.
4.30 p.m.
Again, if the deterrent argument does not apply, why not let the judge decide in the particular circumstances of the case which sentence is the appropriate one? For manslaughter the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. Therefore if, even though the killing was not intended, the circumstances were very grave, the judge could still give the sentence of life imprisonment, but in other cases he would have a discretion to impose a lesser sentence. Surely, where killing is not intended, manslaughter is more of a reality. To talk of murder where killing is not intended—perhaps not to lawyers but to the ordinary man—offends one's sense of reason and of the meaning of words.
The main case which one could exclude is where the intention is to wound, to do some fairly serious injury. To take an extreme example, if a man were running away and turned round and shot at the legs of his pursuer in order to avoid being caught and accidentally killed the pursuer, that would no longer be murder. But it would, none the less, probably be a manslaughter sufficiently serious for the judge to say that the offender should be sentenced to life imprisonment.
This is a Bill which, according to the Home Secretary, is introduced solely to deal with professional criminals. That is the Government's case for introducing the Bill. If after a smash and grab raid somebody is escaping in a car and fires at the tyres of a pursuing car with the result that the bullet ricochets and kills somebody on the pavement, that would not be murder under the definition that I am proposing. Why should it be murder? It is unintentional killing. It is, of course, a very grave crime, but do we really deter people from doing one thing by making a massive penalty for another? If we want to stop people carrying arms when they commit crimes, let us step up the penalty for carrying arms when crimes are committed—

Mr. Hale: Or abolish arms.

Mr. Paget: —or abolish arms. Make it more difficult to have arms; provide a penalty for possessing arms. Let us not try to deal with the matter by the back door, by providing a larger penalty for something else, because it will have no effect.
There is one passage in Russell on crime which struck me as very interesting. It is from the Report of a Commission which discussed this problem as long ago as 1832. In 1832 they argued the great futility of imposing a sentence for murder in order to prevent people from doing something which was never intended to be murder at all. This is the passage:
The law upon this subject is collected in 1 East's P.C. 295. We state this rule as it is laid down by the authorities; though we are fully sensible of the imperfection of this part of the law of homicide. It is unquestionably necessary that officers of justices should be protected, by exonerating them from criminal responsibility when, in the discharge of their duty, they kill those who resist them; and it is entirely a question of policy whether the offence of killing officers by persons so resisting them should be punishable with death. But we conceive that it ought to be made a substantive crime (as it is in the laws of most other countries), and should not be drawn by presumption and implication into the general class of murder, of which offence it may in fact bear none of the distinguishing characteristics. The policy of the law in endeavouring to secure obedience and prevent resistance to ministers of justice, would, probably, be better effected by making the punishment in case of resistance more severe than it now is, where death does not result from resistance, and relaxing its severity where death does accidentally result. The evil to be prevented is unlawful resistance

to legal authority—an object which cannot be fully attained by making punishment to depend on a mere accidental event, and upon that event inflicting a punishment frequently disproportioned to an offence which derives its quality from a mere accident. Justice may thus suffer in two ways. Where death results, the severity of the punishment has a tendency to prevent conviction, whilst in other instances, the punishment may not be sufficient for the purpose of examples.
I would say that those words of 120 years ago are still absolutely valid today. Let us confine murder to those cases where somebody intends to kill. If we wish to stop people firing guns to cover their retreat or anything like that, step up the present inadequate penalties for bearing arms for a felonious purpose. If we wish to make that a matter of long imprisonment let us do so, but let us not stretch the crime of murder to cover killing which is unintentional.

Mr. Montgomery Hyde: Would the hon. and learned Gentleman, therefore, exclude the intention to commit grievous bodily harm?

Mr. Paget: Yes. I would say that if the intention is to commit grievous bodily harm and the jury so hold, then it is not murder because one did not intend to kill. But of course if the grievous bodily harm is of such a nature that a reasonable man would expect it to kill, then the law, the jury and the ordinary man in the street assume that people intend the reasonable probable consequences of their acts.
Therefore, if the grievous bodily harm is of a nature which a reasonable man ought to expect to kill, then it is murder. It is for a jury to decide. A jury can perfectly well decide that. But where the grievous bodily harm is of a nature which the ordinary reasonable man would not expect to kill, and the man in fact did not expect to kill, in my submission that is not murder.

The Attorney-General: I have listened with great interest to what the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said in support of his Amendments; and I would begin my reply by saying that the object of the Clause is not to make an alteration of the definition of murder: it is to get rid of the doctrine which we lawyers refer to as constructive malice. That is the sole object of the Clause. A great deal, if I understood him correctly, of the hon. and learned Gentleman's criticism of the existing law was


in fact criticism of that doctrine, and so I hope that to that extent he supports the object of the Clause, although I appreciate from his speech that he does not think that the Clause goes far enough. The Clause has that sole objective and. of course, is a Clause intended to apply to all charges of murder, whether they are capital murders or non-capital murders.
I think that the doctrine of constructive malice was well summarised in paragraphs 81 and 94 of the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment; that is to say: where death was caused in the commission of a felony involving violence or resisting arrest that might be held to constitute murder. That doctrine has been the subject of very considerable criticism over the years from many people and, as I said, the object of this Clause, and its sole object, is to abolish that doctrine.
The hon. and learned Gentleman, in putting forward these two Amendments, has sought to make the Clause read as though killing another person should not be murder if the killing be unintentional. The word that he wishes to have inserted is "unintentional". That word, in my view, is one which is likely to give rise to considerable ambiguity, for merely saying that
if the killing be unintentional
does not really do more than say that there must be some mens rea for a killing to amount to murder but without giving any indication by the mere use of the word "unintentional" what that mens rea should be. The hon. and learned Gentleman made it quite clear in the course of his speech that he thought that the crime of murder should be confined to the killing of a person with intent to kill. He made that perfectly clear. One criticism which I advance of his Amendment is that it does not achieve that object. It leaves in doubt what the intent necessary to constitute murder should be.

Mr. Paget: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman feels that way, of course I would be only too happy, on the Report stage, to accept any Amendment which he might then bring forward, having considered the matter with his draftsmen, to clarify the intention. I think that the words that I have used at least make clear enough what is intended, and that is the object of the Amendment.

The Attorney-General: I do not agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman. I do not think that the words in the Amendment support the speech which he made; but, as I said before, he made it quite clear that he desired to restrict the crime of murder to killing where there is an intent to kill. That would be a narrowing of the present definition as applied in the courts, and the real effect of his Amendment would be to exclude from the category of murder killings where it had been proved that there was an intent to do grievous bodily harm or where it was proved that there was knowledge that the act would probably cause death or grievous bodily harm.
4.45 p.m.
Of course, all these matters were considered by the Royal Commission, and it is interesting to note that in paragraph 472 the Royal Commission expressed this view:
We believe that few people would dispute the propriety of making the definition of murder wide enough to include cases where death is caused by an act intended to cause serious bodily injury.
There the Royal Commission is expressing what I believe is the view of the majority of people that it is proper to have a definition wide enough to include cases where death is caused by an act intended to cause serious bodily injury.
Of course it is right to say that there was some comment by the Royal Commission in that paragraph on the meaning which might be attached to the words "grievous bodily harm." It was said in that paragraph that if any change was made in the wording, such as to say "intended to kill or to endanger life," it did not believe that it would lead to any great difference in the day-to-day administration of the law; and its impression was that in practice today, except in certain cases of killing while committing a felony or resisting arrest, which this Clause would mean would not amount to murder, a person would seldom, if ever, be convicted of murder unless there was evidence that he had wilfully put life in jeopardy.
The hon. and learned Gentleman said that the time had come for a new definition of murder. That too, of course, was considered by the Royal Commission, and it expressed its view in paragraph 483:
We find ourselves in agreement with those eminent witnesses who consider that, apart


from the question of constructive malice, the existing definition of murder in English law is in substance satisfactory; … 
Later, it said:
None of the alternative definitions proposed can be regarded as satisfactory, and we believe that it is impracticable to frame a definition which would effectively limit the scope of murder and the resulting liability to capital punishment and would not have overriding disadvantages in other respects.
The purpose of the Clause is to remedy the ground of criticism to which the Royal Commission referred on the question of constructive malice. That, in my view, is satisfactorily achieved by the Clause, and I am sorry to have to disappoint the hon. and learned Gentleman by telling him that we are unable to accept his Amendments, which seek to convert the Clause into one of a different character and alter in other respects the definition of murder.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: I think that the difference between my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) and the right hon. and learned Gentleman is one of construction, if I may import that word into the argument on the words "constructive malice". The Attorney-General has based his argument, as I think he will agree, upon the assumption that what the Royal Commission was recommending was the removal from our law of the doctrine of constructive malice as narrowly interpreted in paragraph 81; whereas I would submit for his consideration and that of the Committee that what the Royal Commission was really dealing with was something very much wider than that.
It will be seen that the section which the Royal Commission devotes to the subject of constructive malice covers a great many paragraphs and pages and includes what I should have thought was a very valuable and lucid discussion of the legal principles now applied and the historical background to them.
In essence, what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton is seeking to do is not so much to introduce into this Bill a new definition of murder, but rather to get back to the definition of murder as it was originally understood in the common law. The common law in its principles would, I think, be accepted by most common lawyers as common sense. In those respects in which it now

is patently contrary to common sense, the difference is due not to the inherent principles as the common law originally understood them, but to the incrustation upon those original principles of a long series of judicial interpretations, constructions, modifications, limitations, and embarrassments of all kinds in order to give effect to a pet theory of a particular judge. The result is that the original common sense of the original common law principle which everyone understands has been lost.
This is very clearly brought out in the Report of the Royal Commission. I shall not bother the Committee with quotations or references; were I to do so, I should only delay the Committee unnecessarily. I do, however, hope that all hon. and right hon. Members who will be called upon shortly to give a vote on this will take the trouble to look at what the Royal Commission actually did. After all, it was a very powerful Commission; it sat for four years, considering the matter exhaustively, and it took the Government a great number of years, comparatively, to decide to do anything whatever about it. I hope that people will look at the Report. I will try to summarise the points now
What the Commission makes very clear is that the original common law distinction between unlawful homicide which was murder and unlawful homicide which was not murder lay in the element of malice aforethought. In their ordinary connotation, the words "malice" and "aforethought" are plain enough. "Malice" must include a malicious intention, and "aforethought" must imply something thought of by the man before the act. In other words, the two words are really unintelligible except on the basis of what my hon. and learned Friend wants to put into this Bill, namely, the sense of an intention to kill.
No ordinary man or woman would regard it as right to convict anyone of murder, whatever the penalty, where there was no intention to kill. A great deal has been said in this controversy about public opinion and common sense, but I should have thought that if there were two propositions which would be universally accepted, they would be these: first, that it is a matter of common sense that murder cannot be committed by a man who has no intention of killing;


secondly, that that proposition would commend itself to most people and to most juries.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Hyde) intervened in my hon. and learned Friend's speech to ask about the intention to do grievous bodily harm. With all respect, I thought my hon. and learned Friend's answer was correct. What he was saying was that if a man intends to do grievous bodily harm of such a nature that death might easily result, then it is quite right to say that what he intends to do is to kill or to take the risk of killing. I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend would agree with that. If a man deliberately makes up his mind to kill somebody else, or if he deliberately makes up his mind to inflict such harm upon somebody that any rational person would know he was running the risk of killing, then, obviously, that is an intention to kill and the offence is clearly murder. But we have gone a long way from that, and what I suggest that the Royal Commission was really recommending the Government to do was to get back to it.
When one looks at the Clause one must remember that a judge will, if this Bill becomes law, have the duty of making it clear to a jury in circumstances which may still, under the Bill, entail the capital penalty. There will be 12 ordinary, un-instructed, unlearned men and women in a jury box, who will be asked to say whether a killing is murder or not murder in circumstances where, if they answer, "Murder," then, under Clause 5 or Clause 6, they may be saying, "Capital murder and the gallows".

The Clause says:
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.

The man in the jury box will say he understands what that means in a way; it means that it is not murder if it is done in the course of another offence unless it would be murder without the other offence. But what he wants to know is what would be murder anyway, and the Clause leaves that completely unexamined and unexplained. In other words, it does nothing to assist him in

making up his mind whether a thing that is done, perhaps in the course of another offence or perhaps not, is, under the law we are now seeking to pass, an intentional killing or not.

I said that I should not weary the Committee with quotations, and I shall not; but I feel that I must draw attention to one or two passages. In paragraph 74, in pages 26 and 27 of the Report, the Commission quotes Sir James Stephen's "Digest of the Criminal Law". Sir James Stephen defines what "malice aforethought" now means, and I will remind the Committee that, originally, it meant simply and solely premeditation and intention. What did it mean by 1877? We find four things set out, the first of which is:
an intention to cause the death of. or grievous bodily harm to, any person, whether such person is the person actually killed or not.

An intention to kill somebody, whoever is killed, makes the offence murder: and so it should be.

Let us turn to the next:
Knowledge that the act which causes death will probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, whether such person is the person actually killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused.

I do not pause to explain. I proceed to (c):
an intent to commit any felony whatever.

Let us consider how far that goes. If Sir James Stephen was correctly interpreting the law as it was in 1877, subject to any modifications that may have been made by later decisions, any killing which occurs during an act with
an intent to commit any felony whatever.

is murder; or, more particularly, although, quite plainly, by definition, there is no intention and no premeditation, the mere fact that it is done with an intent to commit any felony makes it murder by malice aforethought, by connoting malice aforethought. Could the doctrine of constructive malice go further than that?

5.0 p.m.

It is true that Sir James Stephen himself thought that that particular definition went a little too far and he modified it, but his modification does not reduce it


very much. We find, at the end of the same paragraph:
an intent to commit any felony of such a kind that the actual commission thereof would involve the use or at least the threat of force"—
any force—
against the person killed.

In other words, we have got so far as saying that a premeditation and intention to kill may occur where, by hypothesis, there was neither premeditation nor any such intention. That is absurd and I think it is offensive to common sense. It is offensive to a natural sense of justice and it would be overwhelmingly rejected by the public if they understood what was being done.

Why do the Government not want to put that right? It is all very well to say that they prefer to deal with the much more limited thing of felony—that is, paragraph 81, to which the Attorney-General referred; but if the Government are still so obstinately determined to resist the whole weight of the evidence against having a death penalty at all, if they are determined to keep it for some offences partly because, in their view, public opinion is not ready for total abolition, at least they ought to be prepared to go so far as public opinion would take them.

Is there any hon. Member of the House, whether learned or not, who really thinks that public opinion would have any hesitation whatever in saying that it did not wish to have people convicted of murder where there was no intention to kill and no premeditation of any kind? That is all that my hon. and learned Friend's Amendment asks the Government to do. There really is not any reason, except pure obscurantism, which would prevent the Government from accepting that Amendment. I do not say that they should accept it necessarily in those words. Obviously, the Government might well look for other means of doing it, other definitions or forms of words; by all means let it be redrafted in such a way as to satisfy the Attorney-General that it really does all that is intended and no more than is intended.

What we are saying to the Government is, "Choose such form of words as you wish, but do not let us go on with this

monstrosity of convicting people of murder where it is perfectly clear that there was no intention to kill and no intention to do any grievous bodily harm." The Amendment goes no further than that and very few people would understand it if the Government were to be as obstinate about this as the Attorney-General sounded in his speech.

Mr. Hale: My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has called attention to the somewhat devious ways by which we have reached this important occasion. No doubt we shall be assured in a moment or two from the Front Bench opposite that the Government planned this from the commencement and that their technique from the start was to allow the Silverman Bill to run its course so as to prepare public opinion for the acceptance of their Bill.

Mr. S. Silverman: With malice aforethought or not?

Mr. Hale: I am not quite sure.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: It is called the Suez technique.

Mr. Hale: I believe this to be, on the whole, a well-drafted Bill. I do not mean that it is a good Bill in the sense that it is clear to everyone, although many of the Clauses are acceptable to me. I believe it to be a well-drafted Bill in the sense that the Parliamentary draftsman has tried to put in as reasonably simple language as possible a set of confusing and conflicting intentions. The reason for that is clear enough.
Most of the issues in the Bill have to be decided by 12 men in a box, and 12 men in a box ought to be able to have the law explained to them as clearly as it can reasonably be explained. I thought, therefore, that the Clause on the whole was a reasonable attempt to abolish the doctrine of constructive malice. I consider that the proposal of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) is a little better but I do not think that either his proposal or that of the Government makes the issue as clear, beyond doubt, as it can be made, although I have no better words to suggest. I recognise the difficulty—it is a considerable one indeed—in making the position clear.
If we are leaving to 12 men in a box a fantastic variety of decisions to make, each one of great complexity, involving a good deal of appreciation of human difficulties, each one involving a good deal of psychological knowledge and understanding, and each of them involving the power to accept evidence, why could we not take a chance for once in a Statute to say what we mean? Why not start saying what we mean instead of elaborating these fantastic monuments of obscurantism to create darkness through which the bright and discerning eye of no judge can pierce?
I well remember the history of all this. It arose during the passing of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the result of which was that every word was contested time after time. The contest, of course, was over "in the course of his employment" and not over the meaning of the words, but in relation to the practical application of those words to a vast variety of industries, occupations and extraordinary circumstances. It is perfectly clear that no Parliamentary draftsman could have prepared a Clause to cover whether a man who was walking across a road from the station to his work or was wandering around a slightly more different way to avoid the snow, was doing so as part of his occupation. It was the practical difficulty of making a completely new law to meet eventualities in new circumstances.
If I had been drafting the Clause, I should have done it something like this:
The doctrine of constructive malice is hereby abolished.
The meaning of the term "constructive malice" is perfectly well known. It has been judicially determined on many occasions. It is true that its application is continually extended, but that need not affect our minds as we approach it. The fact that it has grown to large dimensions is no concern of ours.
All that we are suggesting—and I believe it is the general intention of the Government—is to revert, so far as the Clause is concerned, to the ordinary old law of murder as stated in the past by Coke, to the ordinary old basis of the general rule of malice applying to every crime.
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.

There must be an intention; there must be an act which of itself imports an intention.
Of course, the difficulty of applying that to the doctrine of constructive malice was perhaps never more clear than in cases of abortion. This is one of the real difficulties of constructive malice. That operation was a felony; the old lady with the rusty needle was a menace, and in the course of time she caused the loss of life, and that, under the doctrine of constructive malice, was murder.
In my early days it was the habit to charge such people with murder, but it was never the practice to convict them of murder. I may be wrong, but in the thirty-odd years since I commenced practice I do not recall a single case of a conviction for murder arising out of abortion, although it is clear that the law provides for a conviction.

Mr. Paget: Would the Clause as drafted exclude the abortion case?

Mr. Hale: I am coming to that. My whole reason for developing this argument was to make it relevant to the Clause before proceeding from the exordium to the lucubration and then the comment.
First, one has to consider this. A rather curious history of the matter is that it is one of the ways in which capital punishment has been reduced. It is not a good thing that juries should have to disregard the law and substitute something else because the law is out of date and ridiculous. In the past that was so. Juries found that £100 worth of jewels was worth a few shillings so that the man need not be hanged. It happened time after time.
There really is a doubt about the words in the Clause. Indeed, there is a doubt about the whole intent. Supposing someone commences with the primary intention of relieving some unhappy girl of a child she does not want. At what stage does it become so grave, menacing and risky as to mean that a person has really produced a constructive intent to kill, using the words not in the sense of constructive malice, but in the sense in which they are used in the second paragraph of the Royal Commission's Report, in the sense of whether the reasonable, likely or probable result of this action is death?

Mr. Paget: To imperil life.

Mr. Hale: Yes, to imperil life. There is a very grave danger about this, and it seems to me that it applies to a whole series of cases.
Take the case of Rex v. Stone, the rape case. We are discussing the whole question whether killing during rape should or should not be murder. I do not want to get involved in that argument. I am trying to find out whether this Clause says what it means or means what it says. It will be remembered that in the Stone case the man, in the course of the rape, while the woman was struggling, held his hand to her neck and subjected it to pressure which was either very great or very slight. Obviously, there is no one to testify to that.
It was held that such a case would not be murder. This additional action by itself was, as it were, the dividing line between felony and murder. It was the moment at which there had been an act which could be constructively applied in imputing an intent to kill. What about that under the Clause? I should be very grateful for some assistance on it. The wording as it stands is as follows:
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.
5.15 p.m.
I am open to correction, and I beg the Committee to believe that I have not the slightest desire in a matter of this importance on which most of us have conscientious feeling to waste time in purely technical arguments or in the delight of rhetorical questions. There are a great many lawyers in this House, but is there any one of them who is sure what would be the decision in Rex v. Stone in those circumstances? I do not mind them saying that Rex v. Stone is good law and that we ought to keep it. But what does the Clause mean?
It would be undesirable to refer to any recent or current cases, but let me take a purely imaginary case of arson. Under the Clause, it is clearly the intention that if I set fire to a building with the intention of claiming the insurance money, and if in the course of that fire someone unhappily loses his or her life that is

not murder. When firing the building, I do not intend to kill anyone. I commit a very grave crime for which I shall be duly punished and I am liable to imprisonment for life. But that will not be murder.
At what stage under the Clause does my knowledge that there is someone in the house when I set fire to it make that act an act of murder? Suppose that evidence comes to the authorities that I know that there is someone in the building at the time I set fire to it: if that person loses his life, does that fact make it murder? I think not. I am not sure, but suppose that evidence comes to the authorities that that person is over 80 years of age and cannot move, does that fact make the act one of murder? Suppose that evidence comes that the person is bedridden, that there is no one else in the house at the time to give any help, and that the criminal knew it. Is that murder? It may be right that it should be. I am merely saying that we ought to know what the law is to be under the new proposition. I am bound to say that under the wording of the Clause I find it difficult to know.
The hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Hyde) made an interjection on the question of grievous bodily harm. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton has drawn my attention to the paragraph in the Royal Commission's Report on that subject which I think is extremely important. I am bound to say that I can well understand people asking why if someone really commits grievous bodily harm and death results, it should not be murder. There must come a point at which it is impossible to apply a line. Therefore, all the cases of which we speak normally as murder can be the subject of a second charge of grievous bodily harm in the indictment. The Royal Commission said:
The only issue upon which there is room for serious discussion is the precise degree of injury to which this principle may properly be applied.… There is always a probability that death may result from such an injury, and it is accepted that a man must be presumed to intend, and must be held responsible for. the natural and probable consequences of his action.
I do not think that anyone is arguing about that. The Report goes on:
The Lord Chief Justice said he would direct a jury to the effect that anyone who inflicts grievous bodily harm must know that


he is likely to cause death. Stephen at one time took the same view, but he later expressed the opinion that to substitute' bodily injury known to the offender to be likely to cause death' for' grievous bodily harm' would to some extent narrow the definition. There is no statutory definition of' grievous bodily harm', but it has been held that it need not be permanent or dangerous, but only' such as sensibly to interfere with health or comfort'. We find it difficult to believe that the intentional infliction of such an injury necessarily involves 'wilful exposure of life to peril'; and we are therefore disposed to think that it is too wide a criterion to support a charge of murder. Although' serious bodily injury' should no doubt connote a graver injury than' grievous bodily harm', it would in practice be difficult to draw a clear distinction between these two terms. We should therefore prefer to limit murder to cases where the act by which death is caused is intended to kill or to' endanger life' or is known to be likely to kill or endanger life. But we do not believe that, if this change were made, it would lead to any great difference in the day-to-day administration of the law. Our impression is that in practice the courts have been moving in this direction and that today, except in certain cases of killing while committing a felony or resisting arrest, a person would seldom, if ever, be convicted of murder unless there was evidence that he had wilfully put life in jeopardy.
I observed, while reading the last few words, that my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne was shaking his own able head in some dissent. I agree with him. I do not believe it is true that the courts have been moving in that direction. I think there is some evidence, as I think the hon. Member for Belfast. North will agree, that the police definitions have been widened.
It is incumbent upon the Attorney-General to have a look at the Clause to make sure that it says what it means. II do not think there is any real dispute about this. The Royal Commission was quite clear. It said we should abolish the whole question of constructive malice. My hon. Friend has said it is fair enough, under the old definition, Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. We can imply an intent from a series of acts. We never have to prove the intent by some positive evidence. If I pull out a gun and fire in the direction of somebody, people are entitled to presume that my intent was to kill, unless I can prove a whole set of circumstances to the contrary. There is no question about that. There is no question under any of the definitions of the Clause that killing with intent will still be murder. What the Royal Commission

recommended was that this judicial interpretation, which did not really start badly but which has been gradually extended during the centuries and enlarged to include other things, should be abolished. I hope that the Attorney-General will say the same thing, too.

Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) is quite correct when he says that the words "constructive malice" have been the subject of a great deal of judicial interpretation. Judges are very careful about the use of those words. The term is really an invention of the text book writers and dons.
The side-note of the Clause says "Abolition of' constructive malice'." That does not really help us one way or another, because there is no such thing, in so many words, as constructive malice in the law. Moreover, the side-note has no legal effect anyhow.

Mr. Hale: I am obliged to the hon. Member. He is quite right, and has very properly corrected some careless words of mine. I think I followed them up by saying that we want to revert to the old form, Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, the old definition. "Constructive malice" is really a judicial construction of the term "malice" and would have to be put in the negative, not positive, form.

Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: I would say that it is the dons' construction of a judicial construction of the common law, one farther removed, but I do not really think it is of importance because it is in the side-note. We have to look at what is in the Measure itself.
What we are doing by this subsection, as I understand it, is to try to find out what "malice aforethought" is required for the killing to amount to murder when not done
in the course or furtherance of another offence.
I find it extremely difficult to grasp that in my own mind. What is that degree of malice aforethought express or implied? The difficulty which I have, and it is a genuine difficulty, which I am sure my right hon. and learned Friend can clear up, is in contemplating the sort


of murder that he has in mind which is not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.

Mr. S. Silverman: Does the hon. Gentleman agree with me or not—I genuinely want to know—that it looks very much as if this Clause has been drafted on the assumption that constructive malice can occur only where a killing happens in the course of committing another offence, whereas in fact constructive malice may apply to a wide variety of other things?

Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: That may well be so. I should not like to say "yes" or "no" to the hon. Member. He may well be right.
I find it difficult to isolate the sort of murder that does occur except in the course or furtherance of another offence. I suppose if there is such a murder—and there may be—the malice aforethought required must surely be an intention to kill. It cannot be anything else.
If it be that type of isolated murder, which is pure-blooded murder—if I may use that expression—which does not involve any other crime, the malice aforethought required must be the intention to kill. If that is correct, what does the subsection mean? I do not think its intention is that it is only the intention to kill and no other intention that must be proved both in the case of a murder which is not done in the course or furtherance of another offence and in the case of one that is done in the course or furtherance of another offence, which is precisely what the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) wants.
So we have really come to an absurd conclusion, if my argument is correct, because I am quite sure that is not the intention of the Clause. I hear the Attorney-General saying my argument is not correct, and I am perfectly prepared to believe that it is not, but I still do not know where the flaw in it is, and I should like to know.

Mr. Douglas Houghton: I am not a lawyer. I believe there are far too many lawyers in this Committee. I am certain that all the lawyers came here with worthy motives, but that to make the law understanded by the people was

not one of them. I remark that the Chairman of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment was Sir Ernest Gowers, who was the author of a best seller supplied free to all civil servants and called "Plain Words." I presume that the Parliamentary draftsmen and others connected with the drafting of the law were not given a copy.
What appeared to me good about the Amendment was that not only did it make the subsection intelligible but it expressed the law as most people think it is; and not only think it is, but probably agree that is how it should be. As I understand the subsection, it means that if one kills a person while one is committing another felony it is not murder unless it can be proved one had as much intent to kill as one would have had had one committed the crime not in the course of committing that felony. In other words, if a person is engaged in burglary and is surprised by the householder and lashes out at him and kills him, it is not murder unless he had as much intent to kill in his mind then as he would have had if he had met his victim in other circumstances when he was not in the course of committing a felony. There is a long rigmarole in the Bill to get that over but probably my explanation is longer still.
5.30 p.m.
The Attorney-General said that this subsection sets out to abolish the doctrine of constructive malice, and that alone, and that the Clause as drafted achieves that purpose, and therefore is good and need not be amended. But my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) pointed out that even if the Clause abolishes successfully the doctrine of constructive malice, it leaves the definition of murder in an untidy state. Since the Bill is designed to amend the law relating to homicide and other matters, it seems to me that there is no reason why we should not do as good a job as we can while we are at it.
The effect of the Amendment seems to me plainly simple. It seems to be in accordance with public belief of what the law is and in accordance with what the public believe to be the right sort of thing. The Amendment achieves all these


purposes at the same time. It causes the Clause to say,
Where a person kills another, the killing shall not amount to murder if the killing be unintentional.
What could be simpler than that? I realise that there has been so much law set out in judgments in particular cases that that is one of the difficulties with our law at the present time.
It is not what one reads in the Act, it is the dicta of learned judges from time to time, and therefore, one can never know what the law is by producing a copy of the Act. One must have volume upon volume of case law in order to find out what learned judges have said at different times about the construction of the Act. I believe that to be a lamentable state of affairs, because all citizens should know the law. Even those of us who may be contemplating a felony should know the law. How can we be deterred from committing a felony if we do not know the law relating to it?

Mr. S. Silverman: It is, of course, an old maxim of the same common law that everybody is presumed to know what it is.

Mr. Houghton: I am glad to be reminded of that. It is all the more necessary if we are required to comprehend the law that we should make a reasonable effort to do so, and at present that is not possible. I hope, therefore, that the Attorney-General will reconsider this matter in the light of the purpose of the Amendment. I can only apologise to the Committee for intervening in the debate and say that since I have had no success in my mission to secure clarity of language in the law relating to Income Tax, I turn my attention to the Homicide Bill.

The Attorney-General: The remarks of the hon. Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton) about the need to consult a large number of law reports for the purpose of construing a statute are particularly applicable to that branch of the law with which he is especially familiar. The tax law indeed requires that. I think that there is some misconception about what this Bill is intended to do, and what it does. Therefore, I should like to clarify the position a little.

Clause 1 (1) refers to:
Where a person kills another, in the course or furtherance of some other offence..

That is one of the categories in which the doctrine of constructive malice normally applies.

Mr. S. Silverman: Only one.

The Attorney-General: I said "one" and I repeat "one".
Subsection (2) deals with the other recognised categories of cases in which the doctrine of constructive malice is normally thought to apply. It refers to a killing done:
in the course or for the purpose of resisting an officer of justice, or of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue from legal custody …
and states that it shall be:
treated as a killing in the course or furtherance of an offence.
Therefore, all these categories of cases are brought within the scope of subsection (1). That being so, in relation to all those categories where constructive malice applies, the provision is that the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence. That is to say, we are here excluding those constructive malice categories, and the Bill as drafted, in my opinion, does that in an absolutely satisfactory way.
Then the question is asked, "What is meant by the same malice aforethought?" I do not seek to criticise anyone, for this is a very complicated subject, but it has been complicated by reference to Sir James Stephen's "Digest of the Criminal Law" where, in his definition of the meaning of malice aforethought, he includes not only what is ordinarily regarded as constituting malice aforethought but also the categories of constructive malice.
Now, having taken out the constructive malice by this Clause, we are left, if the Clause is carried into the Bill, with cases of malice where the malice is not constructive. I shall be asked, and I shall want to say, what that amounts to. It amounts to the very thing that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) prayed at the conclusion of his speech that we should do. He said in conclusion, "Do not go on convicting persons of murder where there is no intention to kill and no intention to do


grievous bodily harm." In my view, the Clause as drafted will mean that to constitute malice aforethought, which is required now in relation to a murder which is not in the constructive malice categories, it will have to be shown either that there was an intention to cause death or an intention to do grievous bodily harm or that there was knowledge that the act would probably cause death or probably cause grievous bodily harm.

Mr.Paget: Mr.Pagetrose—

The Attorney-General: I should be obliged if the hon. and learned Member would not interrupt. I am trying to deal with the point raised by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne. I think that I know the point which the hon. and learned Member wishes to raise, and I will come to it in a moment. If it should turn out that I do not know, I will give way.
As I was saying, that is the practical, intended effect of the Clause, and I think that that effect is achieved by the present wording. Some criticism was made of Parliamentary counsel and there was reference to the use of plain language. I assure the hon. Member for Sowerby that the task of drafting the Clause to achieve the desired result is a difficult one and that the closest possible examination has been made to try to secure the correct and desired result. Instead of being criticised, Parliamentary counsel should have great tribute paid to them for the success with which they have accomplished that task.
The difference between the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) appears to me to be this. In moving the Amendment, the hon. and learned Member for Northampton said, "Let us confine it to an intent to kill. Let us leave out cases where there is intent to do grievous bodily harm." I think that the hon. and learned Member varied that a little later on by saying that really that would amount to an intent to kill. But we want it clear, as it is in the ordinary case where we do not have constructive malice categories coming in, that there must be either intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm or knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm will probably result. That is what this Clause does, and in my submission to the Committee it is satisfactory.
I hope that I have answered the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke). The hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) asked what would be the position under the Clause in a case such as that of Stone. It is clear what the position would be. There would be no conviction for murder on the facts in a case like that unless it was proved to the satisfaction of the jury that the accused had an intent to do grievous bodily harm or knew that the act he would perform would result in it.

Mr. Charles Royle: If what the Attorney-General is claiming for this Clause is that it carries out the same intent, why not accept the simplest wording?

The Attorney-General: This is the simplest wording to carry out that intention. If it were put in the wording suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, it would be left completely open because the Clause would merely say that it should not be unintentional; that is to say, it must have some intent. If we inserted the words "with intent to kill" we should get this trouble. Take the case of someone shooting with a revolver who, meaning to kill B, kills C. There certainly was never an intention to kill C. If we put in those words the association would be between the two. It would be construed as meaning intent to kill the person killed. Indeed, that was what the hon. and learned Gentleman said in the course of his introductory speech.

Mr. Paget: It was the opposite.

The Attorney-General: No, I took a note.

Mr. Paget: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman will forgive me, I said exactly the opposite. I said that this would include an intention to kill either A or B. There must be an intention to kill. Unless there is, it should not be murder.

The Attorney-General: I am sorry if I misunderstood the hon. and learned Gentleman. I will certainly look up the OFFICIAL REPORT to see what he said, but I understood him to say at one stage in his speech" an intention to kill the person killed".

Mr. Paget: No.

The Attorney-General: Well, we need not argue about it now. At any rate we have it clear between us that all the hon. and learned Gentleman was saying was, an intent to kill. We intend to keep to the present system, namely, the intent to kill or the intent to do grievous bodily harm, which is usually required to be proved in all murder charges that come outside the category where constructive malice applies. As I said first, we are not proposing here to make any other change than to abolish that doctrine, which has been condemned in so many quarters.
After having had this useful debate, I hope that we may now be able to make a little progress.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: As this is the first occasion, Sir Gordon, upon which you have appeared before the Committee invested with your well-earned, new-found dignity and authority, I should like to offer congratulations to you upon it.
It is clear that the Bill will provide a wonderful opportunity for those of our colleagues who are lawyers. I propose, therefore, in the words of the poet, to intervene only seldom and circumspectly. I am emboldened to do so only because my hon. Friend the Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton) broke the ice and took part in the debate from the point of view of a layman.
The Attorney-General has told us several times what is the intention of the Government behind this Clause. All of us are wholly agreed about the desirability of putting an end to the doctrine of constructive malice. The doubt which many of us have, and which has been expressed by hon. and learned Members on both sides of the Committee, who are much better qualified to put it than I am, is whether the Clause does what it is supposed to do.

The question which we really have to decide is not what is the intention of the Government, and whether that is a good intention, but whether the words in the Clause satisfactorily carry out that intention. It may be that they do, but the fact that so many lawyers on both sides of the Committee have expressed their doubt whether that is so, raises at all events some slight doubt in the minds of those of us who are not lawyers.

5.45 p.m.

It is clear from what has taken place this afternoon that if the present wording of the Clause remains as it is, it will certainly not be clear to the public as a whole, and a vast amount of judicial interpretation will be needed. I had hoped very much that, in view of the criticisms made from both sides of the Committee, the Attorney-General would at least promise some reconsideration of the wording of the Clause. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman has not felt able to do that, if my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) feels that he must press this Amendment to a Division, I shall feel inclined to accompany him in the Division Lobby.

Mr. M. Turner-Samuels: Before we divide the Committee, it should be pointed out that if the Amendment were adopted the Clause would be quite unintelligible. I know that my hon. and learned Friend is very sincere about this. I know he wants to do what is right, and I think his anxiety is to make clear what he thinks is obscure at present.

Mr. Percy Shurmer: Let him do it then.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: But what his Amendment will succeed in doing if it is carried is to make obscure what is at present clear. The effect of the Clause, as he proposes it, would be that if the killing be unintentional, then killing shall not amount to murder unless it is intentional. That would be the terminological effect if my hon. and learned Friend's Amendment were substituted for the present wording—in other words, that would completely confuse the question of malice aforethought as it now stands in the Clause.
There is one great difficulty in this matter of the proposed Amendment which has not been considered. The Amendment uses the word "unintentional". May I ask my hon. and learned Friend this question: at what point of time in the transaction is the action to be regarded as unintentional? It may well be that when the original act of killing or of felony begins, the other person who in the course or furtherance of it is eventually killed was not intended to be killed by the killer, but, in the events which happened during the transaction, what


was originally not an intention to kill becomes such an intention subsequently and the killing is carried out.
Suppose, by way of illustration, that someone intends to kill a particular individual in a crowd, takes out a revolver in order to shoot that person, who is surrounded by other persons, and in shooting misses him but kills several other people. Would my hon. and learned Friend suggest that it would be right to allow that person to put forward the plea that he did not intend to kill these others? It is at the point of the time when the act of that man is such that he must be taken to have formed malice aforethought, formed an intention in connection with those other people to commit the act of murder, because that act was in the circumstances such that it was inevitable that someone else or some other people would be killed. Therefore, if, in such a case, these words "if the killing be unintentional "are introduced, how are they going to be interpreted as applied to those facts.
Is the jury to be told "When this matter began, the man had no intention to kill. Unfortunately, during the course of the events he took out his revolver in circumstances in which killing was inevitable, but instead of killing A, unfortunately he killed B, B being so near A that it was a result that was inevitable."? To introduce words of the type suggested by the Amendment must be quite wrong and would result in the Clause being unworkable.

The Clause, as it stands, says:
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.

In other words, its effect is that, by the same token as one has to have malice aforethought where there is an original killing, one has to have the same malice aforethought where there is another killing which takes place during the same transaction. If in the course or furtherance of the original killing, or some other offence, the guilty person at any point brings his act to the deliberate purpose of killing, that is murder within the Clause as it now stands. The Clause says so clearly and properly. In those circumstances, I support the Clause as it stands.

Mr. Paget: Perhaps I might read the subsection as I suggest it should be amended:
Where a person kills another…the killing shall not amount to murder if the killing be unintentional.…
Is there anyone except a lunatic or a very learned lawyer who cannot understand those words? I venture to assert, on the assumption that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels) is not promoted to the Bench, that there really is not, and will not be, a judge who is perverse enough not to understand it.

Mr. Turner-Samuels: That is not argument; that is abuse.

Mr. Paget: If anybody likes to add to those words:
if the killing be unintentional
"unintentional "being the lack of intention to kill, I shall have no objection to the addition, although I do not think the words are necessary.
If we take these words, for which there is an ordinary meaning, what will be the direction to the jury in a case where a man says "I did not intend to kill; I intended only to injure"? The direction to the jury is simply, "A man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his action. If you think the injury that he intended was such that the natural and probable consequence was death, then he is guilty of murder. But if you think that the injury was such that the natural and probable consequence was not death, then, although he intended to injure, it was not murder.
That would exclude the intention to inflict grievous bodily harm. As was said by the Royal Commission, the interpretation has been that it need not be permanent or dangerous but only such as sensibly to interfere with health or comfort. Where all that one intended to do was sensibly to interfere with comfort, I do not think that ought to be murder, and that is all my Amendment says.
Here I would ask for the Attorney-General's special attention. I believe that my Amendment is relatively simple to understand and a very easy one on which to direct a jury, but I find his proposal very difficult, and I believe that, logically, it means something quite different from what he says. I am not at all certain


that, as the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) pointed out, it does not go further, because wounding with intention to cause grievous bodily harm, is. of course, an offence.
Let me just read the subsection substituting that offence for:
… or furtherance of some other offence. …
We then get:
Where a person kills another in the course of wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course of wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm.
Where the offence is wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, that is how the subsection must apply.
If the killing was done not in the course of wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, what is the malice aforethought required? Surely, it must be "to kill." Therefore, I would say that on the logical interpretation of it the intention to wound and to inflict grievous bodily harm is excluded from being murder by the Clause. It is a highly complicated way to do it.
Why do the Government not accept an addition to the effect that "unintentional" means "without an intention to kill"? This could be done on the Report stage, if the Attorney-General would like that. Why not accept simple words

Division No. 7.]
AYES
[5.58 p.m.


Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry
Deedes, W. F.


Aitken, W. T.
Brooman-White, R. C.
Digby, Simon Wingfield


Allan, R. A. (Paddington, s.)
Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)
Dodds-Parker, A. D.


Alport, C. J. M.
Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Doughty, C. J. A.


Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William
Burden, F. F. A.
Drayson, G. B.


Arbuthnot, John
Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A.(Saffron Walden)
du Cann, E. D. L.


Armstrong, C. W.
Campbell, Sir David
Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)


Ashton, H.
Carr, Robert
Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.


Atkins, H. E.
Cary, Sir Robert
Duthie, W. S.


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Channon, H.
Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)


Baldwin, A. E.
Chichester-Clark, R.
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.


Balniel, Lord
Cole, Norman
Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn


Barlow, Sir John
Conant, Maj Sir Roger
Errington, Sir Eric


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Cooper-Key, E. M.
Farey-Jones, F. W.


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Fell, A.


Bidgood, J. C.
Corfieid, Capt. F. V.
Finlay, Graeme


Biggs-Davison, J. A.
Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Fisher, Nigel


Bishop, F. P.
Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Fletcher-Cooke, C.


Black, C. W.
Crouch, R. F.
Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe &amp; Lonsdale)


Body, R. F.
Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)
Freeth, D. K.


Bossom, Sir Alfred
Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.
Cunningham, Knox
George, J. C. (Pollok)


Boyle, Sir Edward
Currie, G. B. H.
Gibson-Watt, D.


Braine, B. R.
Dance, J. C. G.
Godber, J. B.


Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Davidson, Viscountess
Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan


Bromley Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.
D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Gower, H. R.

which everyone will clearly understand such as:
Where a person kills another, the killing shall not amount to murder if it be unintentional.
That seems simple enough. I think it amounts to the same thing as the other words, but it gets us where we want to be very much more easily.

Mr. S. Silverman: The Government say that that is what they want.

Mr. Paget: No, they apparently think that they are including that form of constructive malice which consists of an intention to injure but not to kill when, in fact, on their own words, they are not including it.

Mr. Silverman: I did not say that I agreed with the Government's interpretation of their Clause. I would say that the Attorney-General, from his lucid explanation, wants the same thing as my hon. and learned Friend and I want, only he does not get it.

Mr. Paget: In the circumstances, and hoping that by Report stage the Attorney-General will have reconsidered the point, I must ask the Committee to divide on the Amendment.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 225, Noes 194.

Graham, Sir Fergus
Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Grant, W. (Woodside)
Linstead, Sir H. N.
Remnant, Hon. P.


Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Renton, D. L. M.


Green, A.
Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.
Ridsdale, J. E.


Gresham Cooke, R.
Longden, Gilbert
Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)


Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)


Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)


Gurden, Harold
McCallum, Major Sir Duncan
Roper, Sir Harold


Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.
Macdonald, Sir Peter
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard


Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)
McKibbin, A. J.
Russell, R. S.


Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)
Schofield, Lt.- Col. W.


Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
McLaughlin, Mrs. P.
Scott-Miller, Cmdr. H.


Harvie-Watt, Sir George
McLean, Neil (Inverness)
Sharples, R. C.


Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
MacLeod, John (Ross &amp; Cromarty)
Shepherd, William


Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.
Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)
Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)


Hesketh, R. F.
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)


Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)


Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)
Maddan, Martin
Soames, Capt. C.


Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)
Spearman, Sir Alexander


Hill, John (S. Norfolk)
Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)
Speir, R. M.


Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)


Hirst, Geoffrey
Markham, Major Sir Frank
Spens, R. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)


Holland-Martin, C. J.
Marshall, Douglas
Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard


Hope, Lord John
Maude, Angus
Stevens, Geoffrey


Hornby, R. P.
Mawby, R. L.
Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)


Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.
Maydon, Lieut.-Comdr. S. L. C.
Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)


Horobin, Sir Ian
Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.
Storey, S.


Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence
Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh
Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)


Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Moore, Sir Thomas
Studholme, Sir Henry


Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)
Morrison, John (Salisbury)
Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)


Howard, John (Test)
Nabarro, G. D. N.
Temple, J. M.


Hughes Hallett, Vice Admiral J.
Nairn, D. L. S.
Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)


Hughes-Young, M. H. C.
Neave, Airey
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Hurd, A. R.
Nicholls, Harmar
Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)


Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)
Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.


Hyde, Montgomery
Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. amp; Chr'ch)
Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.


Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.
Nugent, G. R. H.
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Iremonger, T. L.
Oakshott, H. D.
Turner, H. F. L.


Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)
Turner-Samuels, M.


Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Vane, W. M. F.


Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.


Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Osborne, C.
Vickers, Miss J. H.


Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)
Page, R. G.
Vosper, D. F.


Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot
Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, w.)


Kaberry, D.
Partridge, E.
Wakefield, Sir wavell (St. M'lebone)


Keegan, D.
Pickthorn, K. W. M,
Wall, Major Patrick


Kimball, M.
Pilkington, Capt. R. A.
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)


Kirk, P. M.
Pitman, I. J.
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Lagden, G. W.
Pitt, Miss E. M.
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Lambert, Hon. G.
Pott, H. P.
Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith &amp; Border)


Lambton, Viscount
Powell, J. Enoch
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Langford-Holt, J. A.
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)


Leavey, J. A.
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Leburn, W. G.
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.
Wood, Hon. R.


Legge-Bourke, MaJ. E. A. H.
Profumo, J. D.
Woollam, John Victor


Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)
Raikes, Sir Victor



Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.
Rawlinson, Peter
TELLERS FOR THE AYES


Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)
Redmayne, M.
Mr. Wills and Mr. Bryan.

NOES


Ainsley, J. W.
Brown, Thomas (Ince)
Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)


Albu, A. H.
Burke, W. A.
Dye, S.


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Callaghan, L. J.
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)


Anderson, Frank
Champion, A. J.
Edwards, W. j. (Stepney)


Awbery, S. S.
Chapman, W. D.
Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)


Bacon, Miss Alice
Chetwynd, G. R.
Fernyhough, E.


Baird, J.
Clunie, J.
Finch, H. J.


Balfour, A.
Coldrick, W.
Fletcher, Eric


Bellenger Rt. Hon. F. J.
Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)
Forman, J. C.


Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)
Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch &amp; Finsbury)
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)


Benson, G.
Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H, T. N.


Beswick, F.
Cove, W. G.
Gibson, C. W.


Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Gooch, E. G.


Blackburn, F.
Cronin, J. D.
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Cullen, Mrs. A.
Greenwood, Anthony


Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.)
Daines, P.
Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.


Bowles, F. G.
Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Grey, C. F.


Brockway, A. F.
de Freitas, Geoffrey
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Dodds, N. N.
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Grimond, J.
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Skeffingon, A. M.


Hale, Leslie
Marquand, R. Hon. H. A.
Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)


Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Mason, Roy
Slater, J. (Sedgefield)


Hamilton, W. W.
Mellish, R. J.
Smith, Ellis (Stoke)


Hannan, W.
Messer, Sir F.
Snow, J. W.


Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)
Mikardo, Ian
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Hastings, S.
Mitchison, G. R.
Steele, T.


Hayman, F. H.
Monslow, W.
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Healey, Denis
Moyle, A.
Stones, W. (Consett)


Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)
Mulley, F. W.
Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)


Herbison, Miss M.
Neal, Harold (Bolsovar)
Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)


Holmes, Horace
Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.


Holt, A. F.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)
Sylvester, G. O.


Houghton, Douglas
Oliver, G. H.
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)
Orbach, M.
Taylor, John (West Lothian)


Howell, Denis (All Saints)
Oswald, T.
Thornton, E.


Hubbard, T. F.
Padley, W. E.
Timmons, J.


Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Paget, R. T.
Ungoed-Thomas, Sr Lynn


Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Palmer, A. M. F.
Usborne, H. C.


Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Viant, S. P.


Hunter, A. E.
Parker, J.
Wade, D. W.


Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Parkin, B. T.
Warbey, W. N.


Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Paton, John
Weitzman, D.


Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Pearson, A.
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn &amp; St. Pncs, S)
Peart, T. F.
Wheeldon, W. E.


Johnson, James (Rugby)
Pentland, N.
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)
Plummer, Sir Leslie
White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)


Jones, David (The Hartlepools)
Popplewell, E.
Wigg, George


Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Wilkins, W. A.


Kenyon, C.
Probert, A. R.
Willey, Frederick


Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Proctor, W. T.
Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)


King, Dr. H. M.
Pryde, D. J.
Williams, Ronald (Wigan)


Lawson, G. M.
Randall, H. E.
Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)


Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Rankin, John
Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)


Lindgren, G. S.
Redhead, E. C.
Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)


Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.
Reeves, J.
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Logan, D. G.
Rhodes, H.
Winterbottom, Richard


Mahon, Dr. J. Dickson
Robens, Rt. Hon. A.
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


MacColl, J. E.
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Yates, V. (Ladywood)


McGhee, H. G.
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.


McInnes, J.
Ross, William
Zilliacus, K.


McKay, John (Wallsend)
Royle, C.



McLeavy, Frank
Shurmer, P. L. E.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Mr. Short and Mr. Deer.


Mahon, Simon
Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Sir Frank Soskice: I beg to move, in page 1, line 10, to leave out "(express or implied)".
My object in moving the Amendment is really to ask the Attorney-General to have another look at the language of this subsection. Many of the arguments which I want to use have already been used by my hon. Friends on the last Amendments and I shall not repeat them.
My hon. Friends have questioned whether the subsection will work at all. I should like to have the Attorney-General's views upon this aspect of the matter. The subsection provides that where a person kills another in the course of committing some other offence, the same malice aforethought shall be requisite as is required for a killing done not in the course of committing another offence. I would ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether he can think of a killing which can ever be committed when it is not in the course of furtherance of another offence.
I will explain what I mean. If I take a dagger and stick it into somebody, am I not, by the very act of sticking it into somebody, committing another offence, namely, that of causing grievous bodily injury? Am I not at least committing the offence of an assault? The Attorney-General may be able to give me some examples, but I very much doubt whether a person can ever kill another without, at the same time, committing a number of offences upon him. The murderer would assault the other person, cause him grievous bodily injury, and probably do damage to property. He would threaten him, and do all sorts of things while killing him.
If I am right, it seems to me that the Clause is completely nugatory. It is designed to envisage the case of a killing which is done not in the course of the commission of another offence, but I submit that there just cannot be any such killing. Any killing is always done in the course of the commission of some other offence. An obvious offence in


each case is that of causing grievous bodily harm.
If that is so, the Clause simply will not work. Much as we desire to achieve the object which the right hon. and learned Gentleman has in mind, I would ask him to consider whether, in the language which he and his advisers have adopted, he has got anywhere near achieving it. It will be impossible to envisage the kind of malice aforethought which is requisite when the killing is a killing independently, per se, and in no sense allied to the commission of some other offence, because it always is. Unless I am wholly mistaken, therefore, it seems to me that the Clause will not work in any case. Unless there is a simple and easy answer to what I have been putting to him—which, I am bound to say, is very likely—the Clause will not work.
I submit that the words which the Amendment seeks to delete simply add ambiguity. Implied malice is generally regarded as including constructive malice. The term "implied malice" is sometimes used in the text books as covering constructive malice. Therefore, the Clause posits malice aforethought, whether expressed or implied, and, therefore, includes constructive malice, which needs to be present in the case of a killing not accompanying the commission of some other offence.
I submit that there cannot be any such killing, and if I am right it is sufficient for the killing to amount to murder if there is constructive malice, which there will be if it is an offence committed in the course of inflicting grievous bodily injury. For those reasons, I would ask the Attorney-General, if he feels that there may be a flaw in the words of the Clause, to say that he will give the matter further consideration.
If he does so, I hope that he will also give some thought to the points raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northamtpon (Mr. Paget) and my other hon. Friends who, between them, in various forms, have suggested what, on analysis, is possibly a much simpler formula, in an endeavour to achieve the object of abolishing constructive malice. My hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) possibly suggested the simplest solution of all, namely, that the

words "that the doctrine of constructive malice is abolished" should be inserted.
I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will give that point further consideration. I hope that the Clause will work, and that I have omitted to discern a simple answer to the point which I have raised. I put it to the Attorney-General that when he is dealing with the offence of murder, the characteristics of which every citizen should be able to appreciate, he may feel it desirable to use some formula which is less reminiscent of a Finance Act than the one that he has used. I hope that he will not think that I am seeking to criticise Parliamentary draftsmen. I know how difficult their task is, but with their great expertise in these matters I think that they may be able to devise a formula which is more intelligible to ordinary persons who are considering whether or not they should commit a murder, and which will tell them what the consequences will be if they do.

6.15 p.m.

The Attorney-General: In the course of moving the Amendment the right hon. and learned Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) referred to the debate which we had on the last Amendment, and asked me to make certain observations in connection with it. I assume that I should not be in order in reopening a past debate, despite what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said.
If you will permit me, Sir Gordon, I should like to add my congratulations to those which have already been extended to you on you attaining your new office.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman suggested that if the words "express or implied "were left out it would add clarity to the subsection. I think that the converse is the case, and that we want those words in to show that malice afore thought covers both kinds—express and implied. Some question may be raised—

Mr. John Paton: What is the difference between the two?

The Attorney-General: If the hon. Member will wait he will see. I was just going to say that a question may be raised as to the difference between the two. The terms "express malice" and "implied malice" are used in two differing senses, one by text book writers, very


frequently, and in a loose way, and the other by the courts. Express malice, in its proper sense, covers premeditation; the implication that murder was intended—such as by lying in wait.
Implied malice covers cases where no malice is expressed or openly indicated, but where there is a sudden killing without provocation. That is the sense in which that expression was used by Lord Sankey in the case of Woolmington, with which the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be familiar. Lord Sankey said:
When dealing with a murder case the Crown must prove (a) death as a result of a voluntary act of the accused and (b) malice of the accused. It may prove malice either expressly or by implication. For malice may be implied where death occurs as a result of a voluntary act of the accused which is (i) intentional and (ii) provoked.
It can also be used loosely—I believe that it is a loose use of the term—to cover an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. Some people refer to that as a case of implied malice because there was no intention to kill, but I do not think that that is the correct use.
The only point of having those words in the Clause is to make it quite clear that both kinds of malice are included by the expression "malice aforethought," and I think that the omission of those words would leave that in doubt.

Mr. Paget: Surely the right hon. and learned Gentleman has misunderstood the passage which he quoted from Lord Sankey's observations. Lord Sankey was not distinguishing between malice expressed and implied; he was distinguishing between the proof of malice by circumstantial evidence and by direct evidence. That is quite a different conception.

The Attorney-General: The hon. and learned Gentleman and I will not get much further forward if we argue about what Lord Sankey meant by the words he used. I believe that his words show quite clearly what he regarded as implied malice. If the hon. and learned Gentleman does not agree with me we must leave it at that.
The next point with which I want to deal is not raised by the Amendment, but the right hon. and learned Gentleman asked me to deal with it, and I think we dealt with it a little in our discussion on the

last Amendment. It refers to the use of the words at the end of subsection (1):
… done in the course or furtherance of another offence.
He posed the question: was not every murder done in the course of furtherance of another offence? I am not sure that that is strictly accurate, but I would agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman that when a person commits a murder, he probably commits, at the same time, a whole number of other offences. I think that that is common ground between us. The short answer to the right hon. and learned Gentleman is that the reference in line 12 of subsection (1) is a reference back to the malice aforethought. The same malice aforethought is required for a killing to amount to murder when it is not done in one of the cases to which the doctrine of constructive malice applies.
As the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows, that doctrine does not apply to the killing in the course or furtherance of some other offence. I think that the best way of expressing it. The effect of it is that we eliminate those cases in determining whether the malice aforethought is present which is required in an ordinary case which would not come within the constructive malice doctrine. I think that the language is effective for its purpose. It is not a case of the Clause envisaging a killing not in the course of another offence. What the Clause is saying is that you must have the same malice aforethought in these cases where constructive malice may possibly mean that you have a lesser degree of malice, as in the case where no question of constructive malice could in the past possibly arise.
I am not giving any undertaking to alter the wording. Indeed, it might not be possible to improve on it. But one always gives consideration to anything said in the course of debates during the Committee stage of a Bill. I can assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman—I know he will take it from me—that the wording of this particular provision has been the subject of close and careful consideration, with a view to achieving the object which hon. Members on both sides of the Committee hold, although some hon. Members want the object extended beyond the purpose of Clause 1.

Mr. S. Silverman: It is, of course, some indication of the extreme complexity of these matters that a Clause which the Attorney-General recommended to the Committee when we were discussing the last Amendments, precisely on the ground of the simplicity and clarity of its draftsmanship, should, nevertheless, be capable of being described by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) as producing a ludicrous result.
It seems to me a very great pity when, at long last, the House of Commons is directing its attention to removing from our law the anomalies in the definition of murder, which everyone knows to have been present for so long, that we should have a Clause which is capable of so much construction in more senses than one, and producing such confusion in the minds of the ordinary people; not so much those who may be deciding whether they will or will not commit this crime, but those unfortunate citizens who may one day find themselves in a jury box and be called upon to decide whether a crime has been committed.
I wish to explain my own difficulties. I have no claim, and I make no claim. to be expert in these matters in any way—one does one's best. But my right hon. and learned Friend has raised two points on the construction of the language, and the Attorney-General has attempted to reply to them. I must say that I could not understand—I am quite sure that it is my fault and not his—his answer on either point.
Let us take, first, the parenthesis which my right hon. and learned Friend wishes to leave out. The Attorney-General devoted a substantial part of his argument to explaining to us the difference between express malice and implied malice. With respect to him, it is not that distinction which causes the difficulty; it is not that distinction which will give difficulty to a juryman who is called on to decide whether the man in the dock is guilty or not guilty. What the juryman will be much more concerned with is just what my right hon. and learned Friend said, that if we are to imply malice, then from what is the implication to arise? In other words, what exactly is the difference between implied malice and constructive malice? Is there a difference between the two? If so, what is it?
As I understand constructive malice, it is this. We start, as we all explained to one another in the last debate, from the notion that no killing could be murder unless there was, in the mind of the killer, malice. That was plain enough, until the courts and the judges and the lawyers got busy on it. They sought to say, of course, that where the malice is clear, there is no difficulty, but they thought that malice ought to be implied from certain circumstances where it was not clear, where it was not expressed; and I submit that constructive malice never meant anything more than this. It meant malice that was not clear, malice that was not expressed, but malice which ought, in fairness, to be implied from the surrounding circumstances. If constructive malice is malice to be implied from some surrounding circumstances, how do we distinguish it from implied malice which must equally be malice which is implied from surrounding circumstances?

The Attorney-General: If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, perhaps I can help him. If he will look at paragraph 81 of the Report of the Royal Commission, he will see that there it points out that if we have this doctrine of constructive malice, for instance, where death is caused—I will quote from the last two lines in page 30 of the Report:
Although the exact effect of these decisions may be uncertain, they seem to justify the conclusion that, where death is caused in the commission of a felony involving violence, a lesser degree of violence may justify a verdict of murder than would be necessary in other circumstances, so that (as it is put by the Editor of the most recent edition of Stephen's Digest) 'the fact that the prisoner was engaged on a felony increases the risk for him that upon death accidentally resulting from his felonious enterprise he will be held guilty of murder'.
So where we get the doctrine of constructive malice applying, although it may be implied from the facts, the degree of malice may well be less than in the ordinary case where that doctrine does not apply.

Mr. Silverman: I am obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I had not altogether overlooked the point, but I am grateful to him for reminding me of it. That direction and his explanation of it is undoubtedly a very lucid explanation of one kind of constructive malice. I say with diffidence and with respect—I said it in the previous debate and I


repeat it now because I still think it to be true—that I think the fallacy on which possibly the draftsmen or the Government have constructed this whole Clause is that they have thought from the beginning that paragraph 81 was an exhaustive definition of constructive malice. Quite plainly it is not, and, plainly, the Royal Commission never thought that it was.
6.30 p.m.
I agree that there is no difficulty in defining the rather vague border between implied malice on the one hand and constructive malice on the other hand in the precise circumstances contemplated by paragraph 81, but from the point of view of my right hon. and learned Friend there is a great deal more than that in it. There are a great many cases of constructive malice where another offence is not involved. I should have thought that it would be very much better and simpler on this one point to leave the parenthesis out and to leave the prosecution to prove malice in any way they could to the satisfaction of the jury. There is no need at all to have the parenthesis.
I come to the point made by my right hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-General's answer to which seemed to take the matter no further. The Attorney-General began by conceding the whole matter. My right hon. and learned Friend's case was based on the proposition that every murder involved the commission of other offences, and that it was, in practice, impossible to commit a murder at all without committing, at the same time, a variety of other offences; so that murder was always committed in the course or furtherance of some other offence. The Attorney-General conceded that and then, in my very respectful submission to him, missed the whole point of his concession. He said, "That refers back to the beginning of the Clause." No doubt it does. Let us refer back to the beginning of the Clause and see how it looks. It says:
Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence.
It is common ground now between my right hon. and learned Friend and the Attorney-General that that is every murder that ever is or ever could be.

What is exactly meant by those words? The Clause goes on:
The killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a kiling to amount to murder"—
which never happens. That is the situation in which the Attorney-General finds himself in defending a Clause which he recommends to the Committee for its clarity and simplicity.
Where are we getting to? I should have thought that the Clause as it stands, so far from effecting the purpose which the Government say they want and which is the purpose which we all want, achieves precisely nothing whatever, because it is not capable of having any intelligible meaning attached to it. This seems clear from the concession which the Attorney-General has made. In these circumstances one would expect the Attorney-General to be a little more forthcoming. I concede that he said, "We always look at everything that is said, but I am not giving any pledge", but by his own concession the Clause is completely meaningless. He has said so.

The Attorney-General: indicated dissent.

Mr. Silverman: No doubt the right hon. and learned Gentleman did not say it in words, but he constructively said so.

The Attorney-General: No.

Mr. Charles A. Howell: Malice aforethought.

Mr. Silverman: I do not think that there was any malice aforethought. That is always the difficulty when we are dealing with implied and constructive malice. I acquit the Attorney-General of any malice aforethought, but, constructively, he has said that this thing is agreed. He has said that no murder is capable of being committed except in the commission of some other offence.

The Attorney-General: The hon. Gentleman is completely misquoting me. I never said that it was impossible to commit a murder except in the course or furtherance of another offence. I said that he who commits a murder probably commits, at the same time, other offences. There is a great deal of distinction between committing other offences at the


same time and committing murder in the course or furtherance of some other offence.

Mr. Silverman: I am even more grateful to the Attorney-General this time than I was last time. I hope he recognises that I am making a genuine and sincere attempt to get him to clarify what I believe to be unintelligible.
The Attorney-General is saying now that there is a difference, a conflict, between, on the one hand, committing murder in the course or furtherance of some other offence and, on the other hand, committing murder not in the course of or furtherance of some other offence but while committing other offences at the same time.
Is that what this Clause is intended to mean? Is the juryman, who is to be called upon to determine whether the man in the dock is guilty or not of murder, to have to decide, in addition to all the other burdens imposed upon him by the Clause, whether the other offences which are committed at the same time are offences in the course or furtherance of which the murder was committed or whether they were only simultaneous offences which have nothing to do with the murder? That is put forward as a further clarification of the law.
The Attorney-General's case was a little better before his intervention than it is now. Then he was merely saying that no murder could be committed unless other offences were committed at the same time. I thought he was accepting the perfectly simple proposition of my right hon. and learned Friend, that in that case the murder must be committed in the course or furtherance.
Let me take the example he gave to my right hon. and learned Friend. The Attorney-General invited the Committee to say that if a man takes out a knife and stabs a man with whom he is in combat the assault committed is not an offence in the course or furtherance of which he murders him if the blow goes deep enough to kill him, and that it is merely a simultaneous offence which happened to be committed at the same time. Really, it is complete nonsense.
Let me make an appeal to the Attorney-General. I know that it is his wish to give the Committee the right advice on the Bill, so far as he can. He

said in the course of the last debate that both sides of the Committee wanted the same thing and he did me the honour to quote sentences out of my previous speech in which I said—I translate it from his quotation—that he agreed with me that no one wanted anyone to be convicted of murder unless he either intended to kill or intended to inflict on someone such grievous bodily harm as any sensible person would know might imperil his life. The Attorney-General said that that was the common object on both sides.
If that is the common object intended to be effected by the Clause, I ask him this in all seriousness: does the Attorney-General think that the Clause does that simply and clearly, so that a jury can understand it, and that it does nothing else? If he agrees that even the extremely skilful and conscientious draftsman who drew up the Clause might, understandably, have been mistaken, is it possible, or beyond the resources of the draftsman's ingenuity, or beyond the reasonable resources of the English language, to formulate a Clause which would prove that simple thing in a simple, intelligible way?
Lawyers very often exaggerate the difficulties of stating a thing so that laymen can understand it. The matter is neither so complicated as they think it is nor are people's understandings so limited as they think they are. It is quite possible, surely, to find a form of words which would embody in an understandable way the proposition for which we are all contending and which the Attorney-General says is common ground, that no one shall be convicted of murder without intention as previously explained and defined.
Will not the Attorney-General now take this thing back and reconsider it? The Government are too hasty about this matter altogether. There is no urgency about these technical draftings. There is no reason why matters of this kind should be considered on the Floor of the House. They are matters properly to be examined by a Standing Committee of hon. Members who hear all the arguments before they vote. These are not questions to be decided by an influx of hon. Members from the Smoking Room, the Dining Room, or elsewhere, who have not heard a single word of the argument, but come in, cheerfully


obeying the Whips' command, and vote on matters in which consciences are so deeply engaged.
If the Government insist on dealing with this matter in this haphazard, hasty and irresponsible way, will they not now—the Clause having been demonstrated to them as ludicrous—take it back and reconsider it?

The Temporary Chairman (Mr. W. R. Williams): As a layman, I have hesitated to try to interrupt right hon. and hon. Gentlemen, but it seems to me that we are going a little wide of the Amendment. It would be very difficult for the Chair to accept a repetition of any of this argument on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

Mr. Paget: I do not find myself in entire agreement with my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) when he says that it ought to be possible to redraft this Clause. I do not think so. I agree with the Home Secretary. He advised the House that the decision it had to take was between abolition and retention and that any compromise of this sort to provide a system of new definitions and degrees of murder was quite impracticable. I think that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was quite right then, but he has produced a Bill which is quite impracticable.
I certainly understood the Attorney- General to agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) that no murder could be committed save either in the course of another offence—

The Attorney-General: The hon. and learned Member says that he understood me to say that. I am sure that when he looks at HANSARD he will see that I said nothing of the sort.

Mr. Paget: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman will wait a moment—I accept that—he will see that I said I understood him to say that. I then heard him say that that was not so. His second observation surprised me much more than his first. I will ask him this very simple question. Can he tell the Committee of a murder which would be no offence if the person had not died? If there is not an answer to that, surely every murderer

is necessarily convicted in the course of committing the offence which would have been committed if the victim had not died. Does it not follow that there cannot be a murder which is not committed in the course of some other offence?
6.45 p.m.
Let us see how this reads if that be logical. The Clause says:
Where a person kills another in the course … 
I leave out "or furtherance" because I do not need that—
of some other offence.
For that let us read, "all killings", because that is what it means. It would then be that in the case of all killings the killing
shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance. …
It means that any killing shall not amount to murder unles it is done with the same intention as would amount to murder if there were not a killing. It does not seem to make very good sense.
The next point with which I want to deal is the difference between "express and implied". My hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, North (Mr. J. Paton) interrupted the Attorney-General, who ticked him off—if I may use those words—saying that he was just going to tell my hon. Friend about that. I was on my toes with anticipation to hear the answer, but we never got it. What the Attorney-General told us was something quite different. He came to the famous judgment of Lord Sankey, in the Woolmington case.
I should like to have the attention of the Attorney-General, because I wish to point out to him where I think he quite misunderstood the law. Woolmington was charged with murder because he had shot a girl. Everyone agreed that he had shot the girl. Woolmington said that he had done it by accident. The judge—if I remember aright it was Mr. Justice Rigby Swift—directed the jury that where there was a killing the presumption was that that killing was murder and it was for the accused to prove that it was not murder but accident.

Mr. Hale: He said that the onus was on him.

Mr. Paget: The appeal was solely on the question of where the onus lay. If there was malice it was the directest malice in the world, intention to kill. The issue before the jury was: did Woolmington mean to kill, or was it an accident? Lord Sankey, in the course of his judgment, said that malice can either be proved directly by direct evidence, or can be implied from circumstances, which is by circumstantial evidence.

The question whether the malice itself was express or implied never arose. If there were malice in the Woolmington case it was a direct malice of intention to kill, otherwise there was none. So the Attorney-General, in drawing this distinction, fell into the error of failing to distinguish between express and implied as a part of the definition of malice and express and implied as part of the evidence to prove it.

I would venture to say that the difference between express and implied—the words come from the very ancient definition in Coke—is simply that express malice is the intention to kill and "implied", used here, is a word which, since then, has somewhat changed its meaning. If we were to express the meaning which was intended then we would use the word "deemed".

Implied malice, as used by Coke, meant this: malice which does not really exist, but is deemed to exist. It means a case in which there was not an intention to kill but an intention to kill is deemed because there was another intention. As far as my research goes, it leads me to that construction, although I agree that going through the authorities it is very difficult to find just what difference Coke had in mind when he included those words. It has never been made clear, as far as I know. I have read most of the judgments and I have tried to do some research into this question, but it has never been clearly defined. Nevertheless, I think that, going back to that time, "implied" was used as we should use "deemed".

If this is right, what does it mean? It means with the same malice aforethought, either being an intention to kill, or not being an intention to kill but being one of the other intentions which are deemed to be an intention to kill, which, in fact, includes everything which has ever been held to be murder; because even if one

had not an intention to kill, it was brought into the category of murder because another intention was deemed.

If that be the right interpretation, the inclusion of these two words simply makes the Clause contradict itself. I say that, meaningless as the Clause is in any case, it is certainly worse with these words than without them; and I therefore hope that we shall drop them.

Mr. Hale: A somewhat strange thing happened in the course of the previous discussion which, as you were right in saying, Mr. Williams, necessarily dealt to some extent with the same point. In the course of my speech I casually asked why we should not put the Clause in simple language and why we should not simply say "we abolish the doctrine of constructive malice."
At once the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke), with singular clarity, pointed out my error. He said that I could not do this because the doctrine of constructive malice has been built on the foundation of implied malice. He said that every lawyer has a clear idea of what it means and that every lawyer knows that there is a point of demarcation which has been embodied on this foundation of implied malice; and that we could not therefore, by definition. drop the top storey. Instead, we have to put the thing the other way about, so we revert to the Coke definition—the definition that there must be malice express, or that malice can be implied from a very limited set of circumstances.
I at once got up and acknowledged the justice of that. I put on a penitent air and I pleaded, in mitigation, that it was the first offence I had committed and the first time that it had happened during my eleven years in the House.
What has happened? These casual observations of mine, made, I admit, without sufficient forethought and sufficient consideration, have completely converted the Attorney-General. [Laughter.] Yes, that is so. What has the right hon. and learned Gentleman said? He has said, "There is no difficulty about knowing what is implied malice. It is quite a different thing from constructive malice. No one would be under any misapprehension about that. Any juryman, from Dulwich, Bermondsey, or the Old Bailey, in


the morning, will find that a matter which he can simply comprehend and a matter quite simple to apply. There is no need to alter the Clause at all".
It therefore becomes important that we should consider this matter. We have all put different points of view, although they come to the same thing. I have often thought that ordinary implied malice has a meaning neither more nor less than this: that malice is a legal term which does not necessarily import hostility or venom or personal antagonism, but it imports a state of mind which can be called a guilty state of mind. It means that if I kill somebody by a deliberate act it is necessary to show that it was done deliberately; and that if it was done deliberately there was malice.
Then we come to the circumstance in which there is no need to presume malice at all, there is no evidence on which we can presume malice. It may be that I have killed somebody I did not know, but if I have killed him in circumstances which are such that the irresistible implication is that I meant to do a killing, and a guilty killing—

Mr. S. Silverman: Of somebody.

Mr. Hale: —of somebody—then it is unimportant to say "You meant to kill your uncle and you actually exterminated your aunt".
On that basis there has been built up a wholly different doctrine that, anyhow, if I commit a felony, if I am doing something really criminal, and if, in doing that something really criminal, one of the natural or probable or reasonably possible results of the act would be a killing, I may be guilty of murder.
Where are we going from here? I do not wish to repeat the arguments. I have not the slightest desire to delay the Committee in any way or to waste any time in rhetorical argument. My hon. Friend the Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton) made some observations, but I do not think it in the least necessary for a lawyer to apologise for taking part in making law. Nor do I honestly believe that five or six years of study and thirty years' practical experience as a lawyer is a disqualification for membership of a law-making assembly. Whether there are too many lawyers in the House, I do

not know. When I look around I see some of my colleagues whom I regard as reasonably expendable, but I do not regard myself as expendable. I think that it is necessary to have lawyers in the House. It might also be necessary to have trade union secretaries, but it would be out of order to pursue that and to seek to establish the basis of qualification for membership. We may raise that on the Bill dealing with disqualification of Members.
We are dealing here with a difficult point, but it is important that if we pass the Bill it should mean something, and it is eminently desirable that it should mean what was intended.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said, following my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice), that it was virtually impossible to have a felonious intention which is not in the course of some other offence. A simple example is that time after time the wretched man is arrested for some other offence, charged with it and brought before the court; and then his victim dies and there is added to the indictment for all the other offences an indictment for murder. Of course that is the issue tried, because we always try the most serious offence. It becomes the main charge. But he may have been under charge or even committed for trial on another offence.
No doubt my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton will recall the famous case at Birmingham—was it Nodder?—of a man who was tried before Mr. Justice Swift. The circumstances did not reflect very much credit on Birmingham or the administration of justice. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for the abduction of a girl. She had disappeared and her body had not been found. Then, while he was imprisoned, he either made voluntary statements or was tempted to make statements which provided some evidence to be followed up. The body was discovered, he was convicted of murder and he was hanged after all that. Was that a murder committed in the course of some other offence?

Mr. Paget: My hon. Friend will remember the case of Thomas, who was convicted for wounding with intent to


murder and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Eleven months afterwards his victim died and he was brought from prison, retried and convicted of murder.

7.0 p.m.

Mr. Hale: I am obliged. I had overlooked that. I think that Podmore and the garage case is another example.
This is too serious a question to be dismissed as the Attorney-General attempted to dismiss it. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has said very little more in answer to the very careful examination put to him than "Leave it to me."
We have heard it said by many concerned in this matter that they are grateful for the fact that, although they have failed to avoid the inevitable, they have at least done their utmost to frustrate the incurable. The learned Attorney-General has made the even more unlikely claim that he alone can comprehend the unintelligible. We had the situation once before, over the Town and Country Planning Act, but if the interpretation of a Measure rests in one single bosom—and in one single, perishable bosom—it really will not help the courts to administer justice and juries to return verdicts according to the law.
In those circumstances, I press the learned Attorney-General to look at this with the seriousness which, I know, he normally does apply to such matters, and not merely to dismiss the arguments as irrelevant merely because he has not been able, offhand, fully to comprehend them. If, tomorrow, he will read fully the OFFICIAL REPORT of the debate, and consider the points which we have made, he will find that there really is matter for consideration.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: After having spent a certain amount of time studying the Clause in private, and having listened to some hours of debate, there is only one point in this Clause upon which I feel in any way clear; that is, that there appears to be a general intention on the part of hon. Members on both sides of the Committee, and certainly in the mind of the Government, to abolish the doctrine of constructive malice. If we did not know that from the Explanatory Memorandum and from the Clause heading, we know it from the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General.
As I understand it, this doctrine of constructive malice is the imputing of the intention to kill to someone with regard to whom that intention cannot otherwise be proved. The doctrine of constructive malice is the imputing of the intention to kill in certain circumstances. The point which I wish to raise is one which can be put very briefly. I feel sure that the learned Attorney-General will consider it, and with some effect, before we reach the Report stage.
What are the main circumstances in which this intention is imputed? They are, surely, that the killing was done
… in the course or furtherance of another offence.
My submission on the law is that it is precisely in these cases where the killing is done
… in the course or furtherance of another offence
that the law does impute this intention to kill which could not otherwise be proved. This is the very fact from which the law implies or deems that there was an intention to kill.
The intention of the Government appears to be carried out in the first two lines of Clause 1 (1), and then the last three lines of the subsection take away all that has been done. Therefore, although this subsection intends to abolish the doctrine of constructive malice, it simply does nothing of the sort, because of the use of the technical expression
… malice aforethought (express or implied) …
instead of some words showing that there was intention to kill—about which there has already been argument.
Therefore, my submission is that the introduction of this technical expression
… malice aforethought (express or implied) …
in the last three lines of the subsection, takes away all that is given in the first two lines of the subsection, and that, so far from having abolished the doctrine of constructive malice, nothing whatever has been achieved. If the Attorney-General really intends, as I am sure he does, to abolish this doctrine, I sincerely hope that he will, between now and the Report stage, consider that the effect of the introduction of that technical expression in the last three lines of the subsection is to render completely nugatory the effect of the first two lines.

Sir F. Soskice: We have listened to the answer given by the right hon. and learned Gentleman to the points which we have raised. We think that we have pointed out the defects in the subsection. We are as anxious as he that the subsection should work, and should work as it is intended to do. His arguments have not really met our objections, and as he has not been able to say positively that

Division No. 8.]
AYES
[7.6 p.m.


Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.
Finlay, Graeme
Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.


Aitken, W. T.
Fisher, Nigel
Longden, Gilbert


Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)
Fletcher-Cooke, C.
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)


Alport, C. J. M.
Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe &amp; Lonsdale)
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.
McCallum, Major Sir Duncan


Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcooat (Tiverton)
George J. C. (Pollok)
Macdonald, Sir Peter


Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William
Gibson-Watt, D.
McKibbin, A. J.


Arbuthnot, John
Godber, J. B.
Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)


Armstrong, C. W.
Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan
McLaughlin, Mrs. P.


Ashton, H.
Gower, H. R.
McLean, Neil (Inverness)


Atkins, H. E.
Graham, Sir Fergus
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)


Baldock, Lt.-Comdr. J. M.
Grant, W. (Woodside)
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)


Baldwin, A. E.
Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)
Maddan, Martin


Balniel, Lord
Green, A.
Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)


Barber, Anthony
Gresham Cooke, R.
Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)


Barlow, Sir John
Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.
Markham, Major Sir Frank


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Gurden, Harold
Marples, A. E.


Bidgood, J. C.
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)
Marshall, Douglas


Biggs-Davison, J. A.
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Maude, Angus


Bishop, F. P.
Harvie-Watt, sir George
Mawby, R. L.


Bossom, Sir Alfred
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.
Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.
Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.


Boyle, Sir Edward
Hesketh, R. F.
Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh


Braine, B. R.
Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.
Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter


Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)
Morrison, John (Salisbury)


Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry
Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Nabarro, G. D. N.


Brooman-White, R. C.
Hill, John (S. Norfolk)
Nairn, D. L. S.


Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Neave, Airey


Bryan, P.
Hirst, Geoffrey
Nicholls, Harmar


Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.
Holland-Martin, C. J.
Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)


Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Hornby, R. P.
Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. &amp; Chr'ch)


Burden, F. F. A.
Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.
Nugent, G. R. H.


Campbell, Sir David
Horobin, Sir Ian
Oakshott, H. D.


Carr, Robert
Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence
O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)


Cary, Sir Robert
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.


Channon, H.
Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


Chichester-Clark, R.
Howard, John (Test)




Hughes, Hallett Vice-Admiral J.
Osborne, C.


Cole, Norman
Hughes-Young, M. H. C.
Page, R. G.


Conant, Maj. Sir Roger
Hurd A. R.
Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)
Partridge, E.


Corfield, Capt. F. V.
Hyde, Montgomery
Pickthorn, K. W. M.


Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.
Pilkington, Capt. R. A.


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Iremonger, T. L.
Pitman, I. J.


Crouch R. F.
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Pitt, Miss E. M.


Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Pott, H. P.


Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Powell, J. Enoch


Cunningham, Knox
Johnson Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Currie, G. B. H.
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)


Dance, J. C. G.
Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.


Davidson, Viscountess
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot
Raikes, Sir Victor


D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Kaberry, D.
Redmayne, M.


Deedes, W. F.
Keegan, D.
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Dodds-Parker, A. D.
Kimball, M,
Remnant, Hon. P.


Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.
Kirk, P. M.
Renton, D. L. M.


Doughty, C. J. A.
Lagden, G. W.
Ridsdale, J. E.


Drayson, G. B.
Lambert, Hon. G.
Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)


du Cann, E. D. L.
Lambton, Viscount
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)


Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)
Langford-Holt, J. A.
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)


Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Leavey, J. A.
Roper, Sir Harold


Duthie, W. S.
Leburn, W. G.
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard


Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Russell, R. S.


Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)
Schofield, Lt.- Col. W.


Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)
Sharples, R. C.


Errington, Sir Eric
Linstead, Sir H. N.
Shepherd, William


Fell, A.
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

he will take this back and look at it again, I hope that may hon Friends on this side of the House will register their dissatisfaction with his answer by going into the Division Lobby.

Question put That the words "(express or implied)"stand part of the Clause:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 232, Noes, 176.

Soames Capt. C.
Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hen. C.


Spearman, Sir Alexander
Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Speir, R. M.
Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.
Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith &amp; Border)


Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, w.)
Tilney, John (Wavertree)
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard
Turner, H. F. L.
Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)


Stevens, Geoffrey
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.
Wills, G. (Bridgwater)


Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Vane, W. M. F.
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Stewart, Henderson, (Fife, E.)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.
Wood, Hon. R.


Storey, S.
Vickers, Miss J. H.
Woollam, John Victor


Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)



Studholme, Sir Henry
Wall, Major Patrick
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Temple, J. M.
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)
Colonel J. H. Harrison and




Mr. E. Wakefield.




NOES


Ainsley, J. W.
Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)
Pentland, N.


Albu, A. H.
Hastings, S.
Plummer, Sir Leslie


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Hayman, F. H.
Popplewell, E.


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Healey, Denis
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)
Probert, A. R.


Anderson, Frank
Herbison, Miss M.
Proctor, W. T.


Awbery, S. S.
Holt, A. F.
Pryde, D. J.


Bacon, Miss Alice
Houghton, Douglas
Randall, H. E.


Benson, G.
Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)
Rankin, John


Beswick, F.
Howell, Denis (All Saints)
Redhead, E. C.


Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)
Hubbard, T. F.
Reeves, J.


Blackburn, F.
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Robens, Rt. Hon. A.


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.)
Hunter, A. E.
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Bowles, F. G.
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Ross, William


Brockway, A. F.
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Royle, C.


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Janner, B.
Short, E. W.


Brown, Thomas (Ince)
Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Burke, W. A.
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn &amp; St. Pncs, S.)
Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Johnson, James (Rugby)
Skeffington, A. M.


Callaghan, L. J.
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)
Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)


Champion, A. J.
Jones, David (The Hartlepools)
Slater, J. (Sedgefield)


Chapman, W. D.
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Chetwynd, G. R.
Kenyon, C.
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Clunie, J.
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Sparks, J. A.


Coldrick, W.
King, Dr. H. M.
Steele, T.


Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)
Lawson, G. M.
Stewart Michael (Fulham)


Collins V. J. (Shoreditch &amp; Finsbury)
Ledger, R. J.
Stones, W. (Consett)


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)


Craddock, George (Bradlord, S.)
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)


Cronin, J. D.
Lindgren, G. S.
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.


Cullen, Mrs. A.
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Sylvester, G. O.


Daines, P.
McGhee, H. G.
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
McInnes, J.
Taylor, John (West Lothian)


Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Thornton, E.


Deer, G.
McLeavy, Frank
Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn


Dodds, N. N.
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Viant, S. P.


Dye, S.
Mahon. Simon
Wade, D. W.


Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Warbey, W. N.


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
Marquand, Rt. Hon. M. A.
Weitzman, D.


Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
Mason, Roy
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Fernyhough, E.
Mellish, R. J.
Wheeldon, W. E.


Finch, H. J.
Mikardo, Ian
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Fletcher, Eric
Mitchison, G. R.
White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)


Forman, J. C.
Monslow, W.
Wilkins, W. A.


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Moyle, A.
Willey, Frederick


Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.
Neal, Harold (Bolsover)
Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)


Gibson, C. W.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)
Williams, Ronald (Wigan)


Gooch, E. G.
Oliver, G. H.
Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)


Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Orbach, M.
Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)


Greenwood, Anthony
Oswald, T.
Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)


Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.
Padley, W. E.
Winterbottom Richard


Grey, C. F.
Paget, R. T.
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Palmer, A. M. F.
Yates, Y. (Ladywood)


Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.


Grimond, J.
Parker, J.
Zilliacus, K.


Hale, Leslie
Parkin, B. T.



Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Paton, John
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Hamilton, W. W.
Pearson, A.
Mr. Holmes and Mr. J. T. Price.


Hannan, W.
Peart, T. F.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

That the Clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Paget: I was hoping that at this point we should have from the Attorney-General an explanation of what he now thinks this Clause means, in the light of the arguments and of the thought which he must have been applying to the Clause. Various views have been expressed as to its possible meaning—perhaps that is not unique among lawyers—but many seem to agree, including the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke), that it is meaningless. However, that apparently did not stop the hon. Member for Darwen from voting. None the less, we are hoping to receive from the Attorney-General some explanation of why he now commends this Clause to us.

Mr. S. Silverman: I do not intend to delay the Committee for very long because, as you were good enough to point out in the debate on the last Amendment, Mr. Williams, some of the things which it would have been appropriate to say on the Question "That the Clause stand part of the Bill" have already been said.
Nevertheless, I hope I may be forgiven if I ask the Attorney-General to afford us some further and better answer than he has so far vouchsafed to us in reply to the doubts cast on the drafting of this Clause or its efficacy for its avowed purpose, or any purpose. In the course of doing so, may I call the attention of the right hon. and learned Gentleman to one rather signficant fact that has nothing to do with the drafting of the Clause.
We have been debating Clause I for rather more than three hours, and I have no intention of saying anything about any of the Amendments which have been considered. But has it escaped the attention of the right hon. and learned Gentleman that so far, in more than three hours of debate, no Member except himself has said a single word in defence of the Clause as drafted? His own explanations, though no doubt offered in all good faith and with complete sincerity, have patently not satisfied his critics. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) said what he thought was the construction of the Clause and what the consequences would be. We thought that the Attorney-General agreed. There was a good deal of further debate in which it became apparent that he did not agree at all. But he did not tell us at the end what the

answer was to the points that had been put to him.
What is the answer? Is there one? In a matter of this kind, when a number of Members, whose qualifications to express an opinion on such a point are surely beyond dispute, have all combined to tell him that his Clause is either utterly unintelligible or perfectly meaningless, is it really good enough to offer no explanation at all in reply to those arguments?; added to the point which I have already made, that so far there is absolutely nobody in the Committee who takes the view which he has expressed except the Attorney-General himself, so far as we know, by any vocal demonstration of agreement. Of course we know that he did carry his point, and throughout our subsequent discussions the Government will carry a great many points on this part of the Bill and on Part II.

The Temporary Chairman: I was very much obliged to the hon. Member when he said that he would not be spending too much time on the Motion "That the Clause stand part of the Bill". I hope that he has not forgotten that promise, because I think that he is going a little wider than he intended to do.

Mr. Silverman: I am not proposing to discuss any of the matters which I am referring to. I am only saying, in support of my argument, that the Attorney-General ought really to give to the Committee a much better explanation than he has so far given. What I am saying to him is that he must not rely too much in rebuttal of my point, that no one spoke on his side of the Committee, on the fact that a majority voted on his side. I am pointing out to him that that is a phenomenon which will occur time after time.

Mr. Philip Bell: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will remember Dr. Johnson's saying:
I have found you an argument; but I am not obliged to find you an understanding.

Mr. Silverman: I am very grateful to the hon. and learned Member, because I am sure he is perfectly right. We have found the Attorney-General argument after argument. It is perfectly true that if he gave us an answer and we did not accept the answer he might be entitled to say that that was our fault and not his,


but he is not entitled to say that if he gives us no answer at all. What I am complaining of is that he has given us no answer at all. The first intervention by any of his supporters to support him has been that by the hon. and learned Gentleman himself, and only to that extent; and I am not at all sure how much of the argument he has heard, but I expect not very much.
I go back to the point that I was making that the Attorney-General must not rely, in rebuttal of my point that nobody—not even the hon. and learned Gentleman, in spite of his intervention—has had a single word to say in support of the Government's interpretation, on the fact that people voted for him, because the people who voted for him have not heard a single word of the argument and many of them voted in quite a different sense on something like the same point when left to their conscience and judgment, as they ought to have been left on this occasion.
We are attempting today to do a serious job, and it ought to be done in a serious and responsible way. If it has been said to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, not with malice aforethought but out of a genuine attempt to understand his speech and to understand the Clause, that at the end of the argument we do not understand it, that we believe that the Clause cannot be made intelligible or be made to mean anything whatever, then I say that before the Committee permits the Clause to stand part of the Bill the right hon. and learned Gentleman ought either to be able to tell us what it means, to assure us that it does mean what we all want to achieve, or, if he cannot be quite sure at this time on either point that he will, if without a Division we let the Clause stand part of the Bill, seriously consider between now and another stage whether it is really right to treat this serious matter in this frivolous way.

Mr. Mallalieu: We have heard a great many arguments, which I will not go over again, about the meaning or absence of meaning of this Clause. I wonder whether, before we leave the Clause, the Attorney-General would answer this question. Does he admit that the Clause at least purports, regardless of what we think of it, to except certain killings from

the law of murder, and that it does so on the grounds that there is in regard to them no express malice or implied malice? If he does, will he go further and agree that there is no point in such a Clause at all because the very essence of manslaughter already is that it is unlawful killing without any malice, express or implied. If I am right, then this Clause is mere surplusage in what it purports to say, and I would be grateful if the Attorney-General would address his mind to that question when he replies.
Here is a Clause purporting to except certain killings from the category of murder on the ground—and it must be on that ground, having regard to the last three lines of subsection (1) which begin with the word "unless"—that there is no malice expressed or implied. There is no need to except a killing from murder on that ground because it is already excepted and dealt with as manslaughter.

Mr. Hale: I hope that the Attorney-General will take the opportunity afforded him a few minutes ago, when my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) put one or two points to him in moving the Amendment which the Attorney-General complained that he was debarred from replying to because they might not be in order. They cannot be out of order on this discussion and it may be that the Attorney-General, in considering my point, may still find an opportunity to reply to them.
I want to express a modest dubiety about subsection (2), which has not been discussed at all, and which, I think, ought not to pass entirely without discussion. It is, of course, quite true that this is, in a sense, a complementary Clause. It does not make anything new; it creates an exception from the new proposals that have been made. Subsection (2) is intended to provide merely that when we impose the necessity for considering the same malice as would be implied from the killing taking place in connection with another offence or in furtherance of another offence, we exclude from that the killing which takes place in resisting an officer of justice.
That seems not unreasonable. On the face of it, it is not a Clause which makes a killing of a police officer a capital murder. It merely retains the ordinary murder verdict where the killing took


place in the course of resisting an officer of justice. But an examination of the Clause, I think, does indicate that it has introduced one or two new curiosities and difficulties.
First, the Act does not contain, nor does the Interpretation Act, any definition of an officer of justice. It may be said that, to an extent, the words have already been judicially interpreted, because there has been a long series of cases where this doctrine has been applied. The doctrine was stated seventy or eighty years ago. What is an officer of justice? Mr. Justice Stephen, in his Digest of the Criminal Law, said that the expression "officer of justice" included every person who had the legal right to do any of the acts mentioned whether he was an officer or a private person. That is a very wide definition.
If one couples that with the somewhat dubious words "lawful arrest" and "legal custody", one then begins to find that the provision embraces a very wide range of possibilities. It appears from this that an officer of justice may be a police officer, or a private person who is trying to make an arrest on sight of a felony, as private persons are entitled to do. But, then, who else may it be? Is a county court bailiff an officer of justice? Is someone acting under a county court warrant to execute a distress warrant an officer of justice?

7.30 p.m.

Mr. S. Silverman: Or a process server?

Mr. Hale: As my hon. Friend says, is a process server an officer of justice?
Will the words apply to someone acting in the course of levying a distraint for rent, for example? There is a whole series of possibilities under the various Acts, because, in some cases, the landlord himself may levy the distraint and often does. Is he,
Drest in a little brief authority".
an officer of justice?
Next what of the words "legal custody"? Is it any custody by any court of any jurisdiction? Is a ward in Chancery included? A ward in Chancery is not, of course, in custody, but is the ward when kept in the care of the court? Is a mental defective, or someone detained for his care and protection,

in legal custody? All such people are, surely, in legal custody.
The Report of the Royal Commission, paragraph 79, says:
Although it was the accepted doctrine of the older authorities, such as Hale"—
not an ancestor, I may say—
… Foster and East, that anyone who caused death in resisting an officer of justice was guilty of murder, some more modern writers have doubted whether this rule was not too severely stated and stricter than was justified by any of the reported decisions or judicial dicta. Whatever may have been the position a century ago, the rule has undoubtedly been limited as a result of more recent judicial decisions …
The Report quotes the Porter case and the Appleby case, the latter, of course, being a fairly recent one.
… but the law as laid down in these cases cannot be said to be entirely clear. It was held that in cases of resistance to an officer of justice' a much less degree of violence' may justify a verdict of murder than in other circumstances, but that nevertheless the violence must be' real violence', amounting to more than mere refusal to submit to arrest and more than clear obstruction of the officer in the execution of his duty. The meaning of' violence' has not been defined, but it has been suggested that it connotes an intentional attack as opposed to merely pulling in order to break clear.
The new Clause goes a lot further than that. It refers to
a killing done in the course or for the purpose of resisting an officer of justice. or of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.
What is a killing done for the purpose of preventing a lawful arrest? Does it apply to the case of a man running in the street, followed by a police constable, who in the course of his running, kills someone by the use of a certain measure of violence in pushing a person to one side?

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: Take the ordinary case, where a robbery has been done. The two parties are making their getaway, and one man covers the other. The police officers come up. The man is clearly preventing a lawful arrest by murdering a police officer or one of the persons concerned.

Mr. Hale: Yes, but, of course, the hon. Gentleman's mind does run to the over-dramatic. Take the case of the ordinary simple sort of man, as I am—the case of an ordinary "bloke" who is trying to avoid being "pinched." It may be that


he has not turned up to answer a summons for riding a bicycle without a light, and the whole Tory bench has issued a warrant. It is a case of lawful arrest. The whole point of this provision turns on lawful arrest; there are no other words.
Clearly, lawful arrest can include arrest by a county court bailiff under a judgment summons because someone has not paid "two bob" a week to the chap he agreed to buy his clothes from on the "Kathleen Mavourneen" a year or two ago. That, of course, is lawful arrest. There can be no argument about it. Those words are, surely, reasonably intelligible. Suppose I do not want to be arrested, and suppose that I start to run, with a police constable after me. What is the degree of violence in pushing away a civilian which would be accepted within the ambit of this subsection?
This Clause is clearly well intended and well meant; I think it could be extremely useful, if it can be reduced to terms which indicate its meaning with clarity. It might be an extremely useful provision, and one which I would welcome. I do not desire to say one word which would be critical of the intention of the Government. I believe that their intentions are honourable. I do not remember saying that before in the whole time I have been in the House of Commons.

Mr. S. Silverman: I am not sure that my hon. Friend is right this time.

Mr. Hale: At any rate, I am not here to condemn what the Clause appears to mean to those who take up another view of its intentions.
However, it really is not good enough for the Attorney-General to say we must turn to some paragraph or other and see what the Royal Commission says so that we may know what this Clause means. It will not do to say that this Clause means what the Royal Commission intended by what it said in paragraph 73, and that, really, is as far as the Committee has got in more than three hours of debate today. [Interruption.] That is quite right. I would willingly give way in order to hear an explanation. I always regard myself as the most humble and unassuming and kindly of men.

Mr. Silverman: Except the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies).

Mr. Hale: Yes, except the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies). No one ever annoys me by attacking anyone else. It is only when people disagree with me that I get annoyed.
Something ought to be done about this. The Attorney-General has his opportunity now. He may have said that it would be out of order to deal with the point some time ago, but it would clearly be very much out of order if he did not give us his explanation now, because this is the last chance we have of knowing what the Clause means before we are called upon to accept or reject it. I therefore venture to offer the right hon. and learned Gentleman the opportunity now of explaining to the Committee just what is intended by this Clause and just what he now thinks it means after listening to the criticisms of the Clause which have been made in some detail.

The Attorney-General: I have listened to a great deal of debate on this Clause. We had a debate on the first two Amendments, and a debate on the third Amendment covering a lot of the ground covered already on the first two Amendments. We have now had debate on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill". I am making no complaint, but I sought to explain what the Clause did in the debate on the first two Amendments, and I sought again to explain it in the debate on the third Amendment. I really cannot add to the explanation I then gave.
What I can say to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) is that none of the criticisms which have been put forward on his side of the House has in any way shaken my belief and conviction that this Clause achieves the result intended, namely, the abolition of the doctrine of constructive malice. I know that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) says that I have given no explanation. I quite understand that he does not accept the one I have given. Indeed, when I rose last time to say something to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice), the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne misquoted me immediately thereafter. I make no complaint of that. The obvious purpose of this provision is, as the Clause heading says, to abolish "constructive malice".
I have dealt, I think, with every point raised during the debate, including the last point raised in the course of the last Amendment by the right hon. and learned Member for Newport. It is true, and I will say it again—I hope that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne will appreciate it this time—that when a person is committing a murder, he may, and does usually, at the same time commit a number of other offences; but the fact that that has happened does not mean that the murder is committed
in the course or furtherance of
those other offences. A person may commit an assault in the course of committing a murder, but he is not likely to commit a murder for the furtherance of an assault.

Mr. Paget: May I ask the Attorney-General this question? If I hit somebody on the head with an axe, is that an offence whether he dies or whether he does not? If he does die, the offence would be murder. Is not the murder "in the course" of the offence of hitting with the axe? It may not be in furtherance, but it must always be "in the course … of". That seems perfectly clear.

Mr. Michael Stewart: There was one comment in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) that caused me to look carefully at the wording of the Clause. I was very worried by his statement that subsection (1) laid down the general policy and that subsection (2) made an exception to that rule. Looking more diligently at the Clause, however, an anxiety has come into my mind. Perhaps the Attorney-General can resolve it.
Subsection (1) classifies killings for this purpose into two groups: killings done
in the course or furtherance of another offence
and killings not so done. I may describe them briefly as killings in furtherance and killings not in furtherance. The subsection then says that both those two types of killing are to be treated in the same manner in respect of the amount of malice that has to be proved. I take it that I am right in supposing that the purpose of subsection (1) is to say that whether it is a killing in furtherance or a killing not in furtherance, they are both the same so far as concerns the amount

of malice which has to be proved. That I take to be the purpose and effect of subsection (1).
If that is so, what is the purpose or effect of subsection (2)? It states that certain types of killing are to be regarded as killings in furtherance. Suppose, however, that they were not so regarded. From the point of view of subsection (1), what would be the difference? If killing in resisting arrest is, as subsection (2) makes it, a killing in furtherance, one has to prove about it the same amount of malice as would have to be proved if it were a killing not in furtherance. If subsection (2) were not there and killing in resisting arrest were therefore regarded as a killing not in furtherance, the amount of malice that would have to be proved about it would still be exactly the same.
To repeat the point, the effect of subsection (1) is to make killings in furtherance and killings not in furtherance exactly the same in regard to the amount of malice which has to be proved. If that is so, surely it does not matter for the purposes of subsection (1) whether any particular killing is regarded as a killing in furtherance or a killing not in furtherance.
Subsection (2) states expressly:
For the purposes of the foregoing subsection, a killing …
done in resistance of arrest shall be regarded as
a killing in … furtherance";
but for the purposes of subsection (1), it makes no difference whether a killing is regarded as a killing in furtherance or a killing not in furtherance. What, therefore, would be the difference in effect of the Clause if subsection (2) were not included? It seems to me an important question and one to which we ought to have an answer before we proceed to vote on the Clause.

The Attorney-General: Had the hon. Member been here earlier, he would have heard me explain what subsection (2) does.

Mr. Stewart: I am quite well aware of what subsection (2) does. It tells us that a killing in resistance of arrest, and so on, is to be regarded as a killing in furtherance. Granted that it does that, what I am asking, and what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has at no time dealt with, is what follows from that in


view of what subsection (1) says. What difference would there be if subsection (2) were not there?

7.45 p.m.

Sir F. Soskice: I am rather disappointed at the Attorney-General's attitude. I assure him that he will not encourage my hon. Friends on this side of the Committee to give an easy passage to the Bill if he is niggardly in refusing to explain points which are courteously put to him.
I feel sure that my hon. Friends are in two minds, in view of the Attorney-General's attitude, about the attitude that they should adopt. Speaking for myself, this would be my advice to my hon. Friends. We have not, as we have made clear, felt altogether reassured by the Attorney-General's answers on a number of the anxieties which we have voiced. We cordially approve of the purpose of the Clause as expounded to us by the Attorney-General. What we feel anxious about is that owing to possible defects in its composition—may I have the Attorney-General's attention? Considerable powers of intellect are required both to talk and to listen, and I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will make sure that he is listening.
I was slating our anxiety on this side of the Committee. Approving, as we do, the purposes of the Clause and anxious, as we are, that it should be fully implemented by the wording and text of the Clause, we have indicated the uncertainties that we feel. We still feel those uncertainties and we still hope that the Attorney-General, between now and the Report stage, will give further consideration to those points. It would be a great disaster if, because of inadequate drafting or imperfection in the language which is used, the whole thing became, as we fear that it might become, a disappointment to all of us.
Having voiced those doubts and pressed them upon the Government, we feel that the right course—at least, this is the advice which I give to my hon. Friends—would be not to challenge a Division on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill". But if we do not challenge a Division, I reassert and emphasise to the Attorney-General that he should give serious consideration to the many points which

have been urged upon him and to which he has given no adequate reply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2.—(PERSONS SUFFERING FROM DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY.)

Mr. S. Silverman: I beg to move, in page 1, line 21, to leave out from "mind" to "as" in line 23 and insert "however arising".

The Clause is one which the Royal Commission did not recommend. It is the Clause which applies to the English law of murder the Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility. I applaud the decision of the Government on this occasion not to follow the advice of the Royal Commission and to include in Part I of the Bill in which we are dealing with the fact of murder this very sensible, sane and merciful doctrine which has already applied in Scotland.

When the Royal Commission finally decided not to include that in its recommendations, it was not, as I understand the matter, influenced by any lack of sympathy with the proposition. On the contrary it thought that it was a very good and sensible provision but it had a doubt. I do not wish to make long quotations from the Report. To summarise the Royal Commission's views, it said that if one was to import into the criminal law the doctrine that men may have different degrees of accountability to the law because of their mental condition—I am using a neutral, summarised expression—then, in the opinion of the Royal Commission, it was undesirable to do so for only one crime.

The Royal Commission argued that if the doctrine of diminished responsibility was a good one and therefore ought to be imported into the English criminal law, it ought to be imported into the English criminal law for all purposes and not merely in the case of the law of murder. If a man was not guilty of murder because of his mental condition whereas a man who had no such mental limitation would have been guilty of murder, then that man ought not to be guilty of theft, rape, burglary, false pretences or any other crime in the same circumstances. It was that consideration which prompted the Royal Commission


not to recommend it for inclusion in any legislation dealing with the law, or definition, of murder.

For my part, though one respects the Royal Commission's reasons, I think it was wrong, and I believe the Government were right to include this matter in the Bill. After all, whatever may be the logic of an academic approach to the question, in practice its only importance is the penalty. One can always make an attempt to fit the penalty to the crime while the criminal remains alive, and the doctrine of diminished responsibility enables a man not to be convicted of murder.

There appear to be doubts as to whether all this is directed to the Amendment when it ought, rather, to be directed to the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill." I am specifically directing my remarks to the Amendment. I want to show precisely why I agree with the Government in including the provision, and I want to explain why I think they have included in the proposal an unnecessary and inconsistent limitation.

As it stands, the Clause reads:
Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind …

I leave out the parenthesis.
… as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.

If the Clause had been drafted without the parenthesis, I should have had nothing but praise for it. Indeed, in the Clause without the parenthesis there is everything that the doctrine of diminished responsibility requires. First, the man has to be suffering from an abnormality of mind, and. secondly, the abnormality of mind has to be sufficient substantially to impair his mental responsibility for his acts.

I am not sure why "mental" is introduced there. What we are dealing with is legal accountability, whether the man is to be held responsible or not responsible in the full sense or in a diminished sense. While one understands that the doctrine and the Clause are limited to mental considerations, that seems to me to be sufficiently covered by "abnormality of mind"; consequently

it seems to me that "mental" later in the subsection is, at best, superfluous. At all events, leaving it in—I understand that the Amendment seeking to delete it will not be called—one has, without the parenthesis, every reasonable requirement to establish the doctrine of diminished responsibility.

Now let us look at the parenthesis. It says:
whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury.

I should like the Attorney-General to tell me what is intended to be excluded by that parenthesis. What cause of abnormality of mind is not to be covered by the Clause? It seems to me, in my simplicity, that there are only two possible answers to that question. One is "There are some things to be excluded by it." The other is "We do not intend to exclude anything by it. We included the parenthesis meaning to define every possible cause of abnormality of mind which might have this result."

Taking the second answer, it may or may not be that those words are apt to cover every known cause of abnormality of mind. I doubt very much whether the words do cover every known cause of abnormality of mind, but I am no expert on that subject, and I express no opinion about it one way or the other. All I say is that, even if the words are apt to include everything that is now-known which might give rise to the mental abnormality required to establish this kind of defence, we all know that medical science, particularly in this field, is—or so we hope—progressing.

I am certain that the judges in the middle of the nineteenth century who, when called upon to frame adequate reasonable and just rules to define insanity, produced the M'Naghten Rules, did everything in their power to work out such a definition as would cover everything that was accepted as insanity in their day, and yet we all know how unsatisfactory those Rules are now. No one defends them.

It is true that the Government do not abolish the M'Naghten Rules by this Bill. Again, I think that the Government were right not to abolish them. They have introduced this provision as an additional line of defence so as not


to absolve a defendant from having to prove all that could be required to be proved in order to establish the defence of insanity, however statutorily defined, In their day the M'Naghten Rules were well done, or at any rate were thought to be well done. They were not well done, because it happens that we know, or think we know, a great deal more today about the causes or nature of insanity than we knew then. I suppose that there is not a living psychiatrist who would not admit that even now we are only on the threshold of knowledge in that respect. It is admitted that there is much which is not known.

8.0 p.m.

If the Government intended by these words to cover every possible cause of mental abnormality for the purpose of this Clause, it would have been much better had those words been left out altogether and the Clause had said:
… such abnormality of mind as substantially impaired …

If the Government wanted to be absolutely certain that there was some pathological foundation, some detectable, provable and ascertainable foundation for the abnormality of mind, I suggest with some diffidence, but with every confidence, that the words "however arising "are the words which they want. I commend those words to them, and I hope that on this occasion I shall satisfy the Attorney-General that the Amendment is one which he can reasonably accept.

There is the other possibility, that the parenthesis would not include, and was so framed because it was not intended to include, a catalogue of all the kinds of mental abnormality, but was intended to exclude some. If that is the case, then the Attorney-General should tell us what he wishes to exclude and why he wishes to exclude it. Once one has conceded that abnormality of mind may afford a partial, although not complete, defence to a charge of murder, it does not really matter how the abnormality of mind arose. The important thing is that the mind was abnormal to such a degree as partially to excuse the accused person from what would otherwise have been full responsibility for the criminal law. For those reasons we suggest that the words in parenthesis should be omitted and "however arising" substituted.

The Attorney-General: I want at one to reply to the interesting observation of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) on this very important Clause. I hope that I shall be able to make him understand why the Government cannot accept the Amendment ant feel compelled to take that course.
The object of Clause 2 is to introduce into English law the Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility. With that object the hon. Member agrees, as, I think, do most hon. Members. While doing that, we want to make the doctrine the same in both countries as far as we can. One objection to accepting the Amendment—not a primary objection, because it might be said that we could enlarge the Scottish doctrine if we so wanted; I merely mention it in passing—is that, if we did so, in England the application of the doctrine might become wider and more extensive than in Scotland.

Mr. S. Silverman: Does it not apply to Scotland?

The Attorney-General: Parts of the Bill apply to Scotland, but this part applies only to England and Wales.
The Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility means that a defence has to show—we will discuss later what degree has to be established—that the mental abnormality must be "bordering on insanity". The hon. Member will see that paragraph 378 of the Royal Commission's Report refers to that. If we are to make the English doctrine the same as the Scottish doctrine, it must be a defence of diminished responsibility in conditions "bordering on insanity".
Here one gets into the difficulty that Scotland has been in the fortunate position of never being troubled by the M'Naghten Rules. We have every intention of making provision for cases bordering on insanity and for cases of insanity in the medical sense which are less than insanity under the M'Naghten Rules and Clause 2 is designed to cover both those categories.
Having said that by way of preface, I would add that the hon. Member made some comment on the word "mental" as it appears before "responsibility". It is put there by design, because one is there considering mental responsibility with a view to determining whether legal


responsibility would be reduced. It would not read very well to say:
… such abnormality of mind as substantially impaired his legal responsibility.
It is either one or the other and the word "mental" is inserted to remove the doubt. If his mental responsibility has been impaired, then his legal responsibility is reduced. That follows from the operation of subsection (1).

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: Can the Attorney-General say whether there is a precedent in statute law for the term "mental responsibility"?

The Attorney-General: Offhand I cannot do so, but I see no reason why those words should not be used in conjunction. The phrase shows the distinction from legal responsibility and there would be doubt, if "responsibility" were left alone, as to which it was. No great importance will be attached to that. It merely clarifies the meaning.

Mr. Silverman: The Attorney-General is now obviously making a valid point. Is not the issue sufficiently covered by the words "abnormality of mind", which are already included?

The Attorney-General: It really is not, and, on reflection, the hon. Member will see that one does not necessarily flow from the other.

Mr. Paget: On a point of order. I understood that we were discussing the first Amendment to Clause 2, which proposes to leave out certain words in parenthesis and to insert others. The next Amendment on the Notice Paper, which, I understand, is not to be called, is in page 1, line 24, to leave out "mental". The Attorney-General's remarks seem to have been so far addressed entirely to the Amendment which is not to be called, I wonder whether he has not got it muddled and got the wrong Amendment.

The Attorney-General: I have not got it muddled in the least degree. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne mentioned that wording in passing—I expect the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) did not appreciate it at the time—and, in passing, I have sought to deal with it so that the Amendment which we are discussing may be

considered against its appropriate background.

The Chairman: The hon. and learned Member for Northampton is quite right in saying that the second Amendment has not been selected, but I think that the issue has been quite reasonably met.

Mr. Paget: I was only trying to seek clarity. I can assure the Attorney-General that we are deeply grateful for any observations of his which make this Bill a little more intelligible.

The Attorney-General: Perhaps I can now continue to make some observations upon the Amendment.
I was coming to the real point which the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne raised. He asked why we had these words in brackets in subsection (1). Was it to exclude something? If not, would not it be much simpler just to leave them out, or to use the phrase, "however arising"? We want to do two things by the inclusion of those words. First, we want to indicate that the serious abnormality of mind must in some way be similar to the Scottish phrase, "bordering upon insanity". The hon. Member will see that the words:
arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes
appear in Section 1 (2) of the Mental Deficiency Act, 1927. The advantage of including those words is that they give some indication to the judge and jury of the sort of abnormality that has to be established. I am sure that the hon. Member will agree that although it may be an impossible task to put into a Statute a definition which would meet the views both of psychiatrists and lawyers, what is really essential is to define a standard which can be applied in the courts. We therefore start with the advantage that the words give an indication to judge and jury of the kind of abnormality that is meant to enable a defence to run under this provision.
The hon. Member asked what we wanted to exclude. We want to exclude the mere outburst of rage or jealousy. If we did not have words of that kind in the Clause we consider that a person who committed a murder as a result of an outburst of rage, jealousy or temper—especially if he were a bad-tempered man—might be able to run the defence of


diminished responsibility on that and that alone.
We consider that that would be going too far, and would be going outside the Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility as it now stands. We have sought, by the wording we have introduced first, to bring English law into line with the Scottish doctrine, and not to go further than that, and then to give a valuable indication to judge and jury of the kind of matters which they are to take into account, namely, abnormality
whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury
and to exclude, at the same time, the possibility of a mere outburst of temper by a bad-tempered man being put forward, without anything else, as entitling him to succeed upon a defence of diminished responsibility.
I hope that I have made the defence of these words clear. When we considered the wording of the Clause we wondered whether we could not follow some line such as the hon. Member suggested, but for the reasons I have given we came to the conclusion that if the Clause were really to work as the equivalent provision works in Scotland words of this sort would be necessary and, indeed, desirable.

Mr. Paget: I feel that in this case a very good effort has been made in drafting the subsection, and that it is a good and valuable one. But I am still a little worried by some of the things which the learned Attorney-General has said. I gather that he retains the present words and does not accept "for any cause" because he desires to cut down the meaning of the words "abnormality of mind." I will give way if that is not a correct definition of what he has said.
8.15 p.m.
I am rather doubtful whether they do. First, considerations of jealousy or temper would not arise unless the jealousy or temper was of such a kind as to amount to an abnormality of mind. Temper or jealousy would be irrelevant unless it amounted to an abnormality of mind. If such temper or jealousy does amount to an abnormality of mind, must it not arise either from an arrested or retarded development of mind or from an inherent cause within the mind? If it

be an abnormality of the mind it seems to me that it must either be a defect in the development of the mind—something which ought to be in the mind but is not—or something which is in the mind and ought not to be.

The Attorney-General: The phrase "inherent causes" is not limited to the mind. The hon. and learned Gentleman read it as if it meant "inherent causes in the mind." I hope he follows that.

Mr. Paget: I entirely agree. The phrase
from such abnormality of mind
is the governing phrase. That phrase must be there. We then consider words which apparently provide a limitation of abnormality of the mind. In fact, abnormality of the mind would cover more if the words in brackets were omitted. I understand that to be the right hon. and learned Gentleman's argument.

The Attorney-General: The phrase might cover more.

Mr. Paget: Yes—might. I wonder whether that is so. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that he wanted to exclude mere temper and jealousy. I humbly submit that neither jealousy nor temper can come in unless it be such as to amount to abnormality of the mind. The question does not arise otherwise.
If the temper is such that it arises from an abnormality of the mind, it is an abnormality of the mind because there is something lacking in the mind—in this case control—which should be there, or there is something in the mind which ought not to be there. If there is something, such as control, which is not there and ought to be, that must be a case of arrested development because, if the mind had developed properly—unless there were disease or injury, which is also covered—what ought to be there would be there, namely, control. On the other hand, if there is something in the mind which ought not to be there, that must surely arise from an inherent cause.
I find it a little difficult to see how these words can cut down the range of the words "abnormality of mind". If they are there simply to illustrate the sort of thing which is meant, I should have thought that it would be desirable, as a precaution, to add some such words as


"or however else arising". But still, I feel that the existing words are an explanation of what is meant by abnormality of the mind and do not in any way cut it down. I do not think that they would in practice be enlarged if we added to them, "from any causes". I do not therefore take any particular objection either to the words in the bracket; nor have I any great enthusiasm for substituting them. I should have thought it would have been tidier simply to leave the words suggested in the Amendment, as I find it difficult to see that it makes any substantial difference.

The Attorney-General: I have listened with interest to what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said. The wording is important. I think it true to say that they are a valuable signpost which is required, if this is to be used in the courts; and also there is the desirability of keeping in line with the Scottish system. It is a useful indication and one must seek to exclude the case of temper which does arise.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I wish to congratulate the Government, and in particular I should like to congratulate the Parliamentary draftsmen, on the inclusion of this important matter in parenthesis. To my mind, for any person who might have to undertake the defence or prosecution in connection with a charge, it will be essential to have some clear guidance. I hope that the Committee will bear with me if I give the reason why, and illustrate it by a particular case.
First, Clause 2 is introduced to introduce the Scottish doctrine for one reason only. The Royal Commission reported clearly that it accepted this doctrine as an effective doctrine and one which would work. But the Commission came to the conclusion that it was unnecessary, for one reason. It recommended that the jury should decide the question of sentence, and as the jury were to do that, it did not trouble to adopt this particular doctrine of diminished responsibility. Now the doctrine comes before this Committee as an essential element in relation to the death penalty in this case so that the Prerogative shall not be used, and in those circumstances

the Scottish doctrine has been introduced with the words:
… if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility …
and there would be returned a verdict of manslaughter. The whole doctrine of diminished responsibiity is one, and only one, of mental abnormality. It deals purely with mental abnormality and not abnormality which might arise from any other cause.
The essence of the importance of the words in parenthesis is this. "Abnormality of mind" may not cover certain aspects unless they are included in the parenthesis. It would not include one most important element. Without some guidance or definition it would not include simplicity of the mind. On the other hand, it would exclude irresponsibility of the mind.
Let us consider simplicity of the mind. A simple mind is not, in ordinary circumstances, an abnormality of the mind. There would be a great deal of trouble if there were no definition laid down in that matter. We should be leaving it to the courts to decide, and if there was one thing that I should have thought that hon. Gentlemen opposite did not want it would be for the courts to build up a guide to what they would determine should be regarded as abnormality of the mind. Therefore the Government have, quite rightly, laid down a guide, which is not a definition, but a guide as to abnormality of mind; and one of those matters which they have stated would be abnormality of mind is in fact arrested or retarded development.
Let me give an example of a case which clearly would not have been regarded as one of abnormality of mind, if the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) had his way, and these words in parenthesis did not exist. The case is that of Bass Woodcock. He killed his sister-in-law, who was in fact his mistress, in a suicide pact.
This boy was tried, I think at the age of 21. He had been a minor, and the evidence given was that he was a person whose mental ability was that of a person aged 10. Nonetheless he was perfectly sound and perfectly normal of mind, but he had a completely arrested and a simple mind. What he was doing he thought


to be a very good thing to do, and perfectly proper. Without some guidance the jury might easily have held that that person had no abnormality of the mind, although his mind was ten or twelve years younger than it should have been. It is for that reason—and here is one of the matters on which I have pressed the Government for a long time—that it seems to me that some guidance is necessary, particularly in regard to those who are arrested or retarded in their development.

Mr. S. Silverman: Would the hon. Gentleman consider that there is anything in the Clause to give any guidance as to what abnormality of mind means? If the judges are able to build up a system of law by decision, they can do it in respect of abnormality of mind which is not defined. The hon. Gentleman appears to think that the words in parenthesis afford some guide as to what abnormality of mind shall mean. With respect, they do not do that. "Abnormality of mind" is still open and undefined in any way. What the words in parenthesis do is to give some guidance as to the causes of the abnormality of the mind, whether arising from this, that or the other. Conceding that there might be something in what the hon. Gentleman is saying, if the words in parenthesis were left out and there were substituted the words, "however arising," would not all his points be met?

Mr. Rees-Davies: No, I think not. If I may deal with this point, I did say in opening my argument that it was quite clear to me that this part of the subsection in parenthesis is not a definition. This is not a definition, it is a guide; and, not being a definition, cannot deal with matters of abnormality of the mind beyond those specifically outlined in the parenthesis. Therefore it can do no possible harm to anyone who is seeking to say that it is a limiting factor. It is not a limiting factor.
When the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said that it was a limiting factor in relation to "abnormality of mind", he was quite wrong. It is nothing of the kind. It is carrying out a twin purpose. It is, first, drawing attention to what is abnormality of the mind, which is to be found in the summing up to the jury by Lord Justice

Cooper in the case of Braithwaite in 1945, in the Journal Cases of that year, and the words in parenthesis are merely an epitome of the reasons of that particular judge for his judgment which he gave to afford a guidance. I think the hon. and learned Member for Paisley (Mr. D. Johnston) will agree that one is trying to give, from the Scottish law, guidance in the absence of which an English judge would have no form of guidance.
8.30 p.m.
Let me turn to the other point made by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne. He says that we should exclude altogether these words in parenthesis and have just "however arising" as an alternative. I do not agree with that suggestion. If we had "however arising" there would still be the words "abnormality of mind". The words might cover simplicity of mind, because it would be an abnormality "however arising". We can differ about these matters, but we do not want to have a jury trying to decide whether a man of 21 who has a mental age of 10 years has an abnormal mind. Some people might say that he had a simple mind and others would say that if he is not of normal mental age then his mind is abnormal. I can see tremendous arguments, which would be very unfortunate.
Another abnormality of mind is irresponsibility. The difficulty here would be just as great. One does not want to include somebody who is passionately jealous or has an exceptional mind, abnormal in the sense that it is abnormally irresponsible. What is intended here from the law of Scotland is some-think bordering upon mental disease, and so we include retarded development and inherent disease of the mind, or something bordering on it, sufficient for a jury to say, "He is so abnormal that he ought not to be found guilty of murder", and return a verdict of manslaughter.
I urge the Committee not to support the Amendment. I believe it to be essential to give the guidance contained in the Clause if this law is to be effectively carried out.

Mr. Arthur Moyle: The speech which has just been made by the hon. Member for Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) convinces me


that the view expressed by my colleagues is right and that the sentence in the parenthesis limits rather than widens the scope of the subsection. The Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) would strengthen the admirable purpose of the Clause.
It was significant that the Attorney-General, when replying to my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne, did not reply on the merits of the issue but rather expressed sympathy and took refuge in the argument that what had been found good in Scots law about the acceptance of diminished responsibility ought, by virtue of that simple fact, to operate in England. Some of us on this side of the Committee are laymen and not too familiar with the doctrine of diminished responsibility and how it has worked, but I have not the slightest doubt that the Secretary of State for Scotland could tell the Committee that many Scotsmen disagree with the Scots law about diminished responsibility and how it has been interpreted there in the courts. I cannot imagine that its operation is regarded as perfect by the Scots.

Clause 2 is the best part of the Bill. The hon. Member for Isle of Thanet took courage in his hands and brought forward a number of cases with which he was familiar to demonstrate the necessity for the words in the parenthesis, without which, he argued, the purpose of the Clause would not be fully realised, because it would be left to judges to determine its provisions. I submit that in any case that will have to be decided by the courts, whether the phrase is included in the parenthesis or not.

I wish to put a concrete case to the Solicitor-General. That is the reason I have risen, not so much for the purpose of arguing the merits of the Clause, but to obtain some clarity on what it really means. The Clause seems to be drafted in such a way that what is given in the first part of it is taken away in the latter part. I want to know how the following case would apply if the Amendment were not accepted.

It so happens that I knew Albert Marjoram, a youngster of 20, who was convicted of murder and hanged at Wandsworth Gaol in 1928. I was a witness in that trial. What is important is

the motives which led him to commit murder. Those, I submit, are exceedingly relevant to this Clause. Why did he commit murder? His conduct in the court was impeccable. There was no history in relation to him which could be described as one of arrested development or retarded mind, nor that he had been injured at any time by a fall, by a shock, or an impact with a car which had affected his brain. Apparently he was a normal citizen, except that from time to time he had been guilty of robberies with violence and had caused some trouble to the police as a result.

Why did he commit murder on Dart-ford Heath? He said that he wanted to be the last man to be hanged at Maidstone Gaol which, at that time, was the subject of a great deal of controversy. There was a genuine belief at that time that the gaol was to be closed. He made a bet with Sidney Fox, who was put in the condemned cell there and later hanged for the murder of his mother. Marjoram said that if he killed a policeman he would have a more sensational trial than Fox had, that he would have a packed court and be regarded as more famous than Fox. That was the main motive.

Would one call that an abnormal mind? I say that any act of murder is abnormal. I say that any person committing a murder must obviously be abnormal at the time of its commission. Here was a young man who was obviously suffering from an excessive vanity. He went to his death proud of the fact that he had been condemned to death for murder. He regretted that he could not kill a policeman, and he did what he said was the next best thing—he killed a young woman.

Having related the facts briefly—facts of which I had some knowledge at the time—I should like to ask the Solicitor-General a question. I felt at the time that in a more civilised world Marjoram would not have been hanged. Can the Solicitor-General tell the Committee, if, in 1928, the Clause as it stands without the suggested Amendment had been the law, whether Albert Marjoram would have been hanged? Briefly, would he have been hanged if this interpretation of diminished responsibility had been part of the English law at that time?

Mr. M. Stewart: The right hon. and learned Gentleman argued that one reason for accepting the Clause in its present form rather than the Amendment is that we shall then keep in step with Scottish law on this point. No doubt we shall all want to give a certain amount of weight to that, but I think it will be generally agreed that if it can be shown that the Amendment is substantially better than the Clause in its original form the mere fact that it differs from Scottish practice would not be a sufficient reason for rejecting the Amendment.
If we could establish that the Amendment was a substantial improvement on the Clause, then, if anything, the argument would be to try to see whether we could not, at the same time, improve the Scottish law in the matter; or, at any rate, that we should not lose this opportunity of making the Amendment to the English law in the best and most durable fashion that we could find.
We therefore have to ask ourselves: is the Amendment a substantial improvement on the Clause? That immediately raises a further question: is there, in practice, any substantial difference between what the Clause says and what the Amendment says? Does the Clause, in its present form, include some cases which the Amendment would not include, or does it exclude any cases which the Amendment would not exclude? The hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies), if I followed him rightly, argued that the Clause both included some cases which the Amendment would not include and excluded some which the Amendment would not exclude. Let us suppose, for a moment, with the greatest respect to him, that he is wrong. I will return a little later to the other hypothesis, the hypothesis that he is right.
Let us suppose for a moment that there is no substantial difference and that we cannot establish that anything would be excluded or included under the Clause which would not likewise be excluded or included under the Amendment. If that is so, I submit that the case for the Amendment is overwhelming because of its much greater simplicity. If that is so, all the parenthesis is doing is to invite us and the courts and the jury to consider, not a legal, but a medical and psychological problem as to what are the causes of abnormality of mind. In the

present state of human knowledge, we really do not know the answer. It may well be that in a few years' time we shall know much more about the causes of abnormality, and this, which is intended to be a helpful definition, could then be a very confusing one.
The only justification, therefore, for putting in such a description—that is a better word than definition—is that it is absolutely necessary. Unless it produces a substantial difference in the law, its only result can be to confuse by inviting the courts to try to answer a problem which, in the present state of medical and psychiatric knowledge, cannot properly be answered.
We are, therefore, put in this position. There is no case for rejecting the Amendment unless is can be shown that the Clause has a substantial difference in meaning and that its meaning and effect would be better than that of the Amendment. What are the differences in meaning which it is suggested there might be? On the one hand, there was the difference suggested by the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet, who argued, I think, that the Clause as it now stands would include cases of extreme simplicity of mind that might be excluded by the Amendment. I must say that I disagree with him there.
Let us take the particular case which he gave us. On the facts as he described them to us, the young man's mind was such that he believed that the act of murder was quite a right and proper thing. I think that those were the words, or very nearly the words, which the hon. Gentleman used.

8.45 p.m.

Mr. Rees-Davies: In a suicide pact.

Mr. Stewart: Yes, in a suicide pact, the act of murder was a right and proper thing. It was also established that he had the mental age of a child of 12. Is it conceivable that if those facts had been established to a jury, the jury—or, indeed, any reasonable person—could have said that that man's mind was not abnormal?
We already use the word "subnormal" for children who suffer from severely retarded development, as is apparent in their education. Surely, subnormality is one form of abnormality. It is a definition of a development less than normal.


Abnormality can occur as being either less or more than normal, and subnormality is, therefore, one form of abnormality.

Mr. Rees-Davies: The hon. Member draws from that exactly the point I was making, that there is a difference of opinion straight away. That is the exact reason why it should be clarified in the parenthesis.

Mr. Stewart: If the hon. Gentleman is not happy about my use of the word "subnormality", I return to the point which I made before. If a young man has a mental age of 12, and thinks that murder in a suicide pact is a right and proper thing to do, is it conceivable that any jury could say that he was not
… suffering from such abnormality of mind … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts …"?
I do not believe that any reasonable jury could come to that conclusion, and it is very significant that the learned Attorney-General did not advance this argument. The Clause is evidently drafted on the assumption that the word "abnormality" can include simplicity, because it goes on to say, in as many words, that abnormality can arise from simplicity. That is based on the assumption that the word "abnormality" must, in itself, include simplicity.
Perhaps the most serious matter in the whole of the argument is this. The learned Attorney-General is arguing that if we adopted the Amendment rather than the Clause we might bring within the ambit of this subsection murders committed, say, from jealousy or bad temper—what, I think, the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet described as irresponsible murders. The question I would put is this. Can the argument be sustained that a man's jealousy or bad temper are such that any reasonable person would regard them as
… such abnormality of mind … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility …"?
If we are satisfied that the man's state of mind—jealousy, or bad temper, or whatever it is—is an abnormality such as
… substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts …
then, we should be obliged to conclude that he was covered by this Clause, even

as it now stands, because jealousy or bad temper is certainly something inherent in the personality.
Let us take what is, perhaps, the most famous jealousy case on record—that of Othello. Surely, if Othello were being tried under this Clause the question for the jury would be this: was his jealousy—and he was certainly more addicted to that vice than other men—such that it could be described as
… such abnormality of mind … as substantially impaired his mental responsibility …"?
If the jury decided that it was—and I trust that they would not, because I think that it would be a very bad precedent-then, under the Clause as it now stands, they would have to say that he was not liable to be charged with murder, because whatever view was taken of his jealousy it was certainly something inherent in his personality. If it were felt that his jealousy was to be dignified with the name of abnormality of mind, it would certainly be an abnormality of the mind covered by this Clause.
So it would be in the case of anybody who could manage to convince the court that the jealousy or bad temper was such as to be dignified with the name of abnormality. If he could once jump over that hurdle, he would be safely over the other, even in its present form, because conditions of the mind like that are inherent in the personality.
I should have thought that the proper answer to somebody like that would be. "Your jealousy or bad temper cannot be regarded as an abnormality such as to impair your mental responsibility." I am arguing, therefore, that the jealousy and bad temper cases are not affected by whether we have the Clause or whether we have the Amendment, because the question which has to be asked is: is this lack of virtue, this irresponsibility, or whatever we may call it, so great as to be dignified with the name of abnormality? If it is, we are anxious to make it a case of diminished responsibility. If it is not, we do not want to do so. But the result will be the same whether we have the Clause or whether we have the Amendment.
I submit, therefore, that neither in inclusion nor in exclusion has it been shown that there is any practical difference between the Clause and the Amendment. That being so, the difference


between the two is only that the Clause brings in unnecessary medical and psychological discussions with which there is really no point in bothering the courts. For that reason, therefore, I am sure that we should be more wise to accept the simpler and more straightforward wording of the Amendment than the unnecessarily complicated wording of the Clause.

Mr. Hale: I always listen to my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) with very great attention and complete agreement. Indeed, I envy him his clarity of reasoning and his forceful approach to the subject. However, with the concluding part of his remarks I found myself in some little difficulty. I have not perused the Oxford Dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the word "inherent", but according to my humble recollection it implies the question of heredity.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Send for the hon. and learned Member for Gloucester (Mr. Turner-Samuels).

Mr. Hale: That would certainly add clarity to a drab and dismal subject.
This is an important Clause. I want to approach it with sincerity and not in any provocative way. I am bound to say that I find the observations of the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) a little interesting. His reference to a man of 21 with the mind of a child of 12 who is not regarded as normal seemed to me to be perhaps a possibility at Llandudno, but not normal elsewhere.
In producing this Clause and in following the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, we are doing something today which probably will affect only three or four cases in a year, but we are introducing a major modification applied to a very minor number of people which, if extended, might produce a great social reform and one for which many of us have waited a long time.
I do not think that there is any question that the M'Naghten Rules are inadequate and unsatisfactory. Most people who have considered them have thought of the possibility of substituting something else. We have all had to face the dilemma of what is abnormality.

Many of us have started from the point of view that much crime is due to abnormality of some sort—heredity, environment or something like that—to a condition of the mind or pressure on the brain. Those of us who have considered this matter seriously are conscious that whether that be true or not, we are fifty or sixty years from the possibility of giving to it any effective application.
We are still remotely considering crimes resulting from sexual abnormality. There is overwhelming evidence that sexual abnormality may be inherited. There is equally overwhelming evidence that it can be acquired. There is much evidence that the sufferer who inherited the disease should be treated as a victim of the disease. It is equally true that these people can spread this foul contagion and spread it widely over a whole area. This is a conflict which all of us who are keen on the question of penal reform have to face. I ask the Solicitor-General to apply his mind to this.
I should have thought that there was a general move to support the contention that in almost every legal interpretation if one adds a number of sub-headings after a general classification the effect is to limit it. Obviously, if we have a couple of general words or a general word like "abnormality" or "abnormality of mind" and particularise the methods in which it can arise we shall obviously limit it.

Mr. Paget: The ejusdem generis rule.

Mr. Hale: My hon. and learned Friend learned his Latin at Eton, with the pronunciation of Eton. I, unfortunately, got mine at Ashby-de-la-Zouch, with the pronunciation of Rome; but we will not divide on that. It does limit as a rule of law. It is not a rule of law which we have to pronounce correctly, but it is a rule of law which we have to interpret correctly.
I want to put seriously to the Solicitor-General one or two propositions. I believe that it is important that we should have in our minds the sort of thing we are considering which may be the germ of a very great social reform. Hon. Members will remember the history of the Jukes family, which was written in the United States and has been the subject of a great many books. It originated from one, Thomas Dugdale,


who was inspecting prisons, who found a number of people of the same name and was determined to investigate this family. He exercised a great deal of patience and care in tracing about seven generations from Ada, I think it was, who was a respectable and religious-minded harlot who did no great harm to anyone except to contaminate people with venereal disease. He traced just over 700 members of the family, of 639 of which he was able to get particulars. He was able to show that a very large number of them were convicted criminals; but a large number of the women were prostitutes or brothel keepers. All over the years the original infection, coupled with environment, had debased the whole of the family, until it became a serious social menace. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member wishes to intervene I will willingly give way.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I was only saying that I hoped the hon. Gentleman would address the Chair.

Mr. Hale: I have not had the privilege of congratulating you, Sir Gordon, on your recent and well-merited elevation. If there is any fault in the form of my observations I am sure that you will not be too timid to call my attention to the fact. I am quite sure you will understand that I would willingly give you the full benefit of the observations which I am making.
Since that time, as the Solicitor-General knows, study after study has taken place, in France and America chiefly, and it has been found that we get this condition of things about which nobody can dogmatise. It is nonsense to say that a jury can say that this is inherent, even if they know what "inherent" means, which I, apparently, did not. It is no use saying that a jury can isolate this or that.
During the last few months there has been published a book written by Caryl Chessman, a man who is still in the "death row" at St. Quentin prison in the United States of America. He is still waiting to go into the gas chamber, after seven years of imprisonment. He is a brilliant, able and thoughtful man who could do a great deal for the world if he were allowed to live. He quotes a case of a man who came into the "death row" while he was there, a young officer

—his name was Norris, if I remember aright—who had served in the American forces in the war with Japan, with an admirable record, a man marked for promotion, liked by his colleagues and respected by his men.
9.0 p.m.
There came a moment when, for three or four consecutive days, this man was at Leyte involved, not merely in heavy bombardments, but primarily in hand-to-hand warfare. For nights he lay out in the heat, surrounded by the stench of rotting corpses. At the end of that experience, he changed. Finally, after being promoted, he left the Army, and committed a series of crimes. He gave all sorts of fantastic reasons for his crimes; he was trying to capture a bizarre, undiscovered secret weapon to destroy his enemies, and so on. He was executed for murder.
Under this Clause, that man would still be executed. Is that an
abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development"—
certainly not that—
or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury)"?
Is it such an abnormality?
During the war I had to defend a similar case myself, though the charge was not anything like so serious; if it had been, I should not have been defending. A young man of admirable character and first-class education, a sportsman, esteemed and respected everywhere, joined the Forces in the ranks. He was employed as a dispatch rider. He was very proud of his motorcycle, and once in delivering a ceremonial dispatch on a ceremonial parade, he applied his brakes too sharply, came to too abrupt a stop and went over the handlebars, falling on his head.
He had a perfunctory examination by a medical officer, and was told he was fit to go back to duty. All his friends noticed that his character changed. He got in bad company, with a gang of housebreakers. In all he did there seems to have been some element of automatism because the reports of all his friends were that he seemed to be a dazed and uncollected man. He committed a series of offences, but his participation was not detected.
Later, he saw another medical officer, who examined him and asked why he had received no treatment. He answered that he had seen a medical officer who had told him he was all right. This last medical officer sent him for X-ray, as a result of which he was found to have been walking about for three months with a compound fracture of the skull. He had treatment in hospital, and was discharged cured. He continued his service in the Forces, and later won a medal for gallantry in very difficult circumstances.
A month or two later the police found out about his crimes. They were not murder, so perhaps it might be said that this does not apply. But suppose it had been. It would have been said that in this case he would be all right, because his condition was the result of injury. That may well be so; but we must remember that the onus of proof is now put upon him to show that it was due to injury. The burden of proof has shifted to the accused, who is often a poor person without enough money to call a doctor at all. This is an important consideration.
We are, Sir Gordon, in the infancy of knowledge upon these subjects. I appreciate that one must use a word of fairly collective meaning like "abnormality" and hope that it will cover the situation. But how much do we know about it? Is there such a disease as kleptomania? Is there such a thing as kleptomania, and, if there is, is it a disease? I once traced kleptomania through three generations of the same family, in circumstances which were sufficiently convincing to me.
It all arose from the case of a lad in the Forces who was charged with theft. The officer who was due to defend him wrote to me and said, "This lad has given me a statement in which he says that he has never' pinched' anything of value in his life but has always had this compelling force which has made him pick up comparatively worthless articles, which were of not much use to him and of little use to those from whom they were taken. He is the third generation of his family in which this has appeared. His grandfather, a parson, is still in your district. Will you see him and find out the truth?"
I saw the old man, who was over seventy years of age, but I could not persuade him to give evidence. I checked the evidence with neighbours

and people in the village and found out that this was true. Three generations had been kleptomaniacs. Is that a disease? Is there such a thing as kleptomania? Can one have partial kleptomania, or a slight attack of it?
We now acknowledge some of these things which over the years we have disputed and said did not exist. We criticised hypnotism as a charlatan science. We talked about claustrophobia as something which people had invented. We now know that these things happen, but that is about all that we do know. Can somebody have a partial claustrophobia? Is that a compelling reason why he should seek to escape arrest? Would that be a disease if he sought to escape arrest because he just could not physically stand the strain and stress of incarceration in a small cell? Would that be the kind of abnormality which would justify escape?
We really are at a time when our knowledge of these things is slight. Therefore, it is extremely important that we should not try to put upon a jury the extra burden of having to make a separate decision upon five or six separate issues every time that this is raised.
I used, for my sins, to take cases for the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, with a very good officer, whose name was mentioned in the House not so long ago—Inspector Riley, of Nuneaton, a man of courage, a decent man, who was anxious only to help children and not to put people in prison.
Whenever we went to a really bad case, however, we were confronted with a father and a mother who, generally speaking, were so moronic that there was nothing that could be done. Punishment was no good because they had long passed beyond the normal sense of humanity. They were far below that standard. One might say that they had wallowed like pigs in their own filth until they had reduced themselves to that state. I do not myself generally believe it. I believe that they were the victims of something, either of our social system or of wars or a combination of it all, or of environment or heredity. No jury would ever be able to decide an issue like that. Nobody would be able to know.
When the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet says that a lad of 20, with the mind of a 10-year-old, may not be abnormal—

Mr. Rees-Davies: I did not say that.

Mr. Hale: I give way at once if the hon. Member wants to correct me.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I said that the definition as laid down in the Clause would not necessarily come within the term of abnormality, which was one of the reasons why this provision was needed.

Mr. Hale: I apologise to the hon. Member. I did not want to misrepresent him. I remember now that he made the point as a correction to my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham.
What does this come to? I thought it was conceded that under the ejusdem generis rules this is a limitation, that whatever the result of those words it reduces the ambit of the words if they are left untouched and uncorrected. How, therefore, can it be argued that that lad might be in as the Clause is drawn and could not be in if we widened it? We are certainly widening it—there cannot be any question about that.

Mr. Paget: I am not at all sure that we are widening it. Even if—I cannot think of one offhand—one could find some abnormality of mind which arose neither from
arrested or retarded development of mind
nor from some inherent or inside cause
induced by … injury
surely it must be something of the same sort. If it were something of the same sort, it would not be excluded.

Mr. S. Silverman: Before my hon. Friend answers that question, perhaps he will agree to include in his answer a reply to this one. Can he conceive of any words which would widen the Clause more than the words "however arising "?

Mr. Hale: I think that we ought to have the words "or body" after the word "mind". We could have said:
abnormality of mind or body (whether arising … 
I think that that would be as wide as it could or should be.
I always listen to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) with the very greatest respect, but I think that in his interjection he was speaking out of the back of his honourable and learned neck. The words:
Whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development

represent a marked limitation. There are all sorts and sizes of moronic conditions which would not normally be included under the words "arrested or retarded development".
I said that inherent causes would cover causes inherited, but I was corrected and told that it was an inside cause. What is an inside cause? It sounds like gastric trouble. Suppose a child is born a mongol. What is that?

Mr. Paget: It is a cause inside the child's mind.

Mr. Hale: I agree, but it is not necessarily "arrested or retarded development". I do not profess to be a medical expert, but I believe that it can result from pre-natal causes in the mother. We are not having heredity in any case, apparently, if my hon. Friend is right. What is a disease? If my hon. and learned Friend had followed he would have known that I had been trying to make the point for a long time. Disease does not cover every affliction of mind or body. These are being limited to abnormality of mind.

Mr. Paget: Even if I am talking out of the back of my neck, may I say that "abnormality of mind" may be too narrow a phrase? What I am saying is that I do not think that once we have "abnormality of mind" the words in the brackets in any way confine that abnormality of mind, because they are instances. They do not purport to be inclusive of everything. Under the ejusdem generis rules they might exclude something of quite a different sort, but I find it difficult to believe that there could be something of a different sort.

Mr. Hale: We started with two propositions. My hon. and learned Friend has now admitted the first. The first challenge was whether I could find words which would make the Clause wider. We have now agreed that we could make it wider and that, therefore, this is narrower. The second challenge was that I should name something. Jealousy. Is that inherent?

Mr. Paget: Yes. if it is abnormality of mind.

Mr. Hale: Inherent?

Mr. Paget: Yes.

Mr. Hale: Does my hon. and learned Friend really suggest that he could go to a jury confident that he could convince them that Othello was entitled to an acquittal on a charge of having murdered Desdemona, because of an inherent ailment named jealousy? I should have little confidence if I were defending. Can one say that jealousy is itself an abnormality of mind?

Mr. M. Stewart: No, but if my hon. Friend were defending Othello that would be the first thing he would have to try to establish—that the jealousy was an abnormality. If he could establish that then I think, either under the Clause or under the Amendment, the charge could be reduced from that of murder. Whether the jealousy of Othello can properly be described as abnormality is something which, under both the Clause and the Amendment, is still, presumably, left for the courts to decide.

9.15 p.m.

Mr. Hale: Yes, I agree. If I were defending Othello, I should sub-poena Iago and rely upon my cross-examination to put the whole thing in its proper perspective. I think it would be difficult to establish my hon. Friend's point. It would be getting near the borderline.
My hon. Friend has put the answer to my hon. and learned Friend's point in my mind. There is, for instance, anger, perhaps not provoked in the sense of parts of the Bill. It may be a hereditary disease which is beyond control. At some point it may approach near to madness. However, the whole case against my hon. and learned Friend is that somebody has to draw the demarcation line and say "On one side, it is hereditary; on the other, it is mental disease". Where does it end? That is why we should leave it to the jury unhampered and without any restriction upon it.

Mr. Rees-Davies: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will come back to the realities of the situation for one moment. If there is no definition in parenthesis here, there will within a year or two be a definition by the judges. What does he want—a definition laid down by the House of Commons or one on the basis of case law? The answer must be the former.

Mr. Hale: That would depend a little on the future of the office of the Paymaster-General, a matter which I cannot go into at the moment.
I still find it difficult to understand how the words "however arising" could, even by Her Majesty's present judges, be judicially defined as meaning very much different from what we think they mean. "However arising" relate to the Amendment that we are talking about. The hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet made a passionate plea for me to come down to brass tacks. Here we are in the midst of it, but he said it is another point. Surely, the words "however arising" constitute a clear and capable definition.
This is an important point, and the Clause is an important one. This matter approaches the Scots view of diminished responsibility and the French view of extenuating circumstances. The French jury does not consider whether they are extenuating circumstances in the sense in which we use the phrase. It considers whether there are circumstances in relation to the physical or mental condition of the man himself, or in relation to the crime, which could free him from the capital penalty. Therefore, I believe that it is a change of some importance, and it is one that I should like to welcome. It is a serious matter.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for referring to Othello. When we talk about these matters we come back to Othello, and particularly to what Othello himself said as he thought over the problem that confronted him, blinded as he was by his jealousy:
Put out the light, and then—Put out the light?
If I quench thee, thou flaming minister!
I can again thy former light restore,
Should I repent me:—but once put out thy light,
Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature.
I know not where is that Promethean heat
That can thy light relume.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: The sporting and romantic instinct of all of us were stirred when, after four and a half hours of debate which did not reflect any great credit on the Government, we saw the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) galloping to the rescue of the Attorney-General. I am sorry that there have not been more hon. Gentlemen opposite to share the zeal that we on this side of the Committee


have for clarifying a Bill which in many respects seems to be a little obscure.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) has reminded us, we are now dealing with one of the most important and, in a way, one of the most complicated aspects of the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Oldbury and Halesowen (Mr. Moyle) was right in saying that this is probably the best part of the Bill. We are trying to make it better by making it clearer and less restrictive. To do this we are proposing to leave out the words which limit abnormality of mind, the words:
… (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury.)
It is, as the Attorney-General told us, broadly true that that is the wording which appears in the Mental Deficiency Acts relating in their case to young people under the age of 18. Although the Government have adopted the words of the Mental Deficiency Acts, with certain qualifications, it is interesting to notice that the Royal Commission used the expression "mental abnormality" in a rather different sense. The Commission said in paragraph 212 that it used "mental abnormality"
… as a general term to cover all forms of mental disease, mental deficiency and disorders of personality.
The inclusion of "disorders of personality "seems to make" mental abnormality "a good deal wider than the Clause which we are now considering.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said, it is true that the Royal Commission did not go as far as the Government or the Opposition in adopting the doctrine of diminished responsibility for England and Wales. The Commission did not recommend that change, but in paragraph 411 of its Report it said:
… there is no sharp dividing line between sanity and insanity, but the two extremes of' sanity' and' insanity' shade into one another by imperceptible gradations. The degree of individual responsibility varies equally widely; no clear boundary can be drawn between responsibility and irresponsibility.
Later in the same paragraph the Commission said:
The acceptance of the doctrine of diminished responsibility would undoubtedly bring the law into closer harmony with the

facts and would enable the courts to avoid passing sentence of death in numerous cases in which it will not be carried out.
The Commission did not feel able to recommend the adoption of this change, because in its view it also affected a large number of other offences which the members of the Commission believed to be outside their terms of reference. We are all grateful to the Government for not finding the same difficulty in this respect.
This Clause is the Government's attempt to translate that point of view into effect. We are disappointed at the inclusion of the words in brackets, because we believe that they hedge around "abnormality of mind" with qualifications which must be either superfluous, or, as my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West argued, restrictive. The Attorney-General justified the words by saying that they had two objects. The first was to show that any mental abnormality must be bordering on insanity. He argued that the words indicated the sort of abnormality which the Government had in mind. The second, he said, was that the words were intended to exclude outbreaks of rage or jealousy.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) gave the answer to that when he said that outbreaks of rage or jealousy would come within the scope of the Clause only if they amounted to or revealed some mental abnormality. One of the difficulties in which we all find ourselves is that we do not know what types of mental abnormality will be excluded or included in the wording.
I should have thought that the test which we ought to apply is the degree of abnormality which exists, and not the cause from which it springs. I do not believe that we can legislate for a definition of abnormality and responsibility in this context. I believe that in every case it must be decided by the court in the light of all the circumstances and all the evidence which is given. We find great difficulty in knowing how this doctrine would apply in cases which have already resulted in the hanging of three men. I should very much like the guidance of the Government as to whether, if the Clause had been in operation at the time, the hangings of Miles Giffard, George Newland and Francis Wilkinson would have taken place.
Miles Giffard was the young man, aged 26, who murdered his parents in Cornwall and then threw their bodies over a cliff in order to steal his parents' car and some money and visit a girl friend in London. That man, as his uncle later revealed in a letter to The Times, had a long history of abnormality and mental illness from the age of 4 and onwards. He had seen a mental specialist at the age of 15, and had been under treatment for two years. His uncle wrote to The Times and said that at the trial very little weight was given to the long history of abnormality and mental disease. It must be fairly clear that that case at least would come within the scope of the new Clause.
I now come to the case of George Newland—a metal toy maker, aged 21, living in Walthamstow. I think that that case is not so easy to decide. He battered to death a 65-year-old tradesman and also attacked his victim's wife. He said that he got desperate and wanted money for a new suit. He added:
What really got into my mind was the cosh boy picture I saw the other day.
The electro-encephalograph showed what was described as abnormality of an unspecific character. There is a case of abnormality, as reported at the time, which was unspecific in its character. I should like the guidance of the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General as to whether, in their view, that man would have hanged if this Clause had been in operation at that time.
The third case to which I want to draw attention is that of Frances Wilkinson—a 24-year-old furnaceman, who beat to death his landlord's five-year-old daughter and then attempted a sexual assault upon her. His mother told the court that at an early age he suffered a shock when he found a new-born baby torn in half in a dustbin. That had obviously caused all sorts of disturbances in his mind. I should like to know whether the abnormality thus produced would come within the scope of the words which the Attorney-General has included in the Clause.
The hon. Member for Isle of Thanet asked if we wanted to build up a body of case law on this subject. I should have thought that that was almost inevitable in a matter of this kind, and I should have thought that it was preferable to leave it to the reasonable discretion of the court to decide whether the abnormality

was such as to justify reducing the charge from one of murder to one of manslaughter.
I believe that as the Clause stands it will be difficult to interpret, and because it includes certain categories of mental abnormality it may be that judges will be tempted to interpret it much too strictly, and not with the same flexibility that they would have done if the words proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne were adopted. If we pass the Clause in its present form I believe that on subsequent occasions the Secertary of State will find it very difficult indeed to advise the Queen to exercise the Royal Prerogative of mercy if a defence of diminished responsibility has been rejected by the court.
I hope that that will not be the case. If the Attorney-General or the Home Secretary will give the Committee an assurance of that kind, it will allay a good deal of the uneasiness that we feel. We say that we should not try to circumscribe the jury too much in reaching a decision upon this matter. We say that the test should be the degree of abnormality involved. We hope that the Government will either accept the Amendment or think about the matter again—otherwise, we shall regretfully find it necessary to divide on it.

9.30 p.m.

The Attorney-General: I spoke after the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and said that we are not able to accept this Amendment. That position still stands, for the reason which I have advanced and which I will not repeat.
In answer to the hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood), I cannot say whether this defence would have succeeded had it been put forward in any particular case. In some cases it might have, and in others it might not. The hon. Gentleman cannot expect me, without careful consideration of all the facts, to express a view on what the decision would have been on this issue had it been put forward. Therefore, I must refrain from expressing any view on the particular cases which he mentioned. I can give him the assurance that there is nothing in Clause 2 which in any way limits or puts a fetter on the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of mercy.

Mr. S. Silverman: I am a little disappointed to find the Attorney-General not able—I am sure he was perfectly willing, but he explained that he was not able—to answer my hon. Friend's question whether, in the cases that he put to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, there was a possibility—no one would ask the Attorney-General to say more than that—that this defence, had it been advanced, would have succeeded. I should like to tell the Attorney-General why that is important.
One must remember that the Government are putting forward this Bill as an alternative to something which the House of Commons decided last Session, and, therefore, it is most important to know what effect the proposals of the Government would have on the death penalty generally. I am not discussing that at large or in principle, but, of course, one of the matters which will influence hon. Members in their voting is how far the proposals can deal with certain anomalies and what kind of new anomalies they will create in doing so.
I should like to put one or two other cases to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, in addition to those put by my hon. Friend. I find it extremely difficult to believe that, in deciding whether they would accept the recommendation of the Royal Commission not to do this, or whether they would reject that recommendation and do it, the Government never addressed themselves at all to the question of what effect it would have, what kind of cases it would cover and what kind of cases it would exclude. This is a surprising proposal and I should like to know whether this Clause was intended to cover psychopaths generally.
Would Neville Heath, for instance, still be guilty of murder under this Clause? Would Haigh be guilty of murder under this Clause? There is not the slightest doubt that both these were what are—loosely, I dare say—called psychopathic personalities; undoubtedly they were. Is the Clause intended to cover cases of that kind? Is that abnormality of the mind arising from any of the matters set out in the parenthesis? If it is, people will draw all kinds of distinctions and wonder whether the Government are really recommending to the House of Commons an improvement in the law, if people like Heath and Haigh are to escape the death

penalty and people like Ruth Ellis are still to suffer it.
It is one of the matters relevant to the argument and I think it very disappointing that the Government should not be able to say how far they intended cases of that kind should be covered. I do not intend to proceed any further as I do not think that one should delay the Committee in coming to a decision on this Amendment. But I am bound to say that, although the right hon. and learned Gentleman made a very much more praiseworthy effort to answer the arguments addressed to him on this Amendment than the rather critical abdication of responsibility to which he treated us when we were discussing the previous Amendment, it did not satisfy me and I shall be greatly surprised if it satisfied many other hon. Members.

Mr. David Weitzman: I, too, find great difficulty in understanding exactly what the Clause does. Perhaps I might explain my difficulty in a practical way by reference to a case with which I was intimately connected.
Hon. Members will remember a Cypriot woman, Mrs. Christofi, who, about a year ago, was hanged for the murder of her daughter-in-law. She was held by the prison doctor to be insane—there is no question about that—he having had her under his care. She was tried, and no plea of insanity was put forward. She was not willing for a plea of that kind to be put forward. She was found guilty. She was examined, as is usual in such cases, by three doctors appointed by the Home Secretary, and they did not find her insane.
Clearly, that woman was suffering from an abnormality of mind which impaired her responsibility for her act. Could it be shown that that abnormality arose from arrested development, inherent cause, or disease or injury? So far as I know, there was no evidence to satisfy any one of the matters which are included within the brackets in this Clause. Therefore, the Clause puts a limitation on a person who clearly suffers from abnormality of mind which impairs his mental responsibility by putting upon him the onus of satisfying one of the conditions set out within the brackets. If a person is suffering from abnormality of mind and


it substantially impairs his mental responsibility for the act, that ought to be sufficient. I have cited this case as a practical example of the real difficulties that will arise if the Amendment is not accepted.

Mr. Kenneth Robinson: I have listened to most of the debate—not, I am afraid, the earlier part of it—and I think that the Attorney-General has not dealt with the question, what exactly do the Government intend to exclude by the words in parenthesis? What do they mean when they say "induced by disease"? Will the Attorney-General tell the Committee whether by that phrase the Government intend to embrace the whole field of mental illness? If that is so, do they regard neurosis as one of the factors bringing about the abnormality of mind required, under Clause 2, to bring about a reduction of the charge?

The Attorney-General: I should have thought that it would be a recognised condition which brings about abnormality of mind, and which would come either within inherent causes, or disease or

Division No. 9.]
AYES
[9.40 p.m.


Agnew, Cmdr, P. G.
Cunningham, Knox
Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.


Aitken, W. T.
Currie, G. B. H.
Hesketh, R. F.


Alport, C. J. M.
Dance, J. C. G.
Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)


Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William
Deedes, W. F.
Hill, John (S. Norfolk)


Arbuthnot, John
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount


Armstrong, C. W.
Doughty, C. J. A.
Hirst, Geoffrey


Ashton, H.
du Cann, E. D. L.
Holland-Martin, C. J.


Atkins, H. E.
Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)
Hornby, R. p.


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.


Baldwin, A. E.
Duthie, W. S.
Horobin, Sir Ian


Balniel, Lord
Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)
Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence


Barber, Anthony
Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)


Barlow, Sir John
Errington, Sir Eric
Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Erroll, F. J.
Howard, John (Test)


Bidgood, J. C.
Fell, A.
Hughes Hallet, Vice-Admiral J.


Biggs-Davison, J. A.
Finlay, Graeme
Hughes-Young, M. H. C.


Bishop, F. P.
Fisher, Nigel
Hurd, A. R.


Body, R. F.
Fletcher-Cooke, C.
Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)


Bossom, Sir Alfred
Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe &amp; Lonsdale)
Hyde, Montgomery


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.
Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.


Boyle, Sir Edward
George, J. C. (Pollok)
Iremonger, T. L.


Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry
Gibson-Watt, D.
Irvine, Byant Godman (Rye)


Brooman-White, R. C.
Godber, J. B.
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)


Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.
Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)


Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Gower, H. R.
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)


Burden, F. F. A.
Graham, Sir Fergus
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)


Campbell, Sir David
Grant, W. (Woodside)
Joseph, Sir Keith


Carr, Robert
Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot


Cary, Sir Robert
Green, A.
Kaberry, D.


Channon, H.
Gresham Cooke, R.
Keegan, D.


Chichester-Clark, R.
Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Kimball, M.


Cole, Norman
Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.
Kirk, P. M.


Conant, Maj, Sir Roger
Gurden, Harold
Lagden, G. W.


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)
Lambert, Hon. G.


Corfield, Capt. F. V.
Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Lambton, Viscount


Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Langford-Holt, J. A.


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col, O. E.
Harvie-Watt, Sir George
Leavey, J. A.


Crouch, R. F.




Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Leburn, W. G.

injury, or the other two factors mentioned.

Mr. Paget: Does the Attorney-General regard the effect of the words in the brackets as exclusive? Suppose it were shown that an abnormality of mind which substantially impairs responsibility, and which arises from some cause of a roughly similar nature but different from those mentioned—I cannot quite think what it could be, off-hand—would it be excluded? As I read the words I do not think the words in the brackets set out to be exclusive but are merely illustrative.

The Attorney-General: Illustrative in one sense, but also exclusive in the other. They would not permit, I think, of someone saying that irritation induced by the behaviour of someone else—that is to say, from an external cause, a prolonged period of irritation—would lead to the serious abnormality of mind with which the Clause deals.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 209, Noes 157.

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. &amp; Chr'ch)
Speir, R. M.


Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)
Nugent, G. R. H.
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)


Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)
Oakshott, H. D.
Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard


Linstead, Sir H. N.
O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)
Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)


Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D
Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)


Longden, Gilbert
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Storey, S.


Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
Osborne, C.
Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)


Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Page, R. G.
Studholme, Sir Henry


McCallum, Major Sir Duncan
Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)
Temple, J. M.


Macdonald, Sir Peter
Partridge, E.
Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)


McKibbin, A. J.
Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.


Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)
Pitman, I. J.
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


McLaughlin, Mrs. P.
Pitt, Miss E. M.
Turner, H. F. L.


McLean, Neil (Inverness)
Pott, H. P.
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Powell, J. Enoch
Vane, W. M. F.


Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.


Maddan, Martin
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)
Vosper, D. F.


Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)
Raikes, Sir Victor
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)


Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Redmayne, M.
Wall, Major Patrick


Markham, Major Sir Frank
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)


Marshall, Douglas
Remnant, Hon. P.
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Maude, Angus
Renton, D. L. M.
Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith &amp; Border)


Mawby, R. L.
Ridsdale, J. E.
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Maydon, Lt.-Comdr, S. L. C.
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)
Wills, G. (Bridgwater)


Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh
Roper, Sir Harold
Wood, Hon. R.


Morrison, John (Salisbury)
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
Woollam, John Victor


Nabarro, G. D. N.
Russell, R. S.



Nairn, D. L. S.
Schofield, Lt.- Col. W.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Neave, Airey
Shepherd, William
Mr. E. Wakefield and


Nicholls, Harmar
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)
Mr. Bryan.


Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)
Spearman, Sir Alexander





NOES


Ainsley, J. W.
Grimond, J.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)


Albu, A. H.
Hale, Leslie
Oliver, G. H.


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Oswald, T.


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Hannan, W.
Padley, W. E.


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)
Paget, R. T.


Anderson, Frank
Hastings, S.
Palmer, A. M. F.


Awbery, S. S.
Hayman, F. H.
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)


Balfour, A.
Healey, Denis
Parker, J.


Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)
Herbison, Miss M.
Peart, T. F.


Benson, G.
Holmes, Horace
Pentland, N.


Beswick, F.
Holt, A. F.
Plummer, Sir Leslie


Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)
Houghton, Douglas
Popplewell, E.


Blackburn, F.
Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Howell, Denis (All Saints)
Probert, A. R.


Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.)
Hubbard, T. F.
Proctor, W. T.


Brockway, A. F.
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Pryde, D. J.


Brown, Thomas (Ince)
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Randall, H. E.


Burke, W. A.
Hunter, A. E.
Rankin, John


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Redhead, E. C.


Champion, A. J.
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Reeves, J.


Chapman, W. D.
Janner, B.
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Chetwynd, G. R.
Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Clunie, J.
Johnson, James (Rugby)
Ross, William


Coldrick, W.
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)
Royle, C.


Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)
Jones, David (The Hartlepools)
Short, E. W.


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Kenyon, C.
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Cronin, J. D.
King, Dr. H. M.
Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)


Cullen, Mrs. A.
Lawson, G. M.
Slater, J. (Sedgefield)


Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Ledger, R. J.
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Deer, G.
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Sparks, J. A.


Delargy, H. J.
Lindgren, G. S.
Steele, T.


Dodds, N. N.
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Dye, S.
MacColl, J. E.
Stones, W. (Consett)


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
McGhee, H. G.
Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent. C.)


Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
McInnes, J.
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.


Fernyhough, E.
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Sylvester, G. O.


Finch, H. J.
McLeavy, Frank
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Forman, J. C.
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Thornton, E.


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn


Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.
Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Wade, D. W.


Gooch, E. G.
Mason, Roy
Warbey, W. N.


Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Mikardo, Ian
Weitzman, D.


Greenwood, Anthony
Mitchison, G. R.
Wheeldon, W. E.


Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.
Monslow, W.
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Grey, C. F.
Moyle, A.
White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Neal, Harold (Bolsover)
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Wilkins, W. A.

Willey, Frederick
Winterbottom, Richard



Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES


Williams, Ronald (Wigan)
Woof, R. E.
Mr. Pearson and


Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)
Yates, V. (Ladywood)
Mr. Simmons.


Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

The Chairman: The Amendment Standing in the name of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), in page 1, line 24, to leave out "mental", is not selected.

Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order, Sir Charles. I know that one must not, and I certainly do not, question the discretion of the Chair in the selection of Amendments, but if it were possible for you to explain why the Amendment to which you have referred did not find favour I think that many of us would be grateful, because when we put it down we thought that it did deal with a substantial point—not merely a drafting point—to which we attached some little importance. I know that none of that is in any way binding on, or indeed of interest to, the Chair, but from our point of view, in deciding our subsequent course of action, it would be of great interest if that decision could be explained.

The Chairman: The hon. Member has asked me a question which, of course, I could answer, but if I made a practice of saying why I did or did not select an Amendment my job would become quite intolerable. I must, therefore, ask to be excused; but if the hon. Member comes to see me afterwards, I will give him an explanation. At all events, the Amendment is not selected.

Mr. Paget: I beg to move, in page 2, line 1, to leave out "defence" and insert "prosecution".

The Chairman: The Amendment, in page 2, line 1, to leave out subsection (2), has not been selected, but I think that it can be discussed with this Amendment, as can the last Amendment on this Clause, in page 2, line 2, to leave out "not".

Mr. Paget: I respectfully agree, Sir Charles.
If the two Amendments were accepted, the Clause would read:
On a charge of murder, it shall be for the prosecution to prove that the person charged is by virtue of this section liable to be convicted of murder.
In other words, the effect of this Amendment is to shift the burden of proof to

the prosecution, where, I believe, the burden of proof should lie. I have always believed that people should be presumed innocent until they are proved guilty.
There has been one exception, and one exception only, to that rule, and that is the defence of insanity, in which the burden of proof has been placed on the defence. We shall have an opportunity later, when we consider a new Clause, to shift the burden there to where it ought to belong, which is on the prosecution, but at this stage we are dealing, not with the defence of insanity, but with the defence of diminished responsibility.
There was at one time in the evolution in the law on murder a tendency to shift the responsibility of proof on to the defence. It was said originally, both by Sir John Forster and by Stephen, that once one proved the killing, the person who killed had to justify that killing. He had to show circumstances which showed that the killing was justified, or that it took place in such circumstances that it could be reduced to manslaughter. That view of the law, which had been generally held for nearly a hundred years, was reversed in the House of Lords in the case of Woolmington, which was referred to earlier in this debate by the Attorney-General, but it left the single anomaly of insanity. I believe that we should do far better to take the opportunity of this Bill to correct the anomaly of insanity, rather than add to it by putting diminished responsibility into the same category.
I believe it is important that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution for reasons of principle and of practice. The offence of murder is not simply killing. It is killing with what is artificially referred to as malice aforethought, and the crime is not proved unless both the deed and the will be proved.
Why, where the will is defective, do we say nonetheless that that defect must be established by the defence, instead of leaving the prosecution to establish that the will, the intention, to kill was there, that the malice aforethought was there? The prosecution have to show an intention. They have to show that the killing


was not accidental, that it was not merely negligence, that it was the special intention which distinguishes murder from manslaughter. Surely they should show that there is the mental capacity to form the necessary intention.
I say, therefore, that as a matter of principle the crime of murder is not proved unless its most essential element is proved, which is the element of malice aforethought; and that the element of malice aforethought is not there unless it is shown that the man has a mind capable of that intention. That is the reason why I say that as a matter of principle the burden of proof should here be on the prosecution.
As a matter of convenience, I think it is more important still because the prosecution are the people who have got the man. If he is charged with murder he is in prison. He is almost certainly in the prison hospital, because people awaiting trial for murder are put there. He is in the prison hospital precisely for observation as to his mental quality. About half the murderers are found to be mad anyway. That is the time when it is ascertained. Since they have the opportunity for watching and for examining him for this very purpose, surely they are the people to bring the evidence before the court of the very thing for which they have examined him.
It is often a tremendous hardship on the defence to have to bear this burden. The madder the man is, the greater the problem to get responsible instructions from him. The man who has a mental abnormality may be the very man whose sensitivity makes him utterly reject the possibility of having it pleaded. The case to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) referred is a very striking one. Mrs. Christofi was certainly odd, to say the least of it. The prison doctor thought she was raving mad, and he said so. But Mrs. Christofi would not allow the defence of insanity to be put forward. Therefore, a person whom the prison doctor, who had had her in his charge—

It being Ten o'clock. The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

LACE INDUSTRY (RESEARCH LEVY)

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Draft Lace Industry (Scientific Research Levy) (Amendment) Order. 1956, a copy of which was laid before this House on 6th November, be approved.—[Mr. Erroll.]

10.0 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Jay: I think that this Order which the Government have brought before us, deals with a very small point, but perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary would explain to us what he is doing. I understand that there is a levy for research in this industry, which was instituted in 1955, and that the Government now wish to alter the basis on which that levy is imposed in such a way as to be sure that the actual amount of money raised from each section of the industry remains the same as it has been in the past year.
I want to ask him whether that is correct. Does it mean that in order to produce this result we shall have to have another Order of this kind each year and. if so, just why do we have to proceed in that rather peculiar manner?

10.1 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. F. J. Erroll): This Order, which will come into force on 1st January, 1957, amends the Order made a year ago under which levies are imposed on the lace industry to finance the Lace Research Association. The effect of the Order is to adjust the rates of the levy to take into account changes in the level of trade. The total sum raised is unaltered. The changes are similar to those made in previous years and they are made with the agreement of the employers' associations and the trade unions concerned because the object is to ensure that the same amount of money is raised for the Research Association each year, taking account of the varying levels of trade within the different sections of the lace industry itself.
It is therefore necessary to produce before the House an Order each year so as to make the necessary changes to ensure a fair distribution of the levy in the light of the changed circumstances of the previous trading period. I can, if the right hon. Gentleman wishes, give


him details of what the changes constitute, but they are not very big, and they are obviously fair as between one section of the trade and another.

Question put and agreed to.

RENT [MONEY]

Resolution reported,
That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to amend the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Acts, 1920 to 1939, and for other purposes, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any increase attributable to the said Act in the sums payable out of moneys so provided under any other Act.

Resolution agreed to.

ASHBOURNE ROAD, DERBY (SPEED LIMIT)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. R. Thompson.]

10.3 p.m.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: My constituents owe a great deal of gratitude to you, Mr. Speaker, for allocating the Adjournment tonight to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Derby, North (Group Captain Wilcock) and myself so that we may raise the question—very important to the citizens of Derby—of the speed limit and of road casualties which are occurring on a certain section of Ashbourne Road in Derby.
Before I speak of the local problem and of the lamentable decisions which the Minister of Transport has made, may I say a few words about the general background of road accidents against which this local problem must be seen, because it is of local problems that the national problem is made up. Road accidents today—I do not hesitate to say it—have become a major social evil, ranking with slums, overcrowding of school classes, and the hardships of the old-age pensioners. I have been increasingly astonished year by year by the complacency with which the Minister and his colleagues regard this social evil and by their failure to take effective action to stop it. Even on the material ground of the staggering loss to the nation through road accidents which happen

every year, I find their view very difficult to understand.
The annual cost of road accidents was first estimated while I was at the Ministry of War Transport twelve years ago. Two separate calculations were made at the request of the then Minister and myself, one by a team of skilled economists and one by the public auditor, both of which showed that the true cost to the nation then, the loss of national income, could not be much less than £70 million a year. Today, it must be nearly £200 million. If the railways killed as many people as motor vehicles kill on the roads, there would be a railway accident with 100 people killed every week all the year round. What action would the Minister take, what capital investment would he authorise, if the railways had a holocaust like that?
Alas, the casualties on the roads are still increasing. The President of the National Safety Congress, Sir Howard Roberts, told the Congress the other day that the figure for 1955–267,922 casualties, with 5,526 killed—was the highest total ever recorded in a single year. He went on to say that by the end of 1956, that is to say, this year, the total for Britain would be even worse. In the first eight months of this year there were over 8,000 more casualties than in the corresponding period of last year. Deaths, he said, are up by 213. That increase of 213 in eight months amounts to almost one a day.
Injury may be worse than death. A child may be crippled for life. A father may be rendered incapable of pursuing his trade or profession. A mother may be made a chronic invalid, confined to bed, the whole family life irretrievably ruined. All of us have, among our personal friends, seen tragedies of that kind.
Let me now turn from the background and the national problem to the local problem in Derby, especially in Ashbourne Road. This road is a trunk road for which the Minister is responsible. For one mile it runs along the north side of a new housing estate known as the Mackworth Estate. It is divided into two sections. From its junction with the ring road called Kingsway to its junction with Prince Charles Avenue, which is the principal road by which the 10,000 inhabitants of the Mackworth Estate


come out to go on to the Ashbourne Road to the centre of Derby and by which they return to their homes, it is 28 ft. wide and has reasonable lighting. This section is 800 yards long.
The second section is from Prince Charles Avenue to the borough boundary at Radbourne Lane. This section is 24 ft. wide, very badly lighted, and is 1,000 yards long. The two sections together make a mile. I shall call it the Mackworth mile. Derby will soon be calling it the "Murder Mile".
At the beginning of this year, there was a speed limit of 30 miles per hour on the first section, that is to say, from Kings-way to Prince Charles Avenue. The local authority, never suspecting what it might be stirring up, applied for the speed limit to be extended to the second section, to Radbourne Lane, because it regarded both sections as being very dangerous. The Minister took a very long time to reach a decision. The council's application was made in January. In June, while the Minister was considering the application, a cyclist was killed at the junction with Prince Charles Avenue.
This accident was drawn to the Minister's attention. It influenced him not at all. In spite of local representations and in spite of letters from my hon. and gallant friend the Member for Derby, North and myself, the Minister not only refused to extend the speed limit to the second section, but he even took off the limit from the first section. He is well aware—at least, I hope so—that by so doing he has roused a storm of indignation in Derby. I have not heard a single person there defend what he has done. An eminent local personality, not of my party, said not long ago that his decision was "a most foolhardy act." The Derby Borough Council, the Watch Committee, the Highways Committee, the Chief Constable, the police, the Road Safety Advisory Committee and all the associations representing the 10,000 people in the Mackworth Estate are unanimously against him. They feel that they have a grievance against him for the way in which he and his Joint Parliamentary Secretaries have handled their demand.
I give only a few more recent examples. I wrote to the Minister on 9th August. I got a reply from the other Joint Parliamentary Secretary on 23rd August. I

shall return presently to some of what he said. I considered his reply so unsatisfactory that, after local consultations, I wrote again to the Minister on 6th September. I particularly called his attention to the fact that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary had based his case on a traffic census taken in 1954. I pointed out that very many of the Mackworth Estate houses had been built since that year and that the vehicular traffic had greatly increased since then. I asked whether the census had been taken on a weekday or at the weekend, when the traffic is particularly heavy, because this is the gateway to Dovedale and the Peak.
I got no answer from the Minister for seven weeks. I received it two days before my Parliamentary Question was due to be asked in this House. He gave me no answer whatever about the traffic census; he never mentioned it. Moreover, the letter was addressed and sent, not to me, but to my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker). The only explanation I can think of is that the Minister never read the draft which was laid before him; I am sure he did not.
I do not think that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, who sent me the first letter on 23rd August, had read his letter either before he signed it, because apart from his very doubtful traffic census figures, on which I have had no satisfaction, he told me that the decision was justified because in the three years 1953, 1954 and 1955 there had been only 31 accidents on this Mackworth mile. The Minister considered that that was quite all right.
I looked into the figures. I got details of every accident and studied them all. In fact, in those three years there were 32 accidents on this single mile, 19 of them involving death or injury. But the case is worse than that, if we add in the figures for 1956—they are going up. In three years and 46 weeks of 1956, there have been 47 accidents. In 1956, there were six more than in 1955, or an increase of 60 per cent. The Minister's decision was taken in the face of this rise.
The right hon. Gentleman's decision to de-restrict the whole of this "Murder Mile" became effective on 18th September. Look at what happened. On 24th September, there was a collision in which three vehicles were involved. Fortunately,


no one was hurt, although the vehicles were badly damaged. On 23rd October, the day the Minister wrote me his letter, a child was knocked down and very seriously injured, escaping death by a miracle. Next day, 24th October, an old lady taking flowers to her husband's grave at the crematorium was knocked down and killed. On 27th October, three days later, a motor cyclist was knocked down and seriously injured. On 12th November, another old lady was killed. All of these have happened since the Minister's decision became effective. If it goes on like this, the Mackworth mile will soon be called "Minister's Murder Mile".
I venture to suggest to the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, on the question of the speed limit, that 150,000 Derbeians cannot be wrong. Not only must the Minister restore the speed limit on the first section and extend it to the second section, but he must do more. He must spend more money. He ought to finish the path on the south side of the road which has been begun since my Questions were put a fortnight ago. He ought to make roundabouts at the junction with Kings-way and at the junction with Prince Charles Avenue. It is the only way of dealing with the accidents involving vehicles turning to the right, of which the Minister spoke in his letter to me. There ought to be a bridge, or some other satisfactory crossing, for people from the south side who want to go to the bus stops on the north side. There ought to be proper lighting on the second section as well.
I beg the Parliamentary Secretary to represent to his right hon. Friend that he must take some action and that Derby will not be satisfied until he does.

10.15 p.m.

Group Captain C. A. B. Wilcock: I will not attempt to enlarge upon the review that my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) has just made, but I should like to underline one or two features. The County Borough of Derby, the Road Safety Advisory Committee, the East Mackworth Tenants' Association—and they represent the people who use this road—and the Chief Constable, to name only a few of those concerned, recommend that this road should not be

derestricted. But it has been derestricted by the Ministry.
According to a letter addressed to the Town Clerk of Derby the road has been derestricted because, quoting 1954, the density of traffic was only six vehicles per minute. I do not know whether the Minister is aware that there has been a great increase in the number of houses in the area. I suggest that it would not be unreasonable to assume that ten vehicles a minute use the road now.
In reply to the Town Clerk the Minister, or the Ministry, said on 23rd August that there was no evidence of congestion. I mention this only because the question of congestion had never arisen. It would appear that at the Ministry there is some misunderstanding of the situation. Again, in a letter which the Parliamentary Secretary was good enough to send to me on 23rd August he said:
Traffic is not heavy, a little over 5 vehicles a minute, that with patience pedestrians need find it very difficult to cross.
I imagine that this letter must have been written for him; I do not think that the Parliamentary Secretary could possibly have read it. Surely it is shocking to say that pedestrians need not find it very difficult to cross the road, if they have patience.
There is one feature which I. as a motorist, do not understand. All of us in Derby are asking that this road should be restricted. As a motorist I know that it is safer not to have roads where the speed limit does not apply. There is a greater possibility of accidents if a road is not restrictive. The Minister nods. Only in the air can it be said that speed is a safety measure. We all have our tongues in our cheeks if we say that by having speed we can avoid accidents and incidents.
We are asking that the speed limit should be imposed on this road. My right hon. Friend talked about the number of accidents in the country last year. It is a shocking fact that probably we lost more killed on the roads than Great Britain, France, Israel, Egypt and, possibly, Hungary have lost in war, or massacre, during the last month. I make this request to the Minister. If he does not feel able to give an assurance that this road will be restricted, I ask him to come to Derby or to send a representative there and to hold a public inquiry. He


should allow the mothers of Derby's children living on this road to come to the inquiry. Let these various organisations, including the police, say what they think on the subject.
I honestly do not believe that in this case—I have examined it very carefully—any Minister or his representative in London can know as well as the people on the spot do what should happen on that piece of road. In view of the deaths which occur on that road, surely it is the Minister's responsibility to take into account the recommendations of the various bodies which have examined the matter.

10.20 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Hugh Molson): The right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) has dealt with the matter on general grounds. He used harsh words about my right hon. Friend and myself when he said that we approach the matter of road safety with complacency. I hardly think he will complain if when I express my right hon. Friend's point of view about the matter, I do so with equal plainness.
The Ministry of Transport was established in this country in order, amongst other things, to ensure that there was instituted and maintained throughout the country national standards upon the roads. This is especially necessary on trunk roads like the one under discussion.
The hon. and gallant Member for Derby, North (Group Captain Wilcock) has referred to the fact that the local authorities may be more familiar with the local conditions than we in London can be. That does not alter the fact that there are certain general principles which have been laid down, and which we seek to apply throughout the country. In this case, it is not necessary for me to rely either on the Department in London or, even, on the Divisional Road Engineer. Until less than two years ago, I lived in Ashbourne, and used to drive on this road every Friday and every Sunday afternoon. Therefore, I am familiar with the problem, and I am personally in agreement with the advice which has been given to us by the Divisional Road Engineer.
It is the case that, without exception—I think I may say "without exception"; certainly, it is with very few exceptions—local authorities are always in favour of the imposition of speed restriction. It is not always the case, however, that the speed restriction will result in a reduction in the number of accidents.
The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the time when he occupied a position similar to mine in the Ministry of War Transport. When he was Chairman of the Committee on Road Safety, he indicated what he thought were the right lines upon which speed restrictions should be imposed. He said, in paragraph 81 of the 1944 Report of the Committee on Road Safety:
If the speed limit is to be effective it must be applied with discretion so that it will attract the respect, goodwill and co-operation of the public.
In the following paragraph, he said:
Restriction of speed should not be imposed if the desired effect can be achieved by other means. We suggest, for example …
(c) On important traffic routes the speed limit should not be imposed for the convenience of frontagers: access to the carriageway should, as far as possible, be restricted by means of guard rails and crossings at a separate level, or traffic might be controlled by means of a co-ordinated system of traffic signals.
The right hon. Gentleman thus clearly indicated that it was not an answer to the problem of traffic on a straight road to impose a speed limit.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: I indicated that it was one of the things that ought to be done in proper cases. It ought to be done with discretion. Has the right hon. Gentleman done any of the things which he read out in that quotation?

Mr. Molson: I shall come to that point later. I am merely indicating now that just to impose a speed limit on a straight trunk road to which there are very few accesses is, according to the right hon. Gentleman's own Report, not the right way to deal with the problem.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: Not necessarily the right way.

Mr. Molson: In 1949 the right hon. Gentleman's successor, the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) was Chairman of the same Committee. He went into the matter again, and in


paragraph 7 of the 1949 Report of the Committee on Road Safety, he said:
' A speed limit should never be imposed, however, unless there is clear justification for it: otherwise, drivers tend to disregard it and this inevitably creates difficulties for the Police, as well as tending to bring the whole system of speed limits into disrepute. In our view, the effectiveness of any measure such as a speed limit depends primarily on the willing co-operation of drivers.
This road, with which I am so familiar, stretches for a distance of about 2,000 yards. On the north side there is no development at all. On the south side. Prince Charles Avenue comes into it in the middle, and that is where a number of accidents have taken place. On the stretch which my right hon. Friend derestricted, after the lighting had been put up, there is no vehicular access at all. There is only one access for pedestrians. The further length of road, which the hon. and gallant Member for Derby. North desired to see restricted, has no access of any kind.
This is a clear example of a road on the outskirts of a town where, although there is housing development on one side of the road, the planning of it has been good; where as a result there is only one vehicular access and one pedestrian access, and in the rest of which there is no access at all. On the other side there is no development of any kind. It is a clear example of a road—in accordance with the principles laid down by the Road Safety Committee at the time when the right hon. Member for Derby, South presided over it and subsequently when this problem was again considered under the chairmanship of the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East—which is entirely suitable for fast moving traffic and where the development on the south side of the road has been so planned that there is no need for a speed limit to be applied.

Group Captain Wilcock: Would not the accident rate show that all the Ministers concerned are entirely wrong?

Mr. Molson: The hon. and gallant Member will have an opportunity of discussing that with his right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South and of explaining to him that he fell into error and that afterwards the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East followed him into the same error.

Group Captain Wilcock: And the hon. Member as well.

Mr. Molson: I resented the tone of the right hon. Gentleman's reference to some of these accidents. For example, he has complained to my right hon. Friend that
while he was considering the position, a cyclist was killed."—OFFICIAL REPORT. 14th November, 1956; Vol. 560, c. 939.]
That was at a time when the 30 m.p.h. speed limit was still in operation.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: That is no reason for removing it.

Mr. Molson: Yes, indeed it is. The motorist in question was convicted of driving to the danger of the public. He was driving at the rate of 45 miles an hour, was fined £10 and had his driving licence endorsed. What is the use of imposing a 30 m.p.h. speed limit when the fatal accident which took place was due to the motorist ignoring the speed limit? I am sure he would have been convicted in exactly the same way of driving to the danger of the public, even if there had not been a speed limit.
The right hon. Gentleman complained about other accidents. He said: "Three weeks ago a child aged seven ran out into the road." When a child of 7 runs into the road, it does not make much difference whether there is a 30 m.p.h. speed limit or not. If the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to look at the Highway Code he will find a calculation there that a car with good brakes, on a good surface, travelling at 30 m.p.h., takes 45 ft. to pull up. That is why, when we are dealing with road safety, as I have been lately—and I have gone about in the "Mind That Child" campaign—we have urged upon parents not to regard a 30 m.p.h. speed limit as a safeguard, but to see that very young children are under the care of some older and more responsible person.
Thirdly, the right hon. Gentleman referred to another accident which occurred to an old lady. She stepped out from behind a bus from which she had just alighted. The fourth case he referred to was that of an old lady, aged 80, who was killed by a bus. A bus, in any case is subject to a speed limit of 30 m.p.h.; therefore it makes not the slightest difference whether there is a 30 m.p.h. limit or not on the road.
The right hon. Gentleman also referred to the case of a motor cyclist being


killed. I have no record of that accident and therefore have not the opportunity of giving an explanation of it.
The accidents to which I have referred and have explained all illustrate the fact that it is a complete non sequitur to say, as the right hon. Member and the hon. and gallant Member opposite have done, that because there are a number of accidents upon a road it necessarily makes the imposition of a 30 m.p.h. speed limit desirable.
We are concerned about the number of accidents upon this road, although it is not larger than takes place on many roads of a similar kind in all parts of the country. It is for that reason that we are putting up a concrete post and chain link fence from Kingsway to Prince Charles Avenue. We aim in that way to keep pedestrians from infiltrating on to the road from the housing estate. As the

right hon. Gentleman mentioned, we are also building a footpath 6 ft. wide on the south side. These are measures which should structurally improve the road. We hope they will result in a reduction of accidents.
I am bound to say that I have thought it right to deal with this matter in an outspoken manner, although perhaps no more outspoken than the tone in which the right hon. Gentleman criticised my right hon. Friend and myself, and I think it desirable to make it quite plain that the principles laid down by the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend when they occupied my position have been justified and confirmed by experience. For that reason we see no reason to depart from them.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes to Eleven o'clock.